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The ship acquisition process consists of the development
and production of a ship and its systems by organizations
bound into a structure by existing laws, regulations, and
practices. One of the major determinants of efficiency and
effectiveness of this process is the correlation of the
structure with the tasks associated with acquisition of the
ship. Real and/or perceived problems are indicated in the
process by adverse publicity and management actions. The
thesis contains a review of organizational theory relating
structure, tasks, conduct and performance. The structure
and tasks associated with ship acquisition are examined and
an example is provided from the Patrol Frigate design
showing the relationship of structure and tasks.
The author concludes the ship acquisition structure is
not theoretically well matched at a point in time with the
tasks it is required to perform and a coordinated longitudinal
investigation of the weapons acquisition process is needed.
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There is no generally accepted framework for considera-
tion of the interaction of organizations. Part of the purpose
of this study is to explore the potential methods for
approching such a study. The shear magnitude of the
relationships possible within the weapons system acquisition
process incredibly complicates such a study. If only the
five major players in the ship acquisition structure are
considered, there are 10 relationships between pairs of
organizations that are possible. If the 18 significant
players which will be identified in the thesis are considered,
153 relationships between pairs of organizations are
possible. A general framework for consideration of such a
large structure is presently beyond the standard works in
organizational analysis.
This thesis is being directed at two levels of readership,
those with a significant knowledge of the weapons acquisition
process and those with only a basic understanding of the
process. For those already knowledgable , this thesis will
provide a checklist of building blocks and a framework for
consideration of the structure as a whole. For those
having only a basic knowledge, the thesis will additionally
provide a broad overview of the structure, tasks, conduct
and performance of the ship acquisition process. The
reader who is familiar with contemporary and historical
13

organizational theory may wish to omit reading Chapter II,
The reader familiar with the details of the Weapons System
Acquisition Process may wish to omit Chapter III and those
familiar with naval ship construction may wish to omit
Chapter IV.
Finally, background descriptions of existing organization
doctrine, of the structure of the ship acquisition process
and of tasks associated with ship acquisition are being
provided without value judgements. It is the author's
intention to provide, in terms of existing organizational
theory, a framework with which the existing methods of ship
development and construction and present ship acquisition
structure can be considered. With these tools, the author
feels that the entire structure can be evaluated once





A. SCOPE OF THE THESIS
The ship acquisition process consists of the development
and production of a ship. The process starts from the
recognition of need for a ship, proceeds through the design
of the ship, including integration of the individual ship
systems, and continues through the production and deployment
of the ship. Associated with this is the development and
production of individual system that will be incorporated in
the ship. This process is accomplished by large organizations
within the government and private industry that are bound
into a structure by existing laws, regulations and practices.
The news media and various individuals and groups within
the government have reported significant real and/or perceived
problems with the ship acquisition process. These problems
generally relate to difficulties experienced in meeting the
original goals of cost, schedule and performance in the
development and construction of the ship and to changes
made during this period. In the following sections of this
chapter, the views of three major weapons system acquisition
critics will be reviewed. Problems inherent in the use of
cost, schedule, performance and specification or mission
changes as measures of effectiveness will also be discussed.
The author concludes that these measures are valid, though
subject to measurement error, if the final product of the
15

process is the ship. Other goals of the process, such as the
support of social programs, and the ability to actually fight
a battle, are difficult to quantify and/or observe, but
should be considered by a decision maker evaluating the
process
.
The major organizations involved in the ship acquisition
process are large bureaucracies, exhibiting the characteristics
of traditional bureaucracies. The full range of organizations
contributing to the process exhibit or should exibit charac-
teristics of organizations varying from almost classic
bureaucracies to open organizations. This is based on the
premise that the structure of organizations determines their
conduct. When the structure and conduct of the organizations
are compared with the tasks required to be done by the
organizations, performance can be predicted. In other words,
the structure should be appropriate for the task required of
it. The theoretical background for this view will be discussed
Provided the value of the correlation of the structure
and tasks of an organization, the structure and tasks of the
ship acquisition process will be examined. The structure of
the ship acquisition processes is made up of the organizations
of the Department of Defense, the Executive Branch (for this
thesis, exclusive of the Department of Defense), the Legis-
lative Branch, the Judicial Branch and Contractors,
Coordinating and directing mechanisms, the defense system
acquisition review process, the demand for systems and the
means of financing the ship. Each of the major elements of
16

the structure is made up of subelements that further complicate
the relationships. To provide a basis for comparison, the
thesis describes the organizations and the connecting factors
that the author feels are relevant to the ship acquisition
process. The tasks associated with the acquisition of a
ship are then described in order to contrast them with the
structure.
An example of the relationship of structure and task from
the design of the Patrol Frigate (FFG-7) is provided. The
use of the Patrol Frigate project for research was largely
dictated by availability, but the example demonstrates the
effect of apparent mismatch between that portion of the
structure applicable to the case in question and the tasks
to be accomplished. The resultant changes to the ship were
very costly to the Navy.
The author concludes that the ship acquisition structure
is not theoretically well matched with the tasks required
of it at any specific point of time. The changes in the
characteristics of the tasks over the period of the ship
acquisition are not matched by a commensurate change in the
structure. The decision maker must, of course, weigh the
costs of the resulting performance against the costs of
changing the structure to arrive at a "best" solution. He
must also consider the other goals of- the elements of the
structure.
The recommendations resultant from this study are:
1. That some measure of output of staff groups within the
17

ship acquisition structure be implemented. Allocation
of operating funds to staff groups through Project
Offices in a manner similar to industrial funding is a
potential means for initiating this form of evaluation.
2. That an attempt be made to better match the timing of
the change of key personnel associated with a ship
acquisition project to the major changes in the tasks
associated with the development of the individual systems
and with the development and construction of the ship
itself
.
3. That the development of the individual systems through
proof of the basic concept be separated from the
development and construction of the ship.
4. That a coordinated study of all facets of ship acquisition
be conducted. This study should be consider the means
by which each organization in the process transforms
inputs to outputs, the relationship of the organizations
to each other and to the structure as a whole and the
effects of changing one part of the structure on the
other parts of the structure. Each phase of this study
should consider the entire acquisition process, including
the effects of the earlier phases of the process on the
later phases and the resulting output.
B. THE PROBLEM
Each year Congress, in effect, decides how the limited
resources of the United States shall be divided between the
private sector and the national government of the economy by
the passage of appropriation legislation. They further
decide how that portion of the resourses allocated to the
national government shall be divided between national defense
and other competing needs for public goods and services.
Finally, they specify, within the funds appropriated for
national defense, how much shall go to each major defense
sector. Within these sectors it is broken into subsector
and alloted by service. Examples of subsectors are:
Procurement, Missile, Army; Procurement, Vessels, Navy and
18

Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Air Force, The
subsectors are further broken into items called Programs,
such as Patrol Frigate and Nuclear Attack Submarine - both
under Procurement, Vessels, Navy.
Since 1960, the defense budget has consumed less than
50% of the national budget and has shown a generally
decreasing trend. As a percentage of Gross National Product,
the defense budget has also shown a decreasing trend.
Although the amount of current year dollars appropriated to
the budget has continued to increase, inflation has kept the
level of funding in fixed year dollars relatively constant.
(35:pp. 26-31.)
Navy shipbuilding, conversion and repair funds have,
however, stayed relatively stable in relation to general
inflation when measured by the Gross National Product (GNP)
def later. They have also remained a reasonably constant
percentage of Gross National Product itself. '^ ' The
same may be said for Navy Research and Development. This
stable fixed year dollar budget has been overtaken by an
even faster rise in shipbuilding costs. While the GNP
def later rose an average of 8.3% per year between 1970 and
1975, shipbuilding costs have been increasing from 15 to 22%
C49- D QQ)
annually. ' y ' ' Additionally, ships are becoming more
sophisticated, raising the procurement costs of each
succeeding generation of ships, even when measured in fixed
year dollars. Based on a sample of defense systems and on
the assumption that procurement funds will be available at
19

current levels, the Commission on Government Procurement
estimated that there is a shortage of about five billion
dollars in procurement funds needed in 1972 to maintain
planned force levels for their selected sample. $190
million of this was required for Navy shipbuilding. ' p * *'
Thus, the Navy department is faced with the dilemma of
rising costs in the face of limited resources. In the author's
view, six solutions to this dilemma are possible. The
Department of Defense can:
Reallocate resources between programs and sometimes obtain
reprogramming authority from Congress
Obtain higher than planned appropriations from Congress in
succeeding years
Reduce the number of units to be procured and deployed
(force levels)
Reduce the rate at which units are procured and deployed
while reducing the rate at which units are retired from
the active forces
- Reduce the operational capability of the individual units
in order to increase the quantity procured.
Improve the efficiency of the weapon system acquisition
process.
Although the shifting of funds between programs that
accomplish the same mission could theoretically put the
money to more efficient or effective use, discussions with
senior weapons procurement officials indicate that actual
shifting is usually done based on the desire to keep the
program operating at the same rate instead of efficiency or
effectiveness of use. Even if increased efficiency or
effectiveness of funds usage was the goal of shifting, the
difference in missions between programs would make comparison
20

of cost effectiveness difficult if not impossible in most
cases
.
Obtaining higher funding from Congress in succeeding
years is often included in long range planning. A review of
successive Department of the Nave Five Year Defense Plans
shows that Congress seldom provides the additional funds to
make up the short falls of previous years. As a result,
dependence on this method of solution has proved less than
satisfactory
.
Reduction in the quantity and rate of procurement is
the principle method of reducing procurement cost practiced
by Department of Defense. The reduction in the rate of
procurement results in more time for inflation to act on
the later items in the procurement. As an example, the
estimated unit price of an SSN 688 Class submarine went from
$203 million to $229 million when its procurement was
( 31
)
slipped two years. ' This represents a 6.2% total price
change. Most of this change can be considered as coming
from inflation based on the Selected Acquisition Report
presentation. If the inflation of 15-22% cited by Admiral
Kidd remains in effect, the cost would rise to between
$268 million and $302 million. Learning curve benefits
would also be lost by reducing the production rate in
relation to personnel turnover. Reduction in force levels,
^ * u ^ • • „(19:p. 107)on the other hand, has "caused increasing concern.
"
v
As an example, the Commission on Government Procurement quotes




"At these stratospheric price levels, there has been
a tendency in the Pentagon to cut back on costly weapon
orders , . . when costs under a given contract begin to
escalate. Our committee has suggested that this sort of
backing and filling would leave us with forces inadequate
to perform their assigned missions. "^^'P* 107)
The Department of Defense is currently attempting to
design some new systems to a unit cost in an attempt to
reverse the trend of decreasing force levels and increasing
unit costs. ^ p ' ° ' The cost of the Patrol Frigate,
designed under this concept has increased only 18.6% over
the development estimate, net of escalation. If the unit
cost is examined including escalation, however, the cost
has risen 86.6%.
The final solution is the increase in efficiency of the
weapons acquisition process. Thousands of pages of testimony,
several books and many studies have been devoted to this
subject. Opinions vary widely on who or what is the culpret
and what the appropriate "fix" is to the problem. Most
observers have concentrated on segments of the weapons





whole. '*' ' Their recommendations thus dealt with only
a small portion of the process. In the author's view,
those who claim to take an integrated view of the acquisition
process did not look at the structure as a whole, including
all of the relationships of the various parts of the
structure. This does not imply that some solution or
combination of these solutions derived from these studies
would not improve the process. The opinion of the author is
only that if the effect of a change to one part of the
22

structure in relation to its effects on other parts of the
structure is not considered, there is a significant
chance that unforeseen results will ensue. The resistance
of the structure to change is also generally not considered.
The gravity of the situation v/as described by Senator
Chiles in his opening statement to the hearing on Major
Systems Acquisition Reform in June 1975:
"I think it's worth spending a minute to step back and
look at what we are talking about when we hear the words
"major systems acquisition."
"To most people, the words mean C-5's; F-lll's; and
other weapons like the F-16 and F-18 air combat fighters we
used as a case example in earlier hearings....
"To most people, major systems also means a heck of a
lot of money: $80 million for a B-l bomber: $1 billion
for a Trident submarine or a nuclear carrier: $8 billion
for a space shuttle program: $150 billion worth of weapons
systems underway, according to Defense Department accounts:
$1 trillion worth, according to one witness..,.
"Then, again, to most people, major systems means
waste; cost overruns; missiles exploding; planes crashing;
programs canceled; engines falling apart; loose wheels
rolling down the runway; contractor buy-ins and contractor
bailouts ....
"Our weapons acquisitions programs - no matter how
good they might look to the military; no matter how bad
they might look to the critics -- they have not looked
good enough to either enjoy or deserve the confidence of
the American taxpayers who are footing the bill.
"We are simply not getting every dollar's worth of
defense that we know we could be getting out of our , gg 1-2}
technology, our industry, our defense establishment."
Headlines like "U.S. Failing to Hold Down Arms Costs"
(Los Angeles Times, August 23, 1975) ,- "Defense Dollar Ripoffs
Assailed" (Monterey Peninsula Hearld, November 28, 1975)
and "Pentagon Says Cost for 50 New Frigates is Up $1.88
Billion" (The Wall Street Journal, November 20, 1975)
23

reflect this concern, A sampling taken from the June 1975
Selected Acquisiton Reports of 11 major ship and shipborne
weapon systems showed an average growth in unit cost from
development estimate to current estimate of 54.9% for ships
and 41.9% for weapons. This does not present the entire
picture, though, as ships cost growth varied from 25.9% to
119.8% and weapons varied from 13.6% to 58.1%. With cost
growth of this magnitude and so much bad publicity, improve-
ment would appear to be necessary.
Three of the major views of the weapons acquisition
process are provided by the Commission on Government
Procurement, the Government Accounting Office and Senator
Proxmire. These views are presented in the following
paragraphs
.
C. THE COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT
Created by Public Law 91-129 in November 1969, the
Commission on Government Procurement was charged to:
"study and investigate the present statutes affecting
Government procurement; the procurement policies, rules,
regulations, procedures, and practices followed by the
departments, bureaus, agencies, boards, commissions, offices,
independent establishments , and instrumentalities of the
executive branch of the Federal Government; and the
organizations by which procurement is accomplished to
determine to what extent these facilitate the policy...
"... of Congress to promote economy, efficiency, and
effectiveness in the procurement of goods, services and
facilities by and for the executive branch of the Federal
Government by-
(1) establishing policies, procedures, and practices
which will require the Government to acquire goods,
services, and facilities of the requisite quality and
within the time needed at the lowest reasonable cost,




(2) improving the quality, efficiency, economy, and
performance of Government procurement organizations and
personnel
;
(3) avoiding or eliminating unnecessary overlapping or
duplication of procurement and related activities;
(4) avoiding or eliminating unnecessary or redundant
requirements placed on contractor and Federal procurement
officials
(5) identifying gaps, omissions, or inconsistencies
in procurement laws, regulations, and directives and in
other laws, regulations, and directives, relating to
or affecting procurement;
(6) achieving greater uniformity and simplicity whenever
appropriate, in procurement procedures;
(7) coordinating procurement policies and programs of
the several departments and agencies;
(8) conforming procurement policies and programs,
whenever appropriate, to other established Government
policies and programs;
(9) Minimizing possible disruptive effects of Govern-
ment procurement on particular industries, areas, or
occupations
;
(10) improving understanding of Government procurement
laws and policies within the Government and by organi-
zations and individuals doing business with the Government;
(11) promoting fair dealing and equitable relationships
among the parties in Government contracting; and
(12) otherwise promoting economy, efficiency, and
effectiveness in Government procurement organizations
and operations ." (20)
The study approach was built on three points:
"The system acquisition process draws on the base of
technology to create systems to meet national needs.
"The process includes a set of basic steps that must
be taken by any agency in any acquistion program.
"Different public and private sector institutions are
called on to play roles in order to execute each of the
basic steps. "Tl9:p. 28)
The study defined the four basic steps that must be
taken in any acquisition program as: Establishing the needs
and goals, exploring alternative systems, choosing a preferred
system and implementing the system. Implementation of the
system included final development, production and deployment
25

and operation. The study then considered the individual
role of each of the principle institutions of the major
system acquisition structure in carrying out each of the
(19: p. 28)
steps. v ^ J
1 . Establishing the Needs and Goals
Three principal problems were perceived by the
Commission in the way needs and goals for major systems
acquisition programs were established:
- The statement of need did not clearly separate
the problem from the solution.
- Needs were defined by each military service with
little or no formal agencywide coordination.
- Congress did not have oversight into the need for
new acquisition programs.
The Commission Concluded that:
"The responsibility for identifying and defining defense
mission needs that require major system acquisition programs
has been delegated to each military service. This contri-
butes to some unplanned duplication of new systems from
different services to meet similar needs.
"The first decisions on needs and goals for new
acquisition programs significantly affect the kind of
system eventually procured. Current statements of needs
and goals focus on a preferred system product and not on
its purpose. This contributes to rising unit costs and
the rnultimission character of new systems.
"Balancing of program cost, capability and schedule
goals is difficult because they are largely predetermined
by the "need" for a particular kind of system.
"OSD and the military services do not have consistent
hierarchies of defense mission needs. This makes it
difficult to coordinate the allocation of resources, mission
responsibilities of agency components and needs and goals
for new system acquisition programs.
"Roles and mission overlap causes competition among
the military services that directly affect the statements
of needs for new programs and the size, cost and character
of new major weapon systems and permits unplanned overlap
in systems and "their capabilities.
26

"Current budgeting and funding procedures do not
facilitate congressional debate on policy, priorities for
different kinds of agency mission capabilities or the
related needs and goals for new acquisition programs."
(19:pp. 52-53)
The Commission's view of the existing pattern of estab-
lishing needs and goals for new acquisition efforts is shown
( 19 • p 41 )in Figure l. v y They recommended that new system
acquisition programs be started with agency head statements
of needs and goals that have been reconciled with overall
agency capabilities and resources. The program needs and
goals should be stated independently from any system product,
using long-term, coordinated projections of mission capabil-
itie and deficiencies. The responsibility for responding
to needs would be assigned in such a way that either one
agency would be responsible or competition between agencies
would be formally recognized.
The Commission further recommended that congressional
budget proceedings begin with an annual review by the
appropriate committees of agency missions, capabilities,
deficiencies and the needs and goals for new acquisition
. . , . . . , . (19:pp. 53-54)programs as a basis for reviewing agency budgets.
The full text of the recommendations of the Commission on
Government Procurement is given in Appendix A.
2. Exploring Alternative Systems
The Commission felt that the technology base was
inadequately developed to serve new acquisition programs and
the search for candidate systems. The formulation of alter-
native systems in their view, suffered from premature
27
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commitment to system concepts and preliminary designs because
of a predetermined design linked to a statement of "need" and
the motivational pressures of agency components responsible
for creating new systems. Competition in system acquistion
was deemed ineffective because the government required
contractors to compete to develop and produce a "required"
system, not offering their best, low cost solution and
Congress and the agencies are placed at cross-purposes by
the procedures for financing system exploration. * pp * °~ 1J )
Figure 2 is an illustration of the existing basic pattern of
exploring alternative systems as observed by the Commission.
(19:p. 64)
The Commission felt that the practices of creating
and developing alternative systems need:
"Alternative technical approaches, to hedge against
changes in mission need and the inability to predict the
outcome of technical activity
"A minimum of technical constraints when seeking
solution. Selection of early system ideas should be based
on the exercise of judgment using agency mission goals and
operating constraints as a standard.
"Flexibility to discontinue, modify funding support,
or accept new alternative system candidates as the need
arises
.
"Explicit competition between alternative systems to
motivate competing design teams to seek low-cost but
adequate solutions.
"Concentration on solving elemental problems of a
system before committing to final system development.
"An initial, limited contractual commitment between
the Government and each competing contractor, sequentially
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"Maintenance of worthwile competing designs up to
selection for final development; a recognition and under-
standing that only the best alternative will enter
production. "(19: p. 85)
These needs were addressed in Recommendations 3 through
6, as shown in Appendix A.
3. Choosing a Preferred System
The major problem in choosing a system, in the view
of the Commission, was that financial and other pressures
encouraged commitment to a specific system concept too early.
The range of technological choice and innovation is narrowed
while available research and development information is
low-confidence in nature. They felt that an early choice
was successful only when "the agency retained total system
responsibility and gave itself options for changes, cost-type
contracts were used for high risk portions of the program
and the best talents in industry and Government could be
( 19 • p 95
)
brought to bear on major technical problems."
In order to gain accountability, the Government had
initiated multiple staff reviews, regulations and decision
layering -- practices that the Commission felt produced
"nonproductive costs" that were necessary to an extent, but
were not seen or accounted for and "did not measurably
improve the system product." Transfusion of desired technical
features was seen as narrowing the differences between
contractors to the point where selection processes depended
on proposed prices at a time of great technical uncertainty.
This practice, in turn, created an environment condusive to




Recommendations 7 and 8 were designed to limit
premature system commitments and retain the benefit of system-
level competition. The Commission would retain the advantages
of agency head decision based on competitive demonstration
of candidate systems. Agency head approval would be needed
if an agency component determines that it should develop a
single system without exploration of alternate candidates.
The recommendations and related actions are provided in
Appendix A.
4 . System Implementation
The Commission found that "the effectiveness of the
implementation phase depends on how well the earlier
acquisition phases were accomplished. When the earlier
phases are not conducted well or are not done, a tremendous
burden is placed on functions carried out in the implemen-
tation phase. "( 19:p - ") 80-90% of the ultimate program
costs are preset in the stages before engineering design
. . (89: p. 31)begins . * '
In their study, the Commission observed that about
15 percent of the cost growth in major programs during the
1960 's could be attributed to imprecise cost estimates. The
major reasons for avoidable cost growth were: System
advocacy and premature commitment, misuse of price competi-
tion, overlapping development with production, demands for
unachievable performance, demands for increased performance
within present technology and sole-source development. The
other major problem areas noted in this phase were the
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inadequacy of test and evaluation, inadequacies in contract-
ing and problems in the management of programs.
Some increase from the initial estimate was felt to
be certain to occur due to human fallibility in estimating,
imperfect information and the optimism of Government and
industry program advocates. It was further noted that the
longer the time period covered by an estimate, the more
likely the estimate will be unrealistic. They further found
that "decisions to propose a major system program for congres-
sional approval have often been made before high-risk system
features have been resolved and before realistic cost esti-
mates can be made, leading to cost growth." This results in
systems entering final development and production at costs
so much higher than planned that force levels are being
substantially reduced. "^' "' Based on these findings,
the Committee recommended strengthening the agency's cost
estimating capability and withholding selection of a candidate
system until alternatives are adequately explored and un-
certainties have been narrowed acceptably.
In relation to contracting, it was found that:
"When system acquisition uncertainties are reduced to
an acceptable level in early development, the use of
priced production options in contracting for final develop-
ment may be advantageous and should be permitted.
"Special contract clauses involving limits of Government
obligation, contractor total system- responsibility , and
contract changes represent efforts to fix problems rooted
in early acquisition phases. Such clauses do not correct
these problems; rather they increase the complexities of
contracting and administration and some tend to generate
contract claims and disputes.
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"Procurement regulations have developed into voluminous
detailed documents that do not accomodate the flexibility
and experienced judgment needed to accomplish major system
program objectives."
Recommendations were made to allow the use of contracting
as a tool of systems acquisition instead of substituting it
for management of the program. The specific recommendations
are found in Recommendation 10 in Appendix A.
The problems of management included:
- Lack of focus of authority and responsibility for
policymaking and monitering of programs and the results
of specific policies
- Management layering, overstaffing and redundant reviews
and coordinations
- Inconsistancies between policies governing the
structure of new system acquisition programs and those
governing the procurement tools and contracting tech
techniques
- Assignment of program managers after essential perfor-
mance and cost characteristics have been set.
These problems lead the Commission to recommend the
unification of policymaking and monitoring responsibilities
for major system acquisitions within each agency and agency
component and the delegation of authority for all technical
and progra.m decisions to the operating agency components
except for the decisions defining mission needs and goals,
approving systems for fabrication and demonstration, approv-
ing full production release. These are Recommendations 11
and 12 in Appendix A.
5. The Results
In June 1975, E. Perkins McGuire, Former Chairman of
the Commission on Government Procurement summed the
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recommendations of the Commission with;
"These recommendations would facilitate the acquisition
of major systems by; Highlighting the key decisions for
all involved organizations -- Congress, agency heads,
agency components, and the private sector, defining the
role of each participating organization, and giving
increased visibility to Congress and agency heads by
providing the information needed to make key program
decisions
.
"These recommendations stress the need of a clear
understanding of the mission for which funds will be needed
and a determination of who will be responsible to carry out
that mission.
"They stress the orderly development of a system, once
its need is established, utilizing to the maximum extent
available know-how, both in Government and industry, with
particular attention to the so-called front-end decisions
being made only when adequate data are available to make
them. I believe that these recommendations will foster
more meaningful competition and increased innovations that
will give us better and less costly hardware
.
M (° J • P
•
^°)
He further noted that though the executive branch
supported the thrust of the recommendations, they had not
come to agreement on how to implement them in the time that
they had held the report — over 2 years. ' Mr.
Robert R. Judson, former Deputy Director of Commission
Studies, Commission on Government Procurement, had the same
feeling, saying "I would have to see clear evidence of
management reform before I would concede that DOD had made
any significant movement, whether they embrace the principles
* +x * +• * „(89:p. 40)of the recommendations or not."
In this author's view, the first question that is apparent
is "Why weren't the recommendations implemented?" They
seem logical enough and would appear to provide the best











































bit further, although the Commission on Government Procure-
ment stated that "To improve system acquisition, not only
procedureal impediments but also the roles, objectives, and
motivations of the participating organizations must be
considered," there seems to be very little in depth look at
the relationships of roles, objectives and motivations
between the participating organizations. As a result, there
seems to be little thought given about how to implement the
recommendations and what possible resistance there might be
to their implementation.
D. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE
In June 1972, the Chairman of the House Armed Services
Committee expressed the Committee's "deep concern over the
problem of unforeseen cost escalation in military procure-
ment" and asked the Government Accounting Office (GAO) to
"make its own independent study of the bases for cost




Comptroller General responded with the report Cost Growth in
Major Weapon Systems dated March 26, 1973. The report found
that 25% of the cost growth was due to estimating errors,
30% was due to inflation and 45% was due to changes in
. (21:p. 26)
requirements.
1 . Cost Estimating
Planning estimates, development estimates and
current estimates are the three estimates that are provided
for a weapons system. The first, the planning estimate, GAO
found to be "characteristically low compared with subsequent
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developmental estimates." This was felt to be due to lack
of definition of the system in the early stages of develop-
ment and "powerful incentives «— for example, to gain
general approval for the new system -- to keep the estimate
low." The more mature development estimate was found, in
the 45 systems sampled by the GAO, to be 15% greater than
the planning estimate. Finally, the periodically updated
current estimate provides the most recent view of what the
program is to cost. This estimate includes variations for
quantity changes, engineering changes, anticipated inflation,
cost overruns, estimating errors from the development
estimate, etc. The GAO found the current estimate to be 39%
greater than the planning estimate and 20% greater than the
it * • 4- • j-u 4.^-3 (21:pp. 11-14)development estimate in the cases studied. ^ '
GAO found that in the past cost estimates were
frequently based on contractor estimates, which relied
almost exclusively on the industrial engineering, or "bottom
up" estimating approach. By this approach, the cost of each
part of the system, including evaluation of design effort,
testing, etc., is estimated and a cost estimate is derived
from summing up the costs. GAO recommends the use of param-
eters of the new system to derive the cost of the new
(21: pp. 11-14)system v*
2. Greater Capability Demanded
In the view of GAO, "most resources are invested in
systems to replace systems to perform the same types of
missions. The successive generation of systems which follow
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this pattern push state-of-the-art frontiers and, of course,
costs increase with each increment of improvement. This
technological momentum can be expected to drive costs up no
matter how well the programs are managed,"^ p * ' In
a review of 13 weapon systems, GAO found that research and
development costs were 5.4 time predecessor costs and unit
costs were 4.2 times predecessor costs while performance
increased only 1.8 to 3 times the performance of the
predecessor. The examples of a 20% cost increase in the
SSN 688 propulsion cost over the SSN 637 Class propulsion
cost and the greater than 600% cost increase of the MK 48
torpedo over the MK 37 torpedo are cited. The performance




GAO's criticism of acquisition management centers on
revisions to the specifications — time schedules, quantities
or engineering changes. They felt that much of this type
of cost growth comes from unrealistic performance targets at
the outset of the project. This results, in their view, from
challenging the state-of-the-art frontier too much and trying
to develop and produce the system too fast, including
concurrency (beginning production before full-scale develop-
ment and testing have been completed).
4 Recommendations
The Comptroller General felt that actions to improve




~ "Making the right decision at the outset on what to
develop and for what purpose
- "Applying lessons learned about slippages and overruns
- "Strengthening the overall management of the systems
acquisition process . "(21 :p , 41)
In order to ensure the right decision at the outset,
GAO recommends that a consensus be achieved by the Office of
the Secretary of Defense, the applicable service and Congress
on the operational need, the system characteristics, and the
expected level of resources required before commitment to
acquisition. Strengthened staff support for the Secretary
of Defense to allow more comprehensive and objective analyses
of missions and weapons requirements is recommended and
strengthening of congressional review by examination of the
budget by major missions within each service is espoused.
To apply lessons learned about slippages and overruns,
GAO would require weapons system acquisition managers to:
- "Avoid concurrent development and production and adhere
to orderly and sequential design, test and evaluation
- "Stress austerity, small design teams, freedom to
innovate and maximum competition in the design phase
with clear separation of development and production.
Encourage continuous development of subsystems.
- "Adopt contracting practices and Government-contractor
relationships which will encourage the most effective
team performance.
- "Continue to improve the Government's capability to
develop cost estimates covering the development phase,
as well as the production phase, of new systems.
- "Emphasize life-cycle costing to gain better perspective
on proposed new systems and strengthen cost-effective-
ness analyses."
Finally, to strengthen the overall management of the
acquisition process, GAO recommends that the emphasis on
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upgrading the competence, stature and tenure of program
managers and procurement specialists be continued and that
independent test and evaluation organizations "independent
of the user" be established in each military department,
reporting directly to the Secretary of Defense or to his
deputy. Finally they recommend that one of the deputy
secretaries of Defense assume the responsibility for mission
, i+ • -4.- (21:pp. 54-55)analysis and system acquisition. ^ y
In the author's view, there is no clear tie within
the report between the symptoms (cost growth, overdemands
on performance and schedule slippage) and the structure that
produces them. As a result, the recommendations are of two
types: Entreaties to discontinue the symptoms and structural
changes that are not related, within the material presented
in the report, to the solution of the problem. It is not
clear, for instance how strengthening the Secretary of Defense's
analysis staff, creation of an independent Test and Evaluation
organization and assignment of a deputy secretary to mission
analysis and system acquisition will aid in the desire to
"stress austerity, small design teams, freedom to innovate
and maximum competition in the design phase." It would
appear that increasing these staffs would place a greater
requirement on the projects for information, requiring the
project office to increase its size to provide the informa-





One of the better known and perhaps the most vocal critic
of the Department of Defense weapons system acquisition
structure is Senator William Proxmire, (D) Wisconsin. In
his testimony before the Subcommittee on Federal Spending
Practices, Efficiency, and Open Government of the Senate
Committee on Government Operation, Senator Proxmire stated:
"Hundreds of millions of taxpayer dollars are being
lost, given away, and literally stolen each year because
Government officials from the President down to procurement
officers in the Department of Defense are either failing
to exercise their legal responsibilities under the law
or violating the spirit and the letter of the law."(89:pp. 3-4)
He cites those who feel that cost overruns, gold plating,
schedule slippages, performance failures, and bailouts are
only symptoms of more basic problems, but feels that search
for the original cause is futile for:
"...in a fundamental sense it does not matter what
the origins of our problems are so long as the people
with the power to solve the problems are either too weak
to use their power or too corrupt to properly use it."
(89:pp. 3-4)
In summary, he feels that a lack of accountability on the
part of the people in the procurement process and a lack
of prosecution of responsible parties are primarily
responsible for the problems of weapons acquisition.
He goes on to say that the prevalent attitude in private
industry is that "...if you are dealing with the Government
you can take as much money as you can get , by one means or
another .<<(89:p. 4) and that the muxtiple layers of subcon-
tractors, pyramiding costs and profits, provide enormous
opportunities for mistakes and abuses under the present
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system. In regard to Congress he feels that ".... every time
Congress winks at a cost overrun and goes along with a bail-
C89* n 4)




In the way of solutions, Senator Proxmire cites the
renegotiation program, with the Renegotiation Board strength-
ened and the "loopholes" removed from the act, and the Cost
Accounting Standards Board, with the depreciation standard
upheld. With relation to the recommendations of the
Commission on Government Procurement, he particularly support-
ed the proposition that Congress exercise it's responsibilities
through greater involvement in key acquisition decisions,
that Congress increase its capability to moniter acquisition
programs and the funds being spent on them and that meaning-
ful competition be established, starting with the earliest
stages of research and development. He felt that the defense
establishment should be required to deal with their problems
in the fashion a commercial organization or Congress would —
by bringing them out in the open, not covering them up. For
officials who were found "incompetent or malicious,"
-a- -i -i i v. +u (89:pp. 6-15)dismissal would be the proper response.
Early in the testimony, Senator Proxmire made a very
telling statement:
"We in Congress can pressure the executive branch to
change their regulations and we can pass new laws until
we are blue in our Capitol face. Our efforts will be
worthless so long as procurement abuses go uncorrected
and so long as procurement abusers go unpunished ."( 89 : P
•
In view of this author, if neither pressure nor legislation
can be used to solve the problems as viewed by Senator
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Proxmire, then the causes must lie somewhere deeper in the
existing structure of the weapons acquisition process. Hence
to change the performance and conduct of the process will
require examination of the structure and how it relates to
conduct and performance, followed by a change in the
structure with due regard to the effects of the change on
all facets of the structure.
These three views of the problems of weapons acquisition
represent, in the author's view, a spectrum of the criticism
provided by many authors in a large quantity of studies.
The List of References provides other resources for the
reader who is interested in further pursuing additional
atudies in this area.
F. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS
The ultimate measure of the effectiveness of a weapons
system is its ability to be used to win a war or to provide
a creditable deterrence against war. War is too infrequent
and occurrence to be routinely used to measure the effective-
ness of a system. Significant data is derived from operational
performance and battle damage reports when a war does occur,
but another measure of effectiveness (MOE) must be used to
evaluate a weapons system in a peacetime environment. For
weapons intended for deterrence purposes, one can observe
that there is no war, but it is seldom possible to gain
other that an inferred insight into how much greater the
effectiveness was than the amount needed to deter.
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The surrogate measure most commonly used is the operation-
al capability of the weapons system under simulated wartime
conditions with constraints applied to the tests as required
to ensure safety, to remain within the requirements of the
law, to hold costs under imposed budget constraints, etc.
This measure of operational capability, along with the
number and types of weapons systems in the force determine
the material effectiveness of the force. From projected
material readiness required to meet perceived future threats
and the status of the existing force, a requirement for a
new weapon system with a specific set of operational charac-
teristics and a. set delivery date can theoretically be
derived. Schedule and performance compliance, then, are
the two routinely used output measures of the weapons
system acquisition process.
The amount of resources required to produce and operate
the weapon system is the input measure of the system. This
is routinely measured as the purchase price of the weapon
system and more recently as the total cost of all resources
required to procure and operate the system over the lifetime
of the system. Another view of resource use can be gained
by observing the utilization of the resources or measurement
of the resources expended on the product as compared to the
resources used by the process as a whole. The resources
may be used not only to produce the weapons system, but to
provide for social programs such as equal opportunity, small
business assistance and full employment, for maintaining the
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industrial base to meet expanded weapons requirements, for
the personnal use of the owners of corporations and other
people in the weapons acquisition process, etc.
1 . Schedule and Performance
The critical point in the schedule is the Initial
Operational Capability (IOC) date. This is the date that
the weapons system is to be introduced to the fleet. Mile-
stones are established for the development and construction
of the system based on this date and are used to provide a
measure of compliance during the various phases of weapons
system acquisition. Variation between actual accomplishment
of events and scheduled accomplishment are indications that
either the IOC date will not be met or a variation in
resource input is required to meet the date. Unfortunately,
in the opinion of some senior personnel associated with the
weapons system acquisition process, the IOC date is artifi-
cally established and routinely changed. This reduces the
credibility of schedule variation as a measure of effective-
ness .
Theoretically, the performance characteristic
requirements of the weapon system are derived from the
mission requirements of the system. Actually, on many
occassions the performance requirements are established by
estimating the upgrading of existing systems that is possible
or the possible output of a new technology. From these
performance requirements, a number of specific test require-
ments are derived to test individual systems, sub-systems
46

and components. Successful performance is defined as meeting
or exceeding the test requirements. Since the requirements
are not always related to mission requirements, their value
as measures of effectiveness is open to question.
2. Cost
Although the total cost of a weapon system throughout
its entire life from inception to retirement (life cycle cost)
is the preferred measure, it is seldom used in the actual
evaluation of a weapons system acquisition because of the
difficulty in gaining data. The establishment of personnel
costs and the allocation of system command overhead are
examples of difficulties in assigning costs to any specific
weapons system. When predictions of life cycle costs are
used in system selection and tradeoffs, the process is
doubly difficult because of the uncertainties introduced by
considering long periods of time. For a ship, the total
life can be 20-30 years and a feeling for the difficulty can
be derived from considering the ability to predict 1976 prices
or force structure in 1936-1946. The problem with using
procurement price is that it encourages trading short term
gains in construction costs at the expense of long term gains
in reduced operating, maintenance or personnel costs. Even
procurement costs are difficult to obtain, for every ship
uses some government furnished equipment and information,
with many ships using significant amounts. These costs are
not covered under the prime contract for the ship and are
frequently hard to trace to the specific ship. Again like
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schedule and performance, the existance of unaccounted costs
makes the use of routinely developed cost figures difficult
as a measure of effectiveness.
a. Cost Estimating
Parametric estimates, Engineering estimates and
Learning Curve estimates are the three types of cost estimates
generally associated with weapons system procurement.
Parametric estimates are derived by extrapolating costs from
the actual costs of previous systems and correlating these
costs with physical or performance characteristics of the
system. Examples of the characteristics used are speed,
range, displacement and horsepower. Engineering estimates
are derived by summing the estimated costs of the detailed
components of a system. The estimated cost of the detailed
components may be obtained from analysis of specific work
to be performed, experience on similar components or by
parametric estimates of detailed components. Learning curve
estimates apply to items that are produced in quantity and
are made by extrapolating the actual cost of precious units
based on the assumption that a proportionate reduction will
take place as production continues.
Parametric cost estimates are best when there
is limited design information available for a particular
system and is the only feasible method prior to or during
the concept formulation phase. Parametric estimating has
difficulty in accounting for changes in technology between
system, such as a shift between the use of aluminum and
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titanium, the latter being much more expensive per pound.
The more expensive Engineering estimate requires detailed
information, hence can not effectively be done until detailed
proposals have been received. It is then still subject to
the uncertainties that the design itself experiences, but
has the potential of being a great deal more accurate than
the parametric estimate. Learning Curve estimates have
proved to be very accurate in large production run situations.
They do require previous production of the same product,
hence are generally inapplicable to early program estimates
except in computation of expected reduction in the cost of
follow units. A problem common to all methods of estimating
is that they rely on past information, thus past inefficiencies
are reflected in the estimates of the new system. Even if
they were entirely accurate, they rely on a certain quantity
of the system bought at a specific time. When the quantity




Biases may be introduced into a cost estimate either
inadvertently or by design. Market sensitive or unscrupulous
contractors can purposely "buy-in" on a contract by providing
a low bid, intending to make the overall contract profitable
through the funding of changes they feel the Government will
surely make. Transferrance of technical information between
contractors and conceptual specifications that are too tight
lead to competition on price alone, which encourages "buy-
ins." Lean defense procurement budgets invite optimistic
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estimates to get the program started, based on the feeling
that once started programs are seldom cancelled. Finally,
the general optimism found amongst most development groups
and program advocates has a tendency to lead them to under-
estimate the risks envolved in the program, resulting in
low cost estimates with insufficient allowance for unknowns,
b. Cost Growth
Cost growth is neither new nor unique to weapons
systems. In ancient Rome, based on the works of Edward
Gibbon, "... the young magistrate, observing that the town
of Troas was indifferently supplied with water, obtained
from the munificence of Hadrian three hundred myriads of
drachms (about a hundred thousand pounds) for the construc-
tion of a new aqueduct. But in the execution of the work
the charge amounted to more than double the estimate, and
the officers of the revenue began to murmur.." Fortunately
for the young magistrate, Julius Atticus met all of the
extra cost out of his pocket, silencing the wrath of the
revenue collectors. Today, with no Julis Atticus around,
( 7 9 • p 2
)
the taxpayer must bear the brunt of cost overruns.
In more recent times, a contract was awarded
by a public utility for the delivery of a reactor core within
four years for $55 million. As of the original delivery
date, the manufacturer had run out of- money and was not
able to make delivery. The reactor core was delivered
several years later and the cost overrun was some 200% of
(79
•
d 4 )the original price. '*' ' In the public arena in recent
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years, the cost overruns in the Rayburn Annex to the House
( 7 9 d 4)
of Representatives Office Building are classic. '
Even the Library of Congress is not exempt from cost growth.
The library's new James Madison Memorial Building is present-
ly up to 160% of its initial cost estimate and hasn't yet
been completed. As an interesting aside, there is presently
a difference of opinion concerning the use (or operational
requirements) of the building. "* ' p ' ' As described later
this change in operational requirements is a problem common
to weapons systems.
The three major direct causes of cost growth in
a weapons system are low cost estimates, inflation and
j i (21:p. 26) T .. .. ,system and program changes. In the author's
view, cost growth due to estimating is apparent cost growth
which depends only on the state-of-the-art of cost estimating
If this were the only cause of growth and the state-of-the-
art in cost estimating were to increase to the point where
accurate cost estimating was achieved, all of the original
inefficiencies of the weapons acquisition process would
remain. It is cost growth, however, that brings a major
share of the "bad press" received by weapons system acquisi-
tion. It behooves the organizations within the weapons
acquisition structure, therefore, to do something about
cost growth, whether real or apparent-, to ensure the proper
allocation of resources and the most effective and efficient




General inflation will result in inflation in
the weapons acquisition process. This is based on the fact
that organizations involved in the development and manufacture
of weapons systems must compete in the market place for
material, services and finances with the civilian sector of
the economy. When the prices for goods that are common to
both markets go up, the prices for goods required by the
weapons systems producers will also go up. In addition to
this, there are limited facilities capable of producing some
types of defense systems. When these are in demand heavily
by the civilian sector, as was the case with shipyard space
when tanker construction was at its peak in the late 1960 's
and early 1970' s, inflation 2 to 3 time the national rate
may be experienced in some sectors of weapons acquisition.
When tight defense budgets or technical problems
delay a program, the effects of inflation are felt to an
even greater extent. If it takes 4 years to build a system
and 10% annual inflation is assumed, labor and material costs
will be 46% higher in the fourth year than in the first
year. If the program slips, for any reason, to 5 years,
the costs will be 61% higher than they were in the first
year. Hence inflation acts not only to increase the costs
in its own right, but magnifies effects of schedule changes
as well
.
3. System and Program Changes
The system and the program may be changed to take
advantage of technicological advances, to fix errors, to
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respond to mission changes or to accomodate resource changes.
Any one of these changes normally affects cost, schedule
and/or performance. The magnitude of the effect on each will
be a function of the relative utility of meeting cost,
schedule or performance goals within the structure of the
acquisition process.
Technicological improvement routinely take place in
a given field over a period of time. Hence the second
generation of a weapons system performing essentially the
same mission as its predecessor can be expected to take
advantage of the improvement in the state-of-the-art unless
some external constraint is imposed. A major difference
between a ship and most other weapons system is the time
required for design and construction. The longer time
required for ship design and construction means that state-
of-the-art advances can be expected to occur throughout the
process. The system acquisition organization is then faced
with the decision to either accept a ship with technology
that is several years old upon delivery or accept the
consequences of disruption in the production process by
incorporating changes before delivery.
Design problems, manufacturing problems and supplier
problems can all cause disruption in the system or program.
The design and manufacure of a ship is such a complex task
that there will almost certainly be human error which will
result in the need for a "fix." Depending on the magnitude
of the error, there can be a significant effect on cost,
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schedule and/or performance. Most of the components used on
a ship and many of the systems are manufactured at some
location other than the shipyard, usually by some manufacturer
other than the shipbuilder. This provides the potential for
schedule slippage and/or cost increase when the equipment
does not arrive in time to support the installation schedule.
The mission of the weapons system may change because
the threat for which it was designed changes, because inter-
pretation of the threat changes or because the mission was
not adequately defined before the process started. If the
threat changes, the weapons system acquisition organizations
are faced with the alternative of either modifying the mission,
therefore the operational characteristics, of the weapons
system or finding some other way to meet the revised threat.
The usefulness of the system in its present configuration
must be weighed against the cost of modification and a
decision made. The ability to start an entirely new system
and have it operational to meet the revised threat in a
timely manner is also considered. In some cases, changes
in senior personnel in the acquisition process will result
in a different view of the threat. This can markedly change
the mission requirements and specifications of a ship.
Finally, if the mission is not adequately defined, its later
definition in the procurement process may result in changes
in operational requirements — with changes in equipment
and configuration the natural result.
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A change in the resourses available to the process
will have a direct effect on the resultant output. As an
example, decrease in appropriations for the program or a
decrease in available construction facilities will generally
result in a schedule slippage and a cost increase. A less
obvious example is that decreased manning in the Navy may
result in less personnel available to man the ship. This
means that allowance must be made for a smaller crew, less
watchstanders and/or maintenance personnel and more




II. VIEWS OF ORGANIZATIONS
In order to explore the dysfunctions of the ship aquisi-
tion process, a theoretical framework of the structure of
organizations must be established. This chapter will
establish the correlation between the structure, conduct and
performance of large organizations. The applicability of
specific structures to certain types of tasks will be examined
A . BUREAUCRACY
1 • History and Definition of Bureaucracy
One of the first management theorists was Henri
Fayol, a French industrialist, who in 1916 published his
observations in Adm inis tration Industrielle et Generale. In
this work he put forward his fourteen principles of effective
management. These included the division of work, the defini-
tion of authority, the requirement for discipline, the
necessity of unity of command and direction, the subordination
of individual interests to general interests, centralization,
chain of authority and other values considered necessary to
the optinum operation of an organization. In 1937, following
the pattern established by Fayol, Luther Gulick and Lyndall
Urwick popularized such principles as fitting people to the
organization structure, recognizing one top executive as the
source of authority, adhering to unity of command, using
special and general staffs, departmentalizing by purpose,
process, persons -and place, delegating and utilizing the
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exception principle, making responsibility commensurate
with authority and considering appropriate spans of
. , (48: pp. 58-60)
control . 1 ^ '
The real father of the Bureaucractic analysis was
Max Weber, a member of the staff of the University of Berlin.
His real contribution to the study of organizations was his
theory of authority structures. His interest in the reason
why people obeyed commands led him to make a distinction
between power, the ability to force people to obey, regard-
less of their resistance, and authority, where orders are
voluntarily obeyed by those receiving them. Under the author
ity system, the issuance of directives by a superior is
seen by those in a subordinate position as a legitimate
exercise of that role. Organizational types were then
characterized by the way that authority was legitimized.
Weber recognized three pure types: "charismatic," which
depended on the qualities of the leader to set himself apart
from other men, "traditional," which depended on precedent
and usage, and "rational-legal," which depended on a well
understood organizational goal and formal rules. The
"charismatic" form of an organization was typified by a
small scale revolutionary movement either religious or
political in form. The early factories of Henry Ford and
the beginnings of the Office of Naval Reactors displayed
many of the attributes of this form of organization. The
patrimonial and feudal forms of organizations are dependent
upon the traditional form of authority. Although these are
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typical of forms of government no longer commonly gound, they
are not untypical of some family owned corporations. The
rights and expectations of the group are established in terms
of taking what has always happened as sacred, depending upon
custom to regulate the system.
The term "Bureaucracy" was used to describe a form of
organization based on the rational-legal form of authority.
The system is "rational" because the means are expressly
designed to achieve certain specific goals. It is legal
because authority is exercised by means of a system of rules
and procedures through the office which an individual occupies
at a particular time. Contrary to the popular usage of the
word as synonymous with inefficiency, an emphasis on red
tape, and excessive writing and recording, Weber states that
a bureaucratic organization is technically the most efficient
form of organization possible. Precision, unambiguity,
speed, knowledge of files, discretion, continuity, unity,
strict subordination, reduction of friction and minimization
of material and personal costs all reach an optimum point in
4.-, u , • • 4. 4.- (75:pp. 19-22)the strictly bureaucratic administration.
Weber's work has served as a point of departure for many
organization theorists, Richard H. Hail, for instance,
suggested that bureaucratization is a continuim whose degree
can be determined by measuring the following six dimensions:
division of labor based upon functional specialization,
definition of the heirarchy of authority, the completeness
and exactness of the system of rules covering the rights
and duties of positional incumbents, the scope and depth of
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the system of procedures for dealing with work situations,
the impersonality of interpersonal relations, and the formality
and adherance to a system of promotion and selection for
employment based upon technical competence. In the "ideal
bureaucracy" these dimensions would all exist to a high
degree, where a less bureaucratic organization would have
them to a lesser degree. Study of large-scale, complex
organizations indicate that these dimensions are always
present in varying degrees/ ,p ' ^ Given the presence of
these dimensions, their advantages and disadvantages to the
ship acquisition process must be examined.
2 , Advantages and Disadvantages of Bureaucracy
Max Weber's view of the principle advantage of a pure
bureaucracy is:
"Experience tends universally to show that the purely
bureaucratic type of administrative organization-that is,
the monocratic variety of bureaucracy-is , from a purely
technical point of view, capable of attaining the highest
degree of efficiency and is in this sense formally the most
rational known means of carrying out imperative control
over human beings. It is superior to any other form in
precision, in stability, in the stringency of its discipline,
and in its reliability. It thus makes possible a particular-
ly high degree of calculability of results for the heads
of the organization and for those acting in relation to
it. It is finally superior both in intensive efficiency
and in the scope of its operations, and is formally capable
of application to all kinds of administrative tasks."
(93: p. 24)
With regard to the people operating within such an
organization, there can be no question in their minds just
where they stand within the heirarchy, what they must do
to advance, and the exact requirements of their job. This
approach will provide the "rational" man with the comfort of
the security derived from a certain situation.
59

The first major drawback to the bureaucratic approach
to organization is its dependence on a constant task to
accomplish. An organization perfectly designed to do one
task will be less efficient in doing any other job. A direct
analogy can be drawn to a machine specifically designed to
do one job. Although it may be more efficient and less costly
than any other way of doing that job, it fails miserably when
required to accomplish some other task. When the machine is
designed to be capable of adaptation to several jobs, effi-
ciency is lost in the specific accomplishment of a single
job. This may be overshadowed, or at least offset, by the
reduction in capital investment realized when the machine is
capable of handling changes in the product manufactured. The
organizational equivalent is the saving realized in not having
to retrain the workers as the product changes.
The second major drawback to a bureaucratic system is
the requirment for a constant input to the system. This
implies that the environment, as viewed by the organization
must remain constant. As a result, organizations must "buffer 1
themselves from environmental influences, anticipate those
environmental changes that cannot be buffered against and
ration their resources when the environmental influences can-
not be controlled. The organization necessary to do this is
clearly "overhead" though it is not clear whether a "buffered"
bureaucratic organization is more efficient in handling
changes in the environment than one specifically designed to
handle a wide spectrum of environmental changes. It is the
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author's hypothesis that this would depend upon the rate and
magnitude of the change.
A third factor which throws doubt on the viability of
the bureaucratic approach is the nature of the organizational
members themselves. A bureaucratic system assumes that people
can be found that exactly fit the requirements of the position
in the heirarchy and that they will act entirely in accordance
with the organization's desires, The studies of numerous
researches have shown that the conflicting roles of the in-
dividuals within the organization make the belief that indi-
viduals can be made to work like well oiled machines is a
naive approach at best. James G. Marsh and Herbert A. Simon
also identify the fact that there are limits to an individuals
cognitive abilities which restrict the extent to which he
can make rational decisions in or out of the organizational
context. Thus an individual has a tendency to "satisfice"
instead of optimizing, which results in something less than
C 44
•
dd 14-22 )the totally rational approach. '^K * These three
factors cast doubt on the applicability of bureaucratic
organization to the weapons acquisition process.
B. STRUCTURE, CONDUCT AND PERFORMANCE RELATIONSHIPS
1 . Relationships
Graham T. Allison describes three basic conceptual
models that can be used to describe the operation of a large
organization. The first model, the Rational Policy Paradigm,
explains conduct as a group of actions chosen by the
organization. Under this model, the organization selects
Gl

actions that will maximize the goals and objectives of that
organization. Although this type of model is frequently
used by analyists, it assumes a unity of purpose within an
organization that is seldom found. The second model is the
Organizational Process Model. Under this model, organiza-
tional behavior can be understood as the output of the
organization functioning according to standard patterns of
behavior. In order for large numbers of individuals to
accomplish a complex task there must be coordination. Coor-
dination, in turn, requires the use of standard operating
procedures: rules according to which things are done.
"Programs" must be established to assure the reliable per-
formance of action that depends upon the behavior of hundreds
of people. The Bureaucrat ic Politics Model is the third
type used by Allison. In this model, the decisions and
actions of a large organization are essentially political
outcomes. What happens is not chosen as a solution to a
problem but rather results from compromise, coalition, com-
petition and confusion among organization officials who see
different faces of an issue. It is considered political
because the activity from which an action is derived can be
(l:pp. 689-711)
best described as a bargaining process.
The structure of a process is made up not only of
the formal organization of the players in the process, but
of all the rules that govern their performance. Hence in
each of Allison's models, knowing the structure in which the
decisions are made provides an ability to predict the outcome
02

of the process. With a predictable outcome, or conduct, we
can compare this conduct to some theoretical optimum to
evaluate the performance of the process. Structure, conduct
and performance are thus inexorably tied together. If we are
dissatisfied with the performance of a process, we must make
changes in the structure of the process to achieve any real
change in the performance.
2 . S trengths and Weaknesses of the View
The greatest strength of the view that structure
generates conduct which can be measured in terms of perfor-
mance is that it works. Structures have a strong tendency
to produce predictable conduct and performance that is based
on the form and details of the structure itself. Further,
by modifying the structure of a process involving large
organizations, the conduct and hence the performance is
changed. The converse is generally not true. Attempts to
modify the performance without modifying the structure are
not generally successful. On the other hand , modifications
made to the structure without fully considering all of the
facets of the structure and their relationships frequently
results in performance other than that which was desired
when the modification was made.
The weakness of this view is that the model looks at
an aggregate of the process as a whole and doesn't allow for
the individual differences of the personalities of the
players. This can provide a certain sense of futility to a
person in the lower level of the organization who must live
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within the structure without any real power to change it.
The model also explains the mean performance and, while
allowing for observed variance from the mean, has a tendency
to neglect the exceptions to the "rule." Structural changes
which may improve the system as a whole by improving a number
of the elements of the structure may degrade other segments
of the structure by overly restricting their freedom to
operate
.
3 . Results of Changes
The magnitude, character, source and rate of change
all effect the results of a change to the structure of a
process. A large organization exibits significant inertia
that has a tendency to resist change and if change is thrust
upon it, it either builds a buffer mechanism to reduce the
effects of the change on the organization or accomodates
itself to the change in a fashion designed to cause the least
disruption in the organization.
That the results of major changes of structure, like
the creation of large project offices for the development of
POLARIS and nuclear propulsion would have a significant effect
on the conduct of their development comes as no surprise.
What is of greater interest is the effect of relatively
minor changes like the addition of the requirement for
environmental impact statements. Though these may only be
a vehicle for getting some other job done, some of the smaller
changes to the structure can have far reaching effects upon
the conduct of a process.
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Changes that evolve from natural changes in tech-
nology or as a natural result of market forces are much more
easily accepted into the system than changes imposed on the
system. In the latter case, the general question is of the
legitimacy of the authority of the superior to order a change
of the type or scope of the one ordered. The introduction
of rocket technology met far less resistance than the attempt
by Admiral Zumwalt to introduce sweeping social change into
the Navy.
C. VIEWS OF ORGANIZATION
1 . Bureaucratic Model
There exist, in the concepts of Max Weber, eight
requisites for "legal authority." These are required to
have a truly bureaucratic organization. The requirements
were:
(1) A continuous organization of official functions bound
by rules.
(2) A specified sphere of competence, which included
obligations to perform functions which were marked
off as part of a systematic division of labor, the
authority to carry out the functions and a clearly
defined and controlled "means of compulsion."
(3) An organization of offices following the principle of
heirarchy. This was considered to have a system of
appeal, however.
(4) Rational rules which regulate the conduct of an office.
(5) Separation of the means of production or administration
from the membership of the administrative staff.
Officials, employees, and workers attached to the
administrative staff do not themselves own the non-
human means of production and administration.




(7) Administrative acts, decisions and rules are formulated
and recorded in writing.
(8) The Purest exercise of legal authority is through the
the use of a bureaucratic administrative staff, but
other forms of administration can be used to exercise
legal authority . (93: pp. 19-21)
These traits are generally considered independent and
can obviously not be found in their entirity in any specific
organization, but can conceptially be used as yardsticks for
measuring how "bureaucratic" an organization is. This author
has found no specific to measure of the traits or way to
combine them, but a relative "feel" can be obtained. Assumed
within the entire philosophy is the fact that the organization
has some specific purpose and the organization is operating
to accomplish that purpose.
The Bureaucratic Model represents one pole of a
continuum of organization types, that can be applied to
acquisition of a ship. The other pole of this continuum is
the Open System Model.
2. Open System Model
The next major revision in thinking about how an
organization should operate came from the behavioral sciences.
Called an open or organic system, it was contrasted against
the bureaucratic system. In this context, the bureaucratic
system is referred to as a closed or mechanistic system.
The emphasis was placed on human factors and the way people
behave within an organization instead of concentrating on
the structure and task inherent in accomplishing the purpose
of the organization. (48:p * 7?) The organization is viewed
6G

as a transformation system that takes various inputs, changes
them and provides an output. The open system is considered
to be in continual interaction with its environment, achieving
a dynamic equilibrium with continual inputs of people,
material, money and ideas. It was further recognized that
the people within the organization brought with them the
effects of roles they had outside the organization. Hence
a person could not be considered just a "foreman," but also
had to be considered a father, a Boy Scout leader and a
. -
-r- v i (48:pp. 109-111) „, , „member of a specific church. ^ ' The needs of
the individual were examined across the spectrum of his
whole life instead of just looking at his role within the
organization
.
As with the bureaucratic model, it was not felt that
the open system ever really existed in reality, but served
to act as a yardstick against which an organization could
be measured. Bertram M. Gross set forth the following goal
for an open organization:
"The performance of any organization or unit thereof
consists of activities to (1) satisfy the varying interests
of people and groups by (2) producing outputs of services
or goods, (3) making efficient use of inputs relative to
outputs, (4) investing in the system, (5) acquiring
resources, and (6) doing all these things in a manner that
conforms with various codes of behavior and (7) varying
conceptions of technical and administrative rationality."
(48:pp. 161-162)
This model was, however, considered as a desirable objective
for all organizations. Recognizing that the goals of the
various participating groups in an organization are frequent-
ly in conflict and that it is rarely possible to maximize
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the goals of any one individual or group, it was felt that
an organization should "satisfy" the goals of all participants
in order to maintain their participation. pp '
The open system model provides the other pole of the continuum
of possible organizations applicable to weapons acquisition.
Neither is considered viable, but are only used to illustrate
the ends of the scale.
3 . Mixed System Model
Other management specialists feel that neither the
bureaucratic model nor the open system model is the "answer"
to "proper" management of an organization. Rather, they feel
that the task being accomplished by the organization must
dictate the structure of the organization. They feel that
an organization that exibits more bureaucratic traits is the
proper one for a high volume, low change production process.
A system that is more open is appropriate in answer to a low
volume demand of a highly variable nature. The open system
provides the ability to handle a high rate of change, unproven
and uncertain techniques and a large number of continencies
.
If an innovative thrust is desired within an organi-
zation while continuing to achieve the economies of bureaucracy,
a mixed system is desirable. Some portions of the organiza-
tion would be structured as a bureaucratic system while others
would operate as an open or organic system. Typically, the
research and development effort would be structured along
organic lines. These organic sections are characteized by
the devolution of staff services to the specific line
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organizations, decreasing relevance of rules and regulations
covering non-productive functions, high individual skill
levels with more dependence on "professionalism" and a more
decentralized control of the groups within the section. The
production effort, on the other hand would be more bureau-
cratic. There would be specific rules covering working
hours, a highly delineated chain of command and narrowly
defined responsibilities. Other tasks would require struc-
ture somewhere on the continuum between these two. A machine
shop working on short run job orders should not be structured
like either an automobile production line or a research
laboratory, but should be somewhere in between the two.
Variability and analizability are variables used to
define the degree of uncertainty of the task to be accomplish-
ed by an organization. The first, "variability or stimuli"
is a measure of the number of non-routine inputs to the
organization. When a familiar order is received, the
recipiant knows "exactly" what to do, hence requires no
"search behavior." If the stimuli is unfamiliar, the recip-
( 7 *3 * t\ 7 C \
ient must "search his mind" for the response.
Thus an increase in "variability of stimuli" (or exceptions
to the routine) results directly in an increased "search
behavior." The degree to which search procedures are
analyzable is another variable of a task to be accomplished.
If the response to the stimuli is known or can be found by
a set routine such as finding it in a book or retreiving it
from a computor, the method of analysis is analyzable. If
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innovation or intuition is required, then the task is un-
analyzable to the degree that this trait is necessary to
accomplish the task. If these two variables are cross-
classified we can define tasks as craft, nonroutine, routine
and engineering. Figure 4 shows the relationship between the
variables and these decisions. The manufacture of automobile
distributor caps (cell 4) is an example of a routine task
that requires an analyzable search and experiences few
exceptions. The design of made to order, proven technology
machines, like drill presses and electric motors, is an
example of an engineering task (cell 3). The manufacture
of fine glassware is an example of a craft task (cell 1) as
the operation is quite routine, but a great deal of intuition
is require to achieve the proper mix of glass and handle it
properly. Finally, the development of a laser weapon system
. . . ...
,
(73:pp. 75-80)is a non-routine task (cell 2).
The appropriate response to the variation in task
type is a variation in the structure of the organization
responsible for the accomplishment of the task. The struc-
tural characteristics chosen by Charles Perrow to describe
the structures applicable to each task are: the discretion
of subgroups; their power; the basis of coordination within
a group; and the interdependence of individual groups. Within
a given task type, the structure is not generally the same
for middle management, which is defined as the people who are
concerned with the supervision of production. Figure 5 shows
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appropriate to the various tasks. In a nonroutine organi-
zation both discretion and power are high in middle and lower
management. Coordination is through feedback (mutual adjust-
ment) rather than through advance planning (programmed) and,
finally, the interdependence of the groups is high. ' pp '
Another observation of organizations is their tendency
to move toward a bureaucratic structure. One explanation
for this is that as the size of an organization increases,
there is a need for more coordination. This can lead to a
more formalized communication system and more specific des-
criptions of the tasks to be accomplished by each group.
Further, if economies of scale are to be realized, a shift
to the use of less skilled personnel is required. This




, + ,, i ,,(73:pp. 50-91)which leads to more " rules.
Under this view of an organization, five types of
goals are distinguishable:
(1) Societal goals. Referent: society in general.
Examples: produce goods and services: maintain order:
generate and maintain cultural values.
(2) Output goals. Referent: the public in contact with
the organization. This category deals with types of
output defined in terms of consumer functions.
Example: consumer goods; business services; health
care; education.
(3) System goals. Referent: the state or manner of
functioning of the organization, independent of the
goods or services it produces or its derived goa]:
Example: the emphasis upon growth, stability, profits,
or upon modes of functioning, such as being tightly
or loosely controlled or structured.
(4) Product goals (or more exactly, product-characteristics
goals). Referent: the characteristics of the goods
or services produced. Example: an emphasis upon
73

quality or quantity, variety, styling, availability,
uniqueness or innovativeness of the products.
(5) Derived goals. Referent: the uses to which the
organization puts the power it generates in pursuit
of other goals. Examples: political aims; community
services; employee development; investment and plant-'
location policies which affect the state of the
economy and the future of specific communities.
(73:pp. 135-136)
A final point is that this view of organizations also
represents a continuum. A task requiring custom craftsman-
ship falls somewhere between the craft and nonroutine
categories. Even within a category there can be a variation,
as one could say that the manufacture of airplanes is less
routine than the continuous processing of oil or chemicals.
(73:p. 82)
Another type of mixed organization is the "mattrix"
organization. In this type of organization, managers are
assigned to each functional group and to specific products.
The product (or project) managers responsibility extends
across all functions that are required for his product. This
form of organization has the advantage of having one manager
directly responsible for a specific product but provides
complicated lines of communication and authority.
4 . Quantification of Government Bureaucracy
An attempt has been made by Malcolm Dole to approach
the government as a "firm," whose decision makers attempt to
maximize a utility function subject to some specific con-
straints. He assumes "equal ownership" of the "firm," with
each voter having one vote, and uses "efficiency" and
"personnel" as his two decision variables. The public
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decision maker is presented as having a utility function
containing these two variables. Efficiency is defined as
the difference between value created and value foregone in
the allocation of the bureau's budget. Because the benefits
of actions in the public sector are rarely measurable, the
level of output is assumed given to the bureau and efficiency
is attained by minimizing the cost of attaining the output.
Since efficiency is obviously not the only variable
influencing the government decision maker, there had to be
some other factor. Possible candidates were power, prestige,
patronage, security, salary, ease of workload, agency bigness
and growth, etc. Because of the complexity of an analysis
in the face of the number of possible variables, personnel
was chosen as a surogate measure that best represented these
other variables. Personnel is defined as the number of
personnel supervised by the decision maker. Although there
is no direct relationship, there is enough correlation
between the number of people supervised and the budget,
prestige, power, flattery, patronage, security, salary,
promotion and advancement of the decision maker to make it a
.. ^ (33:pp. 6-18)
reasonable proxy for the other attributes.
Given these two variables, an economic analysis is conducted
.
. (33:pp. 6-18)
to describe the actions of a government bureau.
In the view of this author, minor difficulties arise
from the assumptions that all voters have equal power over
the "firm" and that the output of a bureau is given. The
existance and effect of power groups and the variation in
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services received from many bureaus make these assumptions
difficult to support for anything other than a theoretical
analysis. A graver problem can be seen in the assumption
that the bureau works in a rational fashion to achieve the
maximization of the utility function. Too many public
officials have decried their inability to accomplish their
goals
,
to believe that they succeeded in maximizing.
This is believed by the author to be due to frequently
hidden constraints such as the inability to exert sufficient
influence on the bureau's unweildy structure or the require-
ment to negotiate with some other bureau with conflicting
and sometimes hidden utility functions. The proof of a model,
however, is in its ability to predict and Dole's economic
model of a bureaucracy does indeed describe general trends.
5. A Popular View
The popular view is perhaps best characterized by
the works of C. Northcote Parkinson and Lawrence J. Peter.
Parkinson's Law and The Peter Principle have become phases
in everyday use in the United States in the description of
large organizations, particularly the government. Parkinson
observes that "work expands so as to fill the time available
for its completion," "the number of the officials and the
quantity of the work are not related to each other" (the
number of officials increasing without respect for the job
to be done), "the time spent on any item (of budget) of the
agenda will be in inverse proportion to the sum involved,"
and that a committee, like a plant "takes root and grows, it
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flowers, wilts and dies, scattering the seed from which
(72)
other committees will bloom in their turn." These
traits, along with the others described by Parkinson, are
all too often observed by anyone who has been in a large
organization not to lend credence to them. The "Peter
Principle" that "In a hierarchy every employee tends to rise
to his level of incompentence" has also been observed by
most of us. ' p * Both of these are really descriptions
of observable phenomenum and, in the author's view, fail to
provide sufficient central theory to develop an adequate




If an organization or group of organizations is viewed
as a system, then a system boundry may be described. External
to the boundry, the environment provides the inputs to the
system, accepts the outputs of the system, gives direction
to the system and provides feedback based on the output of
the system. Inside the boundry the system may be broken
into the organization contained and the task it is accomplish-
ing. With this sort of division, the organization, the tasks
and the environment can be described in terms of variables
that will describe each of the major elements.
The following are some of the potential variables
affecting the weapons acquisition process as practiced by
the organizations involved. Some of the listed variables
are directly quantifiable, for example the size and number
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of levels in an organization. Others are subject to
qualitative investigation, like the accuracy and timeliness
of information flow, but defy ratio scale description in
"number of errors and omissions per communication" for
instance. Still others, like adaptiveness , have no unit of





Variables that may be used to describe organizations
associated with the weapon acquisition process are:
Size: The number of people directly employed by the
organization. (44 :pp. 112-119)
Levels: The number of layers of management. '^'
Organizational Complexity: The number of individual




Shape: The type of management used, varying on a
scale between bureaucratic and open, including mixed
system, decentralized control, etc.(48:p. 101)
Core system technology: The type of task around
which the organization is built, varying between




Age: The length of time that an organization has
been in operation, measured in years.
Rate of Management Turnover: The number of changes
of management personnel per year, per operating cycle
or during the duration of the project .( 57 :p . 120)
Organizational goals: The objectives for which the
organization is striving
(1) Social: value to society in general
(2) Output: value to those who receive the output of
the organization directly
(3) System: smoothness of system functioning




Internal Feedback: The clarity and frequency of
status information flow from within the system





Permanance: The length of time that an organization
can be expected to remain in existance. This variable
generally relates to an organization created to
accomplish a specific set of tasks with the expecta-
tion that the organization will be dissolved when the
tasks are complete.
Adaptiveness : The ability of an organization to change
its structure to meet changes in the environment or
the tasks it is required to accomplish.
Staff/Line ratio: The number of people with staff
functions compared with the number of people assigned




Organizational Dependence: The extent to which an
organization is dependent on other external organi-
zations to accomplish tasks assigned
.
(59
: pp . 61-63)
Physical Barriers: The physical proximity of the
members of the organization to each other and to
those exercising control over the organization.
(73:p. 115-116)
Formality: The degree to which operations are
controlled through formal communications. A
measure of the use of formal, recorded communications
vice informal, unrecorded communications such as
telephone conversations and informal meetings.
(44:p. 68)
Control: The degree to which superiors control the
actions of subordinates. This may be observed by
the freedom subordinates have in expenditure of
funds, setting production goals, observance of rules
and directives, etc.(57:p. 57)
Information flow: The accuracy and timeliness of
information flow from the source to those who need
the information to accomplish their function . (44 : pp
.
283-293)
Political power: The abii ity of an organization
to obtain the desired resources. This measure is
applicable to an organization embedded within a
bureaucracy and not subject to the normal market
relationships, (33: pp. 6-18)
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— Interface size: The number of people dealing with
external organizations.
2 . Task Variables
The kinds of variables that can be used to describe
the tasks accomplished by the weapons system acquisition
structure include:
— Value: The worth of the task being done. This is
variously considered in terms of cost of the product,
budget for accomplishing the task, budget for the
task in relation to some standard (DOD Budget, total
Federal Budget or GNP) or the utility of the task in
relation to alternative uses of the resources.
Duration: The length of time required to complete
the task. (59:p. 115)
— Task Complexity: The number of different disciplines
required to accomplish the task (physicists,
mechanical engineers, accountants, etc.).(57:p. 120)
Risk: The amount of uncertainty involved in
accomplishing the task from internal or external
sources. It may be expressed in probabilities that
unforeseen changes will take place before the task
is complete .( 57
:
p . 117)
Difficulty: The degree of technicologica] or
scientific advancement required to accomplish the
task. This dimension varies from the requirement
to go through the entire development process to the
installation of existing equipment in a routine
fashion. (73: pp. 76-80)
Task differentiation: The degree to which product
(ship, airplane, etc.) differs from others capable of
performing the same function (mission) .( 15 : pp . 18-22)
Visibility: The amount of coverage by outside organi-
zations (news stories, editorials, investigations,
etc. )
.
— Chain length: The number of people that a communi-
cation must pass through to accomplish a task.
(44:pp. 269-273)
— Approval pyramid size: The number of people who
must approve the task or its method of accomplishment
to have the authority to do the task. The number of
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people within the organization who provide opinions
relating to approval or disapproval must also be
considered
.
— Task dependence: The extent to which completion of
a task or sub-task is affected by other tasks or
sub-tasks. (59: pp. 61-63)
3. Environmental Variables
The principle contributor to the environment of each
organization involved in the weapons acquisition process is the
other organizations involved in the process. If the organi-
zations within the weapons system acquisition process are view-
ed as a system of organizations, then a significant part of the
environment for the systems remains other organizations exter-
nal to the system. As a result, the variables of the type used
to describe organizations within the weapons system acquisition
structure can also be used to describe those external to the
structure. If a variable has an effect on the conduct of an
organizational external to the weapons system acquisition
structure and that organization has an effect of the structure,
then the variable becomes an environmental variable as viewed
by the structure. The effect of the variable on the structure
may be of a different magnitude or direction than its effect
on the organization external to the structure.
Variables that may be used to describe other facets
of the environment are:
— Types of inputs and outputs: The characteristics of
the resources provided by the environment to the
organization and of the output produced by the
organization. (44: pp. 298-300)
— Competition for inputs: The number of uses for re-




— Competition for outputs: The number of uses for
outputs of the system. (73: pp. 127-130)
— Political climate: The value of the system and the




Economic conditions: The general health of the





External Feedback: The clarity and frequency of
status information flow from sources external to
the system relating to the output of the system.
External Control: The type and frequency of commands
or directives from sources external to the systems.
E. THE APPLIED STRUCTURE, CONDUCT AND PERFORMANCE FRAMEWORK
In the view of the author, a synthesis model containing
the Rational Policy Model, the Organizational Process Model
and the Bureaucratic Politics Model is required to explain the
structure and conduct of an organization. The Rational Policy
Model can be used to explain the formally promulgated goals
set by an organization. It is against the standards of these
Rational Policy Model goals and society's overall goals that
the performance of the organization can be measured. If the
output of the system in relation to the resources used is not
commensurate with these standards, then the system is either
operating ineffectively, operating inefficiently or there are
other goals toward which the organization is striving.
As the number and complexity of the tasks being done by an
organization increases, the complexity of the organization
(48:p.l96)
must be increased to continue to do the tasks required.
With the increased complexity, problems of communication and
coordination build, requiring routinization of repetitive
portions of the tasks being done and the creation of a
bureaucracy. The Organizational Process Model describes the
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operation of an organization in terms of its structure. Given
the structure of an organization, the conduct of that organi-
zation on a given task is, in the opinion of the author, rea-
sonably predictable. When conduct and results are measured
against the theoretical inputs and outputs of the Rational
Policy model, a measure of the performance of the organization
or system may be derived. This chain of structure, conduct
and performance is the central theme of the author's view of
the operation of the system that produces weapons system.
Situations exist where neither the Rational Policy Model
nor the Organizational Process Model Adequately describe the
actual performance of an organization. The Bureaucratic
Politics Model, in the view of this author, describes this
variation reasonably well. Variation, in this perspective,
comes from the suboptimizations of compromise, coalition,
competition and confusion. The three models are illustrated
in Figure 6. These effects, though not designed into an
organization, must none the less be allowed for in the
creation of the structure to accomplish a set of tasks.
The appropriate structure for a specific task will vary
somewhere on a continuum from a closed, bureaucratic organi-
zation to an open organization. When multiple tasks are
being considered, a mixed structure can be used with coor-
dinating mechanisms as required. Uitimatley, in the case of
multiple tasks of a nature that varies over time the optimum
structure must also vary over time. The practical result
is that some compromise in structure is achieved that will
provide the best performance by the organization even though
83

Fi*-e 6 - Organization Model
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most favorable performance of individual sub-units on
specific tasks may not be achieved t
The structure of the system that creates, develops and
constructs weapons systems will determine the conduct of the
individual organizations and of the system as a whole. The
performance of the system will then be a direct result of
its structure and conduct. Conversely, if we can define a
"good" performance, then there is a structure of the system
that will give that performance on a given task or tasks.
Finally, if the task changes or a change in performance is
desired, a change in the structure must be made.
F. THE APPLIED VIEW OF SHIP'S ACQUISITION STRUCTURE AND TASKS
In the view of this thesis, there are five major organi-
zations that play a part in the acquisition of a ship:
Department of Defense, Industry, the Courts, Congress and
the Office of the President. These organizations are divided
into numerous smaller organizations which will be described
later in the thesis. The organizations and their sub-
organizations are connected interna] ly and externally by a
vast network of formal and informal mechanisms. Collectively
the organizations, the sub-organizations and the connecting
mechanisms constitute the structure of the ship's organization
process. Figure 7 is a diagram of this basic structure.
The tasks required to go from technical ability and need
for a ship through the completion of an actual ship are:
Development of systems, Integration of systems, Construction

























Resources. As with the organizations, there are numerous
subdivisions of the tasks and may innerconnecting mechanisms.
The development of systems, the integration of system and
the construction of the ship are a flow over a period of time,
requiring control and the provision of resources throughout
the process. Figure 8 is a diagram of the basic tasks
required to acquire a ship. No feedback is shown between
the major tasks in the flow from development through integra-
tion to construction as these tasks take place over time,
but each task is an iterative process containing feedback
within the task itself and feedback to the acquisition of
other ships and weapons system. Specific descriptions of
the structure and tasks applicable to ship acquisition will
be found in the following chapters.
The form and size of a structure will determine its
conduct with respect to the tasks it is required to perform.
If the structure is of appropriate size and form for the
tasks it is required to perform, the structure will produce
the desired output at maximum efficiency and effectiveness.
If the structure is at variance with the tasks, less than
optimum performance will result. The tasks being considered
are related to the. acquisition of ships and their systems,
which are not the only tasks required of the components of
the structure. As an example, the Naval Sea Systems Command
and, at a lower level, the Naval Ships Engineering Cent
have not only the tasks related to the development and











































































relating to continued support of presently operating ships
in the fleet. The tasks frequently are similar enough and
the resources available are limited enough that the same
subunits are used for both new construction and operating
ship support. An example of the problems that result from
this dual usuage will be presented in Chapter V.
This thesis will consider the structure as it applies to
the development and construction of ships. The structure
that is applicable to the tasks associated with ship develop-
ment and construction can easily be different from the
structure that is applicable to the other tasks required of
the participating organizations. As a result, any restructur
ing of the system must keep all of the desired outputs in
mind so that the changes in structure to improve the ship
acquisition process do not act to the detriment of the
outputs of the system as a whole.
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III. STRUCTURE OF THE NAVY SHI P WEAPONS SYSTEM ACQUISITION
PROCESS
A. THE WEAPONS SYSTEM ACQUISITION PROCESS
The major weapons system acquisition process is generally
considered to contain five distinct phases. These phases are
applicable to systems that are to be installed on a ship but
are not generally considered applicable to the ship as a
whole. The first phase, referred to as the Research Phase
develops the basic technology required for the weapon. No
hardware is generally produced during this phase. The next
phase, the Exploratory Development Phase, is devoted to
producing a specific application of the principles discovered
during the Research Phase. The output of this phase is
likely to be a breadboard model, proving that the concept
works in a laboratory environment. The third step is the
Advanced Development Phase, in which it is desired that an
operating prototype of the system be manufactured and tested.
This workable, handmade version of the system is the goal
of this phase of the development. The fourth step is the
Engineering Development Phase, which results in an engineer-
ing development prototype and finally a production prototype
or an initial production model. The final phase is the
production phase, in which the actual system is produced and
delivered to the fleet. For a ship, these phases are
smeared due to the lack of prototypes and the variation in
the stage of development of the ship systems.

Three additional processes, with the five mentioned
above, make up the full cycle of the system. Operational
Test and Evaluation (OT&E) occurs late in the Engineering
Development Phase and continues into the early part of the
Production Phase. The purpose of the OT&E is to demonstrate
system capability and ultimately to prove operating and
maintenance tasks developed for the system. Beginning with
delivery of the first unit to the fleet, the Operation and
Maintenance Phase describes the period during which the
system is in actual use by the fleet. Parallel to the actual
operation of the system, a Product Improvement Phase is
conducted. Feedback from actual operational experience is
j 4. j j • -4 4-- I-* 4-- (36:pp. 4-5)used to upgrade the system during its entire lifetime.
Another common description of the phases of development
of a system includes the Conceptual, the Validation, the
Full-scale (engineering) Development and the Production
Phases. By this grouping, the need for new military capa-
bility is formulated, a concept which will provide this
capability is established and the technical feasibility of
the concept is explored. During the Validation Phase, the
preliminary designs and engineering for the weapons system
are verified and the initial planning is done for system
development. The Full-Scale Development Phase encompasses
the completion of the design and detailed engineering. This
stage includes the manufacture of a near-production prototype
and testing to verify the final design and producability.
The Production Phase begins with the negotiation and award
91

of the production contract, continues through the production
acceptance tests and ends when the last system is delivered.
(21:pp. 8-10) ml .This view and the proceeding concept of a
weapons system acquisition are illustrated in Figure 9.
The first major drawback of these views of weapons
system acquisition comes from their simplicity. The logical
assumption and the desired process in the eyes of the office
of the Secretary of Defense is for these processes to take
place in sequence, one at a time. "Concurrency" is a phrase
that has been coined to describe beginning production before
development has been completed. In the current administration,
this is generally considered a "bad" and costly practice.
(71:pp. 16-17) _,, ,. , n , ., .Other authors at least recognize the fact
that there are no distinct dividers between the phases of
weapons procurement. Each phase dribbles into the next as
one task never seems quite complete before the commencement
of the next. The simplicity of the previous models does
not provide a problem to those who are familiar with the
process, but for those outside the system, oversimplication
can lead to conclusions that would, if carried to their
logical ends, result in significant elongation of the pro-
curement process. This would result from the implicit
requirement that each stage be completed with all problems
solved before proceeding to the next phase. A more realistic
view of the process is shown in Figure 10. With the exception
of the break that comes between Advanced Development and
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between the phases of the weapon system procurement process.
Frequently not all of the questions have been answered about
the technology before the conceptual phase is started and
may not be answered until well into the evaluation phase.
Although the Department of Defense instructions require that
all the steps of one phase be completed before proceeding to
the next phase, actual practice shows that this is seldom
,, (35: p. 17)the case . * '
The other significant problem is the application of this
simplistic viewpoint to the development and production of
a complex set of weapon systems. A ship is such a set of
weapon systems. The state of development of the various
components of the ship can vary all the way from the use of
a mandane, proven hull to the use of a weapon or sensor
system that is little more than a glimmer in the eye of the
developer. Each of these systems must be integrated to
provide a coordinated ship that is ready to meet its mission
requirements on the day that it completes outfitting. As
a result, although the ship itself is considered a major
weapons system under Department of Defense Directive 5000.1,
it really is an accumulation or set of systems that can
exhibit attributes of any stage of the development process.
B. THE PLAYERS
There are five basic "players" in the weapons system
acquisition field. The Department of Defense is both the
"buyer" and the "user" of the defense systems. The executive
branch is the coordinator of all of the services, such as
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defense, public health and currency regulation, provided by
the United States government. As such, it also has a signif-
icant say in the distribution of the funds available for the
various departments operations. The Congress, or legislative
branch, is the provider of funds. This is not the extent of
its participation, for it also authorizes specific programs
and exercises legislative oversight. The contractors are
the providers of goods and services for the Department of
Defense under our system. Although some goods and services
are provided by Naval shipyards, Navy labs, Army arsenals and.
the like, the large preponderence of weapons system procure-
ment dollars goes to private industry. Navy Laboratories
continue to make significant contribution to the state-of-the-
art of weapons system advancement. The Naval systems Engi-
neering Center (NAVSEC) has taken over the task of the major
portion of the design of the Navy's ships, but still the lions
share of the Navy's weapons systems are built by private
contractors. Finally, the Courts act as the final arbitrators
between the players of the game. They simultaneously decide
what was wrong in the players interpretation of the Law and
the contracts, and just what the errors were worth in
additional payments or denial of payments to contractors.
1 . Departm ent of Defense
The proliferation of organization relating to ship
acquisition in the Department of Defense alone is overwhelming
The follow set of short sketches provides the reader with an
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insight into the complexity of the formal DOD structure as
it relates to ship acquisition.
a. Office of the Secretary of Defense
The major individual participants in the weapons
acquisition business in the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD) are the Director of Defense Research and Engineering
(DDR&E), and the Assistant Secretaries of Installation and
Logistics, Comptroller and Program Analysis and Evaluation.
Groups that carry responsibility within this office (OSD) are
the Defense System Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) , the
Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA), the Armed
Services Procurement Regulation (ASPR) Committee, the Weapons
System Evaluation Group (WSEG), and the Joint Chiefs of
Staff (JCS). Figure 11 is a diagram of the organizational
relationship of the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installation
and Logistics), (ASD(I&L)), has the principle responsibility
for procurement management, policy and control. He is
responsible for the establishment of uniform DOD procurement
policies, methods and procedures as well as carrying direct
responsibility for weapons systems in production. The
Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) super-
vises all research and engineering activities in the Depart-
ment of Defense. As such, he is responsible for all of the
Defense Department major weapons system acquisitions up
the decision to go into productions on the system. The
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physical preparation of the Defense Budget and acts as a
general watchdog over defense spending. The Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Program Analysis and Evaluation)
(ASD(PA&E)) is responsible for the evaluation of the individ-
ual weapons system programs, both from the standpoint of
individual effectiveness and from an integrated forces
. . (9:p. 43)
viewpoint
.
The Defense System Acquisition Review Council is
the group of OSD officials who, in essence, approve the
advancement, of a major weapons system from one phase of
development to the next
.
The members of the DSARC are the DDR&E, ASD(I&L),
ASD(C) and ASD(PA&E). Other assistant secretaries having an
interest in a specific DSARC meeting also participate
(e.g. Assistant Secretaries for Telecommunication and
Intelligence) . "The mission of the DSARC is to serve as an
advisory body to the SECDEF on major defense system programs,
to provide him with supporting information and recommendations
when program decisions are necessary, and to conduct manage-
ment reviews on such programs at least once during their life
cycle. "(25:p. m-61) Jn actual practice, the DSARC reviews
the progress of each major program at each major milestone
and either permits it to go on to the next phase of its
development or holds it up for further work in the existing
state. Although they have the authority to recommend can-
cellation of a program at this stage, they have not normally
taken this course of action.
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The ASBCA reviews claims against the government
by civilian contractors and either specifies the amount due
the contractor from the government or finds against the con-
tractor, which generally has the effect of pushing the case
into the Court of Claims. The board is established by
charter within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, but
draws its jurisdiction solely from the inclusion of the








The codification of rules relating to Department
of Defense procurement is the Armed Services Procurement
Regulations (ASPR)
. This set of regulations has uniform
applicability to every defense procurement from belt buckles
to cruisers. It is under almost constant revision to ensure
that it stays abreast of advances in both weapons technology
and procurement management. Each service is represented on
the ASPR Committee, which reports to ASD(ISiL). This committee
is responsible for ensuring the ASPR reflects the latest
changes in procurement law and philosophy.
Operational analysis and systems evaluations are
provided by the Weapons System Evaluation Group. Although
the group functions under the direction of DDR&E , they perform
studies for the JCS and other elements of the Office of the
Secretary of Defense as well. The studies provide a quanti-
. , (30:p. E-2)fied input for long range planning. v
Finally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff provide the
integrated military input from the individual services.
Within the guidance provided by the Secretary of Defense and
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the secretaries of their respective services, the service
chiefs do the long range planning, prepare the initial budget
requests and finally actually procure and use the weapons
systems
.
Two other agencies of significance to weapons
system acquisition report directly to the OSD . The Defense
Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) performs all necessary contract
audits for DOD. They also provide accounting and financial
advisory services regarding contracts and subcontracts to
all components of DOD who are responsible for procurement
and contract administration. The Defense Supply Agency (DSA)
is charged with providing economic logistic support to all
portions of DOD. DSA administers all items that are common
to more than one service. Their principle involvement with
weapons procurement is in their actions as contract adminis-
trators. Though they are seldom involved in the administra-
tion of a prime contract for a ship, the major portion of all
government furnished equipment (GFE) is provided under a
contract administered by a Defense Contract Administration
Service Office (DCASO) , the contract administration arm of
DSA (30:p E-6)
b. Office of the Secretary of the Navy
The components of the Office of the Secretary of
the Navy that make a major contribution to the navy's
weapons system acquisition process are the Assistant
Secretary of Navy (Installation and Logistics) (ASN( I&L) ) , the
Assistant Secretary of Navy (Research and Development)
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(ASNR&D)), the Assistant Secretary of Navy (Financial
Management ) (ASN(FM) ) , the Assistant Secretary of Navy
(Comptroller (ASN(C)), the Chief of Naval Research, the
Director of Navy Labs, and the Department of the Navy System
Acquisition Review Council (DNSARC)
. Figure 12 is a diagram
of the formal organization of the Office of the Secretary of
Navy and of the Chief of Naval Operations.
ASN(I&L) is responsible for the policy, manage-
ment, and control of production, procurement, supply and
distribution of material throughout the Navy. He is the






49_5 °) ASN(R&D) is
responsible for the performance of research, development,
engineering, test and evaluation of the Navy's weapon system
programs. As such, he is the equivalent of DDR&E within the




also has the equivalent responsibility to his counterpart,
ASD(C). The major variations in structure of the Office of
the Secretary of the Navy from the pattern of OSD are the
deletion of an assistant secretary for Program Analysis and
Evaluation and the addition of the Chief of Naval Research
and the Director of Navy Laboratories. OP 96, the Systems
Analysis section of the Office of the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions (CNO) performs the program analysis and evaluation for
the Secretary with the Office of Program Appraisal acting
as the Secretary's review agent. The Chief of Naval
Development directs the operations of the Naval Research
Laboratories and the Director of Navy Labs is responsible
102























< o _0i M
Id In vi —I u3 o fc»M <Q Z
in j 3
id < w J— a;




— V) O OP «
< u S H
H 0, -IZ M O
3= OS




























z I: - oi
z -i o




















































for the remainder of the Navy Labs. Both hold dual titles,
however. The Director of Navy Labs works for the Chief of
Naval Development in his position of Director of Laboratory
Programs working for the Deputy Chief of Naval Material
( 69 n 52 )(Development)
.
* Additional ties remain between the
personnel of the labs and their former sponsoring bureau.
As a for instance, the Weapons Laboratory, Dahlgren personnel
still feel that they are working for the section of Naval
Sea Systems Command that used to be the Bureau of Ordance.
The DNSARC performs the same function for the
Secretary of the Navy that the DSARC does for the Secretary
of Defense. The relationship between program size and
decision level is shown in Figure 13.
c. Chief of Naval Operations
The Chief of Naval Operations commands the
operating forces of the Navy, which include several fleets,
seagoing forces, sea frontier forces, Fleet Marine Forces
and others. He also commands the Naval Material Command,
the Bureau of Naval Personnel and the Bureau of Medicine and
Surgery. In meeting these committments he determines the
requirements of naval forces and activities for research,
development, test, evaluation and procurement of weapons
systems for the Navy's needs. He plans and provides for
the conduct of development, test, and- evaluation of the
systems and lastly he obtains funding and progresses them
from the earliest stages of development, through production
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The organization under the Chief of Naval
Operations relating to ships system procurement can be divided
into four basic categories; Line, Staff, Bureaus, and inter-
nal staff. The Line organizations relating to ship's
acquisition include OP 01 (Manpower), OP 02 (Submarine
Warfare), OP 03 (Surface Warfare), and OP 04 (Logistics).
The mission of the line Deputies includes the determination
of requirements, force levels and major characteristics of
applicable ship types, appropriate support ships and weapons
systems. This responsibility includes not only the material
requirements, but the operational readiness, tactical doctrine
and training related requirements as well. These deputies
provide the operational requirements which when coordinated
with development proposals from the material commands
result in the establishment of the specific requirements for
weapons systems. This is referred to as the "User-Producer
,. , „ (69:pp.E-ll-12)dialogue.
"
v ^
The Staff Directorates applicable to material
acquisition are OP 90 (General Planning and Programming),
OP 92 (Fiscal Management), OP 95 (Anti-submarine Warfare and
Ocean Surveillance), OP 96 (Systems Analysis) and OP 98
(Research, Development, Test and Evaluation). These direc-
torates provide a basic coordinating function across all
programs and offices. Within their own specialities, they
bring together the requirements and establish the policy for
each of the warfare specialities.
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"The Bureaus" is a historical designation in-
cluding the Systems Commands of the Naval Material Command,
the Bureau of Naval Personnel and the Bureau of Medicine and
Surgery. These commands are the providers of ships, airplanes,
electronics, facilities and people (including their health
care). As such, they are the "producers" of the user-producer
dialogue. Their function is to provide the material and
people for use by the operational forces in meeting the
requirements of the Navy's mission.
The internal staff includes the Safety Coordi-
nation Group, the CNO Executive Board with its Ship Acquisi-
tion and Improvement Panel (SAIP) and Acquisition Review
Committee (ARC) and the Center for Naval Analysis with its
Operations Evaluation Group (OEG), Systems Evaluation Group
(SEG) and Naval Warfare Analysis Group (NAVWAG) . These
groups function to provide advice and information to the
Chief of Naval Operations on their areas of specialty. As an
example, the SAIP is a special panel of the CEB with cognizance
for developing, monitoring and controlling the characteristics




d. Chief of Naval Material
The principle players in the Office of the
Chief of Naval Material (CNM) are the Deputies, the System
Commands and the CNM Designated Project Offices. The
Deputies applicable to ship acquisition are MAT 01 (Programs
and Financial Management), MAT 02 (Procurement and Production),
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MAT 03 (Naval Development), MAT 04 (Operations and Logistics)
and MAT 06 (Reliability and Maintainability). Each of the
Deputies provides staff assistance to the CNM in his area of
responsibility. Additionally, MAT 03 directs the laboratories
that fall directly under his cognizance, in effect supporting
basic research and the engineering development requirements
of the system commands. Figure 14 is a diagram of the
organization of the Office of the Chief of Naval Material.
Naval Air Systems Command, Naval Electronics
System Command, Naval Sea System Command, Naval Supply System.
Command and Naval Facilities System Command are, in effect,
the "line" organizations of the Office of Naval Material.
The Systems Commands are the providers of weapons systems
and support to the fleet operating units. Although ship
acquisition would seem to involve only the Naval Sea System
Command and the Naval Supply System Command, the other
system commands provide missiles, electronics, and test and
support facilities.
The CNM Designated Project Offices theoretically
are temporary offices established by CNM to accomplish a
specific task. In fact, although numerous project offices
are established when a need is recognized and dissolved when
the need no longer exists, several have been around for many
years and are meeting a continuing need that is not likely
to stop within the foreseeable future. The CNM Project
Offices at the time of this writing are PM 1 (Strategic
Systems), PM 2 (Trident), PM 4 (Anti-Submarine Warfare
108
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System (ASWS)), PM 18 (Major Surface Combatant Ship), PM 19
(Mine Warfare), PM 20 (Anti-Ship Missile Defense (ASMD)), and






e. Commander Naval Sea Systems Command
The Office of Commander Naval Sea Systems Command
contains two types of Directorates, Management Staffs, Boards
and Councils, Special Staffs and Designated Projects. The
first type of directorate relates to basic ship types, plus
one for ammunition. These are SEA 92 (Submarine), SEA 93
(Escort and Cruiser), SEA 94 (Amphibious and Auxiliary Ship),.
SEA 95 (Aircraft Carrier), and SEA 99 (Ammunition). These
directorates are involved not only in the procurement of new
systems, but in the monitoring and improving of presently
operational systems. The coordinating directorates are SEA
01 (Plans, Programs, and Financial Management/Comptroller),
SEA 02 (Contracts), SEA 03 (Research and Technology), SEA 04
(Fleet Support), SEA 05 (Shipbuilding), SEA 06 (Weapons,
Systems and Engineering), SEA 07 (Industrial and Facility
Management) and SEA 08 (Nuclear Power). These directorates
provide services and coordination in their respective areas
across all ship types. Figure 15 is a diagram of the
organization of the Naval Sea Systems Command.
There are four Boards and Councils applicable to
ship system acquisition. The Shipbuilding Council, the
Research and Development Council, the Change Control Board
and the Budget Review Board all provide advice to Commander
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Special Staffs include such offices as SEA 00D (Public Affairs
and Congressional Liason), SEA 00L (Counsel) and SEA OOP
(Patent Counsel )
.
The designated projects are in charge of the
program for a specific ship or weapons type. Within NAVSEA,
they are responsible for all facets of the weapons system
acquisition from the earliest conceptual studies, through
development and construction, and into fleet operation and
support. There are two additional projects relating to areas
of interest on the part of COMNAVSEASYSCOM; the 1200psi boiler
system project and the advanced logistic support project.
The field activities of the Naval Sea Systems
Command include the Naval Ships Engineering Center, which
provides technical assistance in ship design and weapons
system integration, the Supervisors of Shipbuilding, which
oversee the construction of ships at private shipyards, and
Naval Shipyards. Naval Shipyards are presently used only
for repair and conversion. " P ' ' Of these, at least
three have the capability for new construction of ships
(including submarines).
2 . The Executive Branch
Based on Article 2, Section 2, of the Constitution
of the United States, the President is the Commander in Chief
of the Armed Forces. Hence the Department of Defense is a
part of the Executive Branch as are the Departments of State,
Treasury, Justice, Post Office, Interior, Transportation,
Argiculture, Commerce, Labor, Health, Education and Welfare
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and Housing and Urban Development, For the purpose of the
study of Navy ships acquisition, the major interest in the
other departments pertains to their competition for a share
of the federal budget.
Departmental budgets can be viewed as existing some-
where on a continuum from a portion of the macroeconomic
allocation of the nations funds to the satisfaction of
departmental needs. The Defense Budget can thus be viewed
at one pole as a portion of a national budget which is set
by the actions of Congress to achieve a desired relationship .
between government revenues and expenditures. This macro-
economic view of government fiscal policy would argue that
the economic health of the nation is a function of the re-
lationship between total government expenditures and total
revenues, both as related to some measure of the total output
in goods and services of the nation. This view results in
the conclusion that the Executive Departments compete for a
slice of the federal budget in some giant zero-sum game. To
achieve an increase in the appropriation of one department
under this system means a dollar for dollar decrease in the
appropriations to another department. This approach ignores
any real evaluation of the utility of the individual programs,
hence is only one end of the scale of means of considering
the budget
.
At the other pole, the view is that the Congress of
the United States, based on recommendations by the President,
decides on the goods and services it desires from each of the
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executive departments. Money is then alloted to pay for
these goods and services without respect for the size of
the budget of the other departments. Line item budgeting
with separate appropriations for each department leans
toward this view of the federal budget. This view represents
the other end of the scale as it does not consider the effect
of the budget as a whole. In actual practice, all budgeting
will fall somewhere between these two extremes.
In the view of this author, Public Law 93-344, the
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974,
putting the total budget under a self imposed Congressional
restraint, has had the tendency to strengthen the view of a
departments budget as a piece of the total federal budget pie.
This strengthens the view of the other departments as com-
petitors for federal spending and further strengthens the
position of the various coordinating agencies (Congressional
Budget Office, Office of Management and Budget, Appropriations
Committees, etc.).
The other function of the President in relation to
the Department of Defense is in guidance and management.
With his assistants in the Executive Office of the President
and the Cabinet, he sets the policies to be followed in the
procurement of weapons systems, the size and structure of the
armed forces and the makeup of the budget requests. In this
task, he is aided by the Office of Management and Budget,
the Council of Economic Advisors, the National Security
Council, the Office of Emergency Preparedness, the Office of
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Science and Technology, the Cabinet and the National Council






The other significant input to the President is the White
House staff. These close advisors, along with the Cabinet,





Article 1, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution says
"The Congress shall have power to .... provide for the common
defense and general waifare of the United States," "raise
and support armies, but no appropriation of money to that
use shall be for a longer term than two years" and "provide
and maintain a navy." It also gives Congress the power "to
make rules for the government and regulation of the land and
naval forces." Based on these sections of the Constitution,
the Congress not only provides the appropriations for the
Department of Defense, but specifically dictates how this
money shall be used.
a. Congressional Committees
There are four committees in each house of
Congress that relate to the weapons system acquisition
process. The recently formed Budget Committees, subject
to the approval of the Congress as a whole, establish a
ceiling on the funds to be budgeted for each government func-
tion. This concurrent resolution is based on a budget from
the President and modified as the House and Senate see fit.
As a concurrent resolution, it forms a self imposed limit and
does not require the approval of the President.
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The Armed Services Committees create the bills
that authorize specific line items for each federal agency.
Without authorization, the Navy may not proceed with a
program, regardless of financing. The Appropriation Committees
create the bills that provide the funding for all government
operations, including weapons system acquisitions. Hence
to become a viable program, a weapons system must appear in
both the authorization and appropriation bills and the total
national defense expenditure must be within the quantity
allowed by the concurrent budget resolution for the specific
fiscal year.
The other committee in each house that is involved
in weapons system procurement is the Committee on Government
Operations. These committees are basically the overseers
of the Executive Branch of the government. They have juris-
diction to inquire into the operations of all executive
departments, and have become "large-scale" investigatory
agencies. Although they are not the only recipient of
Government Accounting Office (GAO) Reports, they are the
(45;pp. 152, 292)
principle user of GAO's services.
b. Congressional Budget Office
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) is charged
with analyzing the current services budget and the president'
budget and drafting each submittal of -the budget resolution.
They are additionally charged with analyzing the fiscal
impact of all reported legislation and conducting long term
studies for the Committees of Budget, Appropriations, Ways
116

and Means, and Finance. The Budget Office is "authorized to
secure information, data, estimates, and statistics directly
from the various departments, agencies, and establishments
of the executive branch of Government and the regulatory
( 22 Title II")
agencies and commissions of the Government." '
c. General Accounting Office
The General Accounting Office (GAO) describes
itself today as: "... a nonpolitical , nonpartican agency in
the legislative branch of the Government created by Congress
to act in its behalf in examining the manner in which Govern-
ment agencies discharge their financial responsibilities
with regard to public funds appropriated or otherwise made
available to them by the Congress and to make recommendations
looking to greater economy and efficiency in public
... ,,(37:p. 1)
expenditures."
GAO is empowered to audit and settle the accounts
of executive officers, including the making of legal inter-
pretations incident to these audits. The determinations of
the Comptroller General, who is the head of GAO, are final
(45* p 139)
and conclusive upon the Executive branch. The
other major function of GAO is to conduct investigations at
the behest of Congressional Committees and individual
(45:p. 149)
members . *
4, The Judicial Branch
In relation to weapons system procurement the courts
provide the basic function of settling claims by contractors
against the government and by the government against
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contractors. In producing these decisions, the courts in
effect interpret the law in relation to the contract. They
also, on occasion, settle differences between branches of
the government.
In the Tucker Act (28 U.S.C. 1491), the Government
consented to be sued by contractors in Federal court. This
can only be done after all administrative remedies have been
exhausted, which is to say after the Armed Services Board
of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) has rendered a decision. The
contractor may take his suit to the United States Court of
Claims or (if less than $10,000. is involved) to the Federal
District Court. Appeal to the Supreme Court is then available
4.1. *• 1 • a- • i a (56:p. 254)as the final judicial remedy.
5 . Contractors
The most obvious contractors in ship acquisition are
the shipyards. The major private shipyards in the United
Sates are listed in Table I. All of these shipyards, with
the exception of Todd, are subsidiaries of large corporations.
(91: p. 31) Based on Fi SCal Year 1974 contract awards, however,
only Bath Iron Works, Electric Boat, Litton, and Newport News
have major Navy ship construction in progress. Marinette
Marine Co. of Wisconsin and Bethlehem Steel Co. both have






^ The U.S. Navy presently has eight ship-
yards in operation. All of these shipyards are presently
being used only for conversion, repair and overhaul of Navy

























Ingall's Nuclear S.B. Div
Litton Ship Systems Div.
Seattle







Of these yards, only Philadelphia, Mare Island, and Puget
Sound are considered capable of new construction of major








The shipbuilder's contribution to the construction of
a ship, however, is normally limited to completing the de-
tailed design, construction of the hull and some of the
systems, and integration of the ship's systems. The present
practice is for earlier phases of the design to come from
NAVSEC. The previous practice, with the exception of the
era of Secretary of Defense McNamara was for BUSHIPS or a
design contractor, such as Gibbs and Cox, to provide the
earlier phases of design. Most of the ship's equipment is
purchased from contractors specializing in the specific
equipment type. This equipment is provided either by the
prime contractor for the ship by use of a subcontract or by
the government through separate contracts with the equipment
supplier. The amount of government furnished equipment (GFE)
in relation to the amount of contractor furnished equipment
(CFE) varies from contract to contract. The use of more GFE
enhances standardization, government control of the design,
and the ability to achieve economies of scale by the purchase
of the same equipment for several ship types. An additional
advantage is that profit is payed only to the equipment
producer, not the producer and the prime contractor. The
major disadvantage is late arrival of equipment or delivery
of equipment not meeting the specifications. These are valid
reasons for claims by the prime contractor and/or schedule
slippage and inadequate ship performance.
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Table II provides an indication of the complexity of
contractor contributions to ship system acquisition. The
contracts shown are all prime contracts, representing either
ships or GFE for installation on ships (and submarines).
Literally hundreds of other contractors, such as Worthington
Pump Corp., Marrotta Valve Corp., and Tektronix Corp. provide
equipment on a subcontract basis to the prime contractors for
installation in the ship.
6 . Other Groups Influencing t he Shi ps Acquisition Process
A list of groups having a second tier influence on
the ships acquisition process would cover many pages without
even attempting to describe the relationships involved. Every
group that influences the major players is in effect a player
in Navy Ship system acquisition. Some of the significant
external forces are;
a. Financial Institutions
Although interest is not an allowable expense in
weapons system acquisition, the contractors frequently must
obtain external financing to have sufficient capital to cover
the expenses of producing a system . As a result,
agencies that effect the money market, such as the Securities
and Exchange Commission and the Federal Reserve Board, as
well as the general state of the money market itself, all
effect the cost and availability of financing to the
contractor
.
b. Labor Related Factions
Shipbuilding is a labor intensive process, with
i ^
(91:p. 47)


























































































































Virginia 11 . 6
Mississippi
NOTE: Some of the above total contract values include
changes to existing contracts.
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The labor intensity in supporting corporations varies from
almost 100% in the field of Design, Engineering and Manage-
ment down to the low levels achieved by some of the basic
material suppliers (such as piping suppliers). This signif-
icant contribution of labor to the cost of a ship means that
two types of institutions can play a major role in determining
the cost of a ship and its systems. The first is the market
using the skills found in the Naval ship system industry.
The labor skills used in ship construction itself are common
to the construction industry. Combat system and communication
system workers are common to the aerospace and communications
equipment suppliers. Propulsion and machinery suppliers use
general machining skill which can be used in any heavy
machinery manufacturing. Hence, the price of the labor input
to an integrated ship system is highly dependent on the state
of the market in the construction, aerospace, communication,
and heavy equipment industries to name but a few of the
competitors in the labor market.
The second group that plays a significant role
in setting the price of the labor input to Navy ships are
the unions. The strength of the unions' control over the
price of labor varies significantly from corporation to
corporation as well as from union to union in dealing with
a specific corporation. In the shipyards themselves, the
principle unions representing the labor force are the In-
dustrial Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Workers of America,
The International Association of Machinists, The Internatic
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Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Shipbuilders, Blacksmiths,
Forgers and Helpers, and the International Brotherhood of
( 91 ' d 51 "iElectrical Workers. v '*" J Labor union inputs are not
limited to direct negotiation with the contractors. Organized
labor maintains a strong lobby organization in Washington
which exerts a direct influence on government procurement.
(71:p. 187)
c. Material Related Factions
Most of the material used in Naval Ship construc-
tion either has a civilian use or is produced by corporations,
capable of producing similar equipment or material for the
civilian market. As a result, there is direct competition
to obtain material for use in ship construction. Examples
of this are the difficulty experienced early in the "Space
Race" of the 1960 's in getting high tolerance electronic
components. The lead time from ordering a turbine until its
delivery has been significantly effected by activity in both
the power production construction industry and the civilian
tanker construction. Thus the activity in competing markets
is going to effect both the price of the material and the
schedule of its deliver which in turn effects the price
of the ship as a whole and its schedule.
d. State and Local Government
State and local governments effect the local tax
structure in an attempt to bring industry into the area and/
or derive revenue from that industry and the people who work
in it. Local laws and political conditions can effect the
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ease with which a contractor can attract workers. A signif-
icant, though somewhat unusual example of the ability of a
state to influence the industry was the State of Mississippi's
assistance to Litton Industries in the construction of Litton 's
west bank facility in Pascagoula, Mississippi. Without the
state's assistance, the facility would probably never have
been built.
e. Citizens Groups
In the last two decades there has been a signif-
icant rise in the number, activities and influence of citizen
groups. Their interests vary from environmental considera-
tions to safety, from strengthening our armed forces to
pacifism. The effect of these groups is related to their
political strength and lobbying ability. They can increase
or decrease the national budget and vary the Department of
Defense's share of this budget in direct proportion to their
ability to influence Congress.
f. Professional, Trade and Industrial Organizations
Various people from within the formal structures
of the weapons acquisition structure form organizations based
on their mutual interest. Examples of this type of group are
Shipbuilders Council of America, the American Society of
Naval Engineers and the National Contract Management Associa-
tion. These associations provide for the flow of new ideas
between separate formal organizations through the use of
meeting, journels, etc., thereby increasing the state-of-the-
art of the system as a whole. This also serves to encourage
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the increase of professionalism amongst the individual
members of the organization through the sponsership of
standards, provision of education for members and general
support of professional ethics.
C. COORDINATING AND DIRECTING MECHANISMS
Among the players of the weapons acquisition process,
communication exists to provide direction, response and
information. The major formal coordinating and directing
mechanisms are the Acts of Congress, Court and Administrative
Decisions, Presidential and Department of Defense Directives,
procurement contracts and other major vehicles.
1 . Acts of Congress
There are two basic classes of Congressional Acts
that govern the Navy's weapons system acquisition process.
Budget, Authorizing and Appropriations acts provide funding
and permission to continue a specific program on a year by
year basis. Other acts of Congress serve the purpose of
governing the actions of the participant in the weapons
acquistion process. These can be used to foster some social
program or to correct some perceived inadequacy in the
mechanics of the process itself.
a. Funding and Authorization Acts
In order to become a viable funded, a program
must be authorized by Congressional legislation and included
in the appropriation for the Department of Defense. The
President annually submits a budget to the Congress contain-
ing requests for funding of specific activities. Based on
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this budget, authorizing and appropriation bills are initiated
by the applicable subcommittee of the Armed Services Commit-
tees Appropriation Committee. Most of the work of drafting
the bill is done at the subcommittee level. It is then
passed by the committee and finally by the Congress as a
whole. When this is passed and signed by the President, the
Treasury is authorized to fund the applicable department for
the purpose specified in the Appropriations Bill. The Annual
Budget Resolution relates to specific functions of the Govern-
ment, providing a budgeted total for that function. This is •
a self imposed ceiling and does not require Presidential
approval, but is designed to act as a cap on the total
appropriations of the annual Appropriations Bill,
b. Governing Acts
The principal statue governing defense procure-
ment is the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947. This
act brought together a century of diverse statutes affecting
defense procurement, swept away many archaic, conflicting
and unnecessary laws and injected a greater flexibility in
procurement. Appropriate safeguards to prevent abuse, assure
the Government fair and reasonable prices and afford all
suppliers the opportunity to compete for, and share in,
defense business were included. The act reaffirmed formal
advertising and competitive bidding as the preferred methods
of procurement, but specified 17 circumstances where exceptions
( 9 * d 82 ^
to this general policy could be made. Numerous
other laws, applicable to labor standards, negotiation and
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renegotiation and other areas directly applicable to defense
procurement, effect the weapons system acquisition process.
A list of some of the more significant of these statutes
is provided in Table III.
2. Decisions
The decisions of the courts and various administrative
agencies have the effect of clarifying and interpreting the
laws as they appear in the statutes. A second function is
the actual finding of the amount of money due either the
contractor or the government. The first step in the process
is for the Contracting Officer to make a decision on the
specific point of the contract. If the contractor does not
agree, he in effect appeals the decision to the Armed Services
Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA), the Federal District Court,
the Court of Claims or the Comptroller General.
a. Comptroller General
The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 gave the
Comptroller General the ability to provide for the payment
of accounts or claims and the power to audit appropriated
funds accounts. Since almost all procurement involves
appropriated funds, the Comptroller General's authority
extends to nearly all areas of procurement law. His more
important decisions are published periodically in a set of
books entitled "Decisions of the Comptroller General."
(56:p. 10)
b. Attorney General
The Attorney General of the United States renders









Defense Production Act of 1950
Tucker Act
Public Law 85-804
Assignment of Claims Act of
1940
Buy American Act
Small Business Act of 1958
Anti-Deficiency Act






Civil Rights Act of 1965
Truth in Negotiation Act
Renegotiation Acts






Authority to establish priorities for
defense material
Allows suit against the U.S. Government
Allows relief of contractors under
extraordinary conditions
Allows claims against the government to
be assigned, to financial institutions
Requires use of United States mined and
produced material in government contracts
Provides for Small Business Administration
and small business set asides
Prevents expenditures or obligation in
excess of appropriation
Specifies 8-hour day and 40 hour week
and certain health and safety standards
Minimum wages for contraction workers
Minimum wages, work day and minimum age
for manufacturing workers
Prevents rebates to contractors or
sub-contractors
Prevents discrimination based on race,
color, religion, sex or national origin
(subsequently extended to include age)
Requires submission and certification
of information by contractor before
negotiation of contracts over $100,000
Provides for review and renegotiation
of excessive profits
Establishes the Office of Management of
the Budget and General Accounting Office
Establishes current budgetary procedures
and impoundment and re-programming
controls
Limits aircraft and ship construction
profits
.
References: (56:pp. 359-478 and 9:pp. 75-78)
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These decisions are published in a series of bound volumes
entitled "Opinions of Attorneys General," published from
1852 to date and containing opinions from 1791.
(
56: P- 10 )
c. Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals
The decisions of the Armed Services Board of
Contract Appeals (ASBCA) are the first (and frequently the
final) step in abjudication of a dispute of a question of








The decisions of the courts form the final
interpretation of the law and settlement of disputes between
contractors and the government. The decisions of all major
state and federal courts are published in bound form in one
of several reporting series. An example is the G'.L. Christian
and Associates v. United States Decision, 312 F 2d 418, which
stated that even though the required termination clause is
missing from a contract, the government has the right of
termination of contract for convenience "by operation of
,. t ,,(56:p. 269)the law. * J
3 . Presidential Directives
Annually the President issues Foreign Policy Guidance
which is the basis for the entire planning, programming and
budgeting cycle of the Department of Defense. Additionally,
from time to time the President issues directives to the
Department of Defense relating either to the weapons
systems procurement process, specific programs or mix and
size of the armed forces.
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4. Department of Defense Directives
Each level in the chain of command from the Secretary
of Defense to the lowest supervisory level issues directives
relating to the policies it feels should be carried out and
specific instructions on the mechanics with which it desires
these policies to be carried out. These directives plus
memorandums and letters form the direction of the lower
echelons by the higher echelons within DOD
. Appendix B is
a list of directives of the Chief of Naval Ships Systems
Command or higher level that are applicable to the acquisition
of an escort type ship. This does not include the myriad of
instructions that are issued by such organizations as the
Supervisors of Shipbuilding, Commander Operation Test and





an d Budgeting System (PPBS)
Related Documents
As described in Section D below, there are numerous
documents associated with the budget process. Specific
descriptions of these documents are provided in Appendix C.
They are basically used in an iterative process to assure
that each level in the budget chain has the opportunity to
make an input and that all of the reasonable alternatives
are explored.
6. System Approval Related Documents
Like the budget process, numerous documents are used
in the sequence of approval of a weapons system from the
earliest conceptual considerations through the actual produc-
tion of the ship. The documents applicable to this process
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are listed in Appendix D. The process itself and the inter-
relationship of the various documents are described in
Section D below.
7 . Selected Acquisition Reports
Each major defense system acquisition program submits
a quarterly Selected Acquisition Report in accordance with
DOD INST 7000.3, Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) . The
implementing instruction in the Navy is SECNAVINST 7700. 5B
of the same title. This report is used to provide the
financial and technical status of the major weapons system
acquisition programs to the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, the General Accounting Office and Congress.
8
.
General Accounting Office Reports
Based on the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, the
General Accounting Office (GAO) has the authority to investi-
gate any govermental agency using appropriated funds. These
investigations are conducted at the request of Committees or
specific members of Congress. Appendix E is a list of recent
GAO reports applicable to major weapons system acquisition.




A contract is a legal agreement between two parties
describing an obligation on the part of one party to provide
goods and services to the second party in return for a
consideration. To be valid and enforceable, a contract must
contain the basic elements of: (1) offer and acceptance,
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(2) consideration or obligation (3) competent parties and
(4) a lawful purpose. (51:p " 3) The objective of the
Purchasing Officer is to obtain "the right quality," from
"the right source of supply" in "the right quantity" at
"the right time .
"
(51 :p * 17)
The type of contract used is a function of the assign-
ment of financial risk and the objectives desired. In a
Cost Plus Fixed Fee contract, the Government assumes all of
the risk of cost variations. The contractor is obligated
only to provide his best effort. On the other side of the
scale, the contractor assumes all of the cost risk in a
Fixed Price Contract. If the cost realized is less than the
agreed price, he makes a profit. If it is less, he suffers
a loss. In between these two, are found fixed price with
escalation, fixed price with redetermination and various
other cost sharing programs. In addition to cost sharing,
which in itself is a form of incentivization , incentives on
schedule and performance of the contract can be written into
the terms to achieve the desired government objectives. The
final type of contract is a Time and Materials contract in
which the government pays only the costs with no fee. This
type of contract is common with Universities and other non-
. ... (51:pp. 125-132)profit organizations.
10. Armed Services Procurement Regulations
A section of the Armed Services Procurement Act of
1947 authorized the Services to reach agreement upon the
performance of procurement functions by one service for
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another and authorized the creation of joint or combined
agencies to perform procurement operations. It further
provided a common, uniform basis for procurement by all
military services. The present Armed Services Procurement
Regulation (ASPR) grew from this standard and unified
approach to procurement.
The ASPR sets forth the underlying principles, policies
and procedures on a vast array of subjects relating to DOD
( 9 ' dd 85— 87")procurement. v ' pp ' ; Some examples of topic areas
covered are: Use of Formal Advertising, Use of Negotiation,
Determinations and Findings, Types of Contracts, Patents,
Data and Copyrights, Taxes and Contractor Industrial Labor
Relations. (7:pp * 1_12 ) The ASPR is issued by the Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics) by direc-
tion of the Secretary of Defense and in coordination with the
Secretaries of the Army, Navy and Air Force and the Director
of the Defense Supply Agency. Its Purpose is to establish
"uniform policies and procedures relative to the procurement
of supplies and services under the authority of Chapter 137,
Title 10 of the United States Code, or under other statutory
authority. ,,(7:p * 1:1)
D, THE DEFENSE SYSTEM ACQUISITION REVIEW PROCESS
The Defense System Acquisition Review Committee concept
was created by Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard to
combat the uncontrolled cost growth in weapons system and
the Department of Defense procurement budget that resulted
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from the "Total Package Procurement" approach to weapons
system procurement. "Total Package Procurement" is the
inclusion of the entire development and production of a
weapons system under one fixed price contract. The objective
of the process is to prevent a weapons system from moving
into the commitments of the next stage of development before
it is ready to do so. The first decision (DSARC I) is the
Program Initiation Decision. The primary concerns of this
decision point are that the Service need has been substanti-
ated, the proposed system performance meets the need, that
a plan exists for evaluation of alternatives and that the
business approach is consistent, with program objectives,
af fordability and predictable risks. The objectives of the
Full-Scale Development Decision (DSARC II) are to reassess
operational need, to evaluate the adequacy of alternative
approaches, to examine the adequacy of the test and evaluation
approach, to verify readiness to enter full-scale development
or detailed design and to check the soundness of the business
approach. The military worth and economic affordability of
proposed alternatives are also examined. The purpose of the
Production/Deployment Decision (DSARC III) is to ensure the
system is fully ready to enter production. The logistic
support plan, test results, business approach, and opera-
tional need are examined. On some occasions, the result of
DSARC III is the authorization of only the lead ship or the
first production run. In this case, a DSARC IIIA is held
to authorize further production.
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The principal members of the DSARC are the DDR&E , ASD(ISiL),
ASD(C), ASD(SA&E), and, for programs within their areas of
responsibility, the ASD(T), and the ASD(I). Other Assistant
Secretaries of Defense are invited to attend when appropriate.
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the cognizant DOD
Component head, the Deputy Director (T&E), ODDR&E and the
Chairman of the Cost Analysis Improvement Group normally
serve as advisors to the DSARC principals.
The major document of the DSARC process is the Decision
Coordination Paper (DCP). It is a summary document providing,
a broad overview of a major defense system program. It
records the primary information on the program, the thresholds,
the issues and risks, the alternatives, the reviews, the
rationale for the decisions, the af fordability of the system,
and finally the decision of the Secretary of Defense. The
DCP and the DSARC process are conducted in accordance with
DOD INST 5000.2, The Decision Coordinating Paper (DCP) and the
Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council (DSARC).
E , DEMAND
The demand for Naval ships systems is a function of
the perception of the need by the Department of Defense, the
President and Congress and the value of the Weapons procure-
ment program in relation to other demands on the National
Economy. These factors regulate the input of dollars into
weapons system acquisition. The availability of design and
production assets and the competition of civilian products
govern industry's response to this demand.
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1 , Perception of Need
The classic view of the weapons system acquisition
process is that the Department of Defense in examining
intelligence perceives a change in the threat to United
States security. The United States' s strategy is then
modified, producing the requirement for a change in forces.
This change may take the form of an increase or decrease in
numbers, a change in the type of weapons or relative quan-
tities or lastly the need for a completely new weapon.
Programs are generated to fill the need which comes from the
difference between forces in being and force requirement.
Funding is then obtained from Congress to support these
programs. With the possible exception of the Polaris
program, no Navy program could be found by this author that
followed this classic pattern.
Three sources of generation of new program require-
ments are identifiable. The wear-out or technicological
obsolescence of the existing system is the most common reason
for the establishment of a program for a new system. Most of
the new ship acquisitions fall under this category. The
second reason for establishing a new program is to capitalize
on the development of new technology. This technology is
usually developed with no specific application in mind. The
advancement in laser technology and underwater acoustic
capabilities are examples of this form of program initiation.
Finally, the perception of a specific threat provides the
need to counter or match that threat. The development of
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the surface to surface missile and the close-in weapons
systems are examples of this form of need recognition,
2
.
Poli t ical Environment
The final authority on the recognition of need is
the President's request, as approved in the authorizing and
appropriating legislation of Congress. The President,
and finally Congress, must balance the stated requirements
of the Department of Defense against the requirements of all
other demands on the Government. These requirements are
further compared to expected revenues and the expected
results of a deficit (or surplus) or a specific size of the
economy of the nation. The status of the economy, the
national and international political situation and the desires
of numerous lobbyists and political groups are all balanced
against the Department of Defense rationale to arrive at the
final "need" for new or modified weapons systems.
The political environment also fosters the inclusion
of social legislation in the government procurement program.
The magnitude of defense expenditures make it a likely
candidate for attempting to accomplish social change. As a
result, numerous laws and regulations are created to assure
equal opportunity, minimum wages and the like within industries
supplying the government. In an attempt to control the pro-
cess, the legislative and executive agencies also create
numerous administrative requirements. Most of these are
designed to cure some problem perceived in the process, but
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all have the effect of limiting the freedom of action avail-




The final ingredient necessary to obtain a new
weapons system is the production capability. This is the
ability to gather together the men, material machines and
know-how required to actually produce the weapons system.
In this arena weapons system production must compete with
the multitude of other industry requirements.
Figure 16 is a representation of the basic inter-
relationships that exist in determining the supply and
demand for a weapon system.
F. FINANCING
Two areas of funding are of interest to the Navy weapons
system acquisition process. The first is the process by
which the Navy receives the funds to purchase the systems.
These funds are paid to the contractor in various fashions
to purchase his material and services. The second area of
interest is that of contractor financing. The contractor of
major weapons systems generally does not have sufficient
capitalization to accept the contract, manufacture the
system and accept payment upon successful delivery. As a
result, several methods of financing the capital equipment,
material and labor required to develop and manufacture a






















































































































1 . The Budget Process
Within the Department of Defense, the budget process
is divided into three phases: Planning, Programming and
Budgeting. The Planning Phase starts each year with the
issuance by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) of Volume I of
the Joint Strategics Objective Plan (JSOP). Following this,
the President, normally issues his annual Foreign Policy
Guidance. The two are integrated by the Secretary of Defense
(SECDEF), who issues his strategy guidance in the Defense
Policy and Planning Guidance (DPPG) document. Following
this, JCS issues JSOP Volume II. Based on JSOP Volume II,
the results of Selected Analysis and the reclama to the
DPPG, SECDEF issues the Programming Policy Guidance Memorandum
(PPGM) which contains Defense Policy and Force Planning (an
update of the DPPG), Fiscal Guidance, Materiel Support
Planning Guidance and Guidance for Program Objective
Memorandum (POM) Preparation. With the issuance of the
PPGM, the Planning Phase is considered complete.
The Programming Phase begins with the submittal by
JCS of the Joint Forces Memorandum (JFM) and by the individual
Department of Defense (DOD) components' Program Objective
Memorandum (POM). The POM is developed within the constraints
of the PPGM and the boundaries of the planning data presented
by the JFM, to satisfy all of the assigned functions and
responsibilities of the Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP).
Differences between the JFM and POM are addressed in a series
of Issue Papers prepared by the Program Analysis and
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Evaluation Office of the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
Based on these inputs, SECDEF issues tentative Program
Decision Memoranda (PDM) and after the reclama, amended PDM's. 1
This completes the Programming Phase.
Based on Budget Policies promulgated by the
President, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) provides
budget guidance to SECDEF, who in turn issues Budget Guid-
ance to the DOD Components. DOD Components submit Proposed
Budgets to SECDEF, who issues a series of Program Budget
Decisions (PBD) based on the Component Budgets, initial
Budget Hearings and reclama to the draft PBD"S. Any unre-
solved items remaining at this time are discussed in joint
meetings between SECDEF, JCS , and the Secretaries of the
various components. SECDEF makes his final decisions and
submits the proposed DOD budget to the OMB. The OMB combines
it with all other Federal Budgets and presents it to the
^ ^ • ^ -. (38:pp. 12-18)President for final review and approval.
The staff of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO)
analyzes the the Current Services Budget and the President's
Budget upon receipt. Hearings are conducted before the
various applicable committees on the critical issues, the
economic impact of the budget, the allocations and priorities
and the projected requirements of the various departments of
the government. The Budget Committees create the First
Concurrent Resolution based on the CBO budget analysis and
the projected requirements reports of other committees. A
conference report and a joint statement of managers allocating
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targets are adopted and other committees report all autho-
rizing legislation for the coming fiscal year. The applic-
able committees report authorizing, appropriating and
revenue bills and they are passed. Following this, the CBO
drafts the Second Concurrent Resolution, which must be
debated and passed before the beginning of the fiscal year
. - . . (78: pp. 16-19)
on 1 October. v l
l
'
2 . Methods of Financing the Contractor
There are five ways of financing Government contracts:
Private financing without Government guarantee, progress
payments in customary amounts, guaranteed loans, progress
payments in unusual amounts and advanced payments. Of these
methods, the most preferred is that of private financing
without Government guarantee. The contractor is able to
assign his right to payment to a commercial financial
institution as security to assit in obtaining this type of
loan. Due to the magnitude of the capital requirements,
however, most contractors require at least some financial
assistance from the government. Progress payments in
customary amounts, based on some measure of completion of the
system, are the preferred way to supplement private financing.
Private loans which are guaranteed by the Government are the
next most preferred method of financing. No federal funds
are expended under this method unless the contractor defaults.
The least desirable method is the use of advance payments
as they usually involve greater risk to the Government





Finally, Public Law 85-804 (as implemented by
Executive Order 1C789, dated 16 November 1958, Section XVII
of the ASPR and departmental regulations) provides authority
for granting relief to contractors in certain extraordinary
situations. By the terms of the Act, the President is
empowered to permit agencies concerned with national defense
to enter into or to modify contracts without regard to other
provisions of law. The three types of relief available are
amendments without consideration, amendments correcting





IV. TASKS REQUIRED IN SHIP ACQUISITION
A. SHIP ACQUISITION TASKS
As previously described, a ship is an integrated set of
individual systems designed to accomplish a mission. The
mission itself may be modified based on the results of
successive study and design iterations, but the end result




; The major categories of tasks
required to produce a, naval ship are: Development of
individual systems, integration of the systems, construction
of the ship, financing, and control of the process. Addition-
al tasks that are required, but are not directly related to
the development and construction of the ship relate to the
inclusion of the ship in the overall defense planning, the
planning itself and the tasks related to the initiation,
funding and control of basic research which ultimately
provides the technology base that leads to the individual
systems
.
The development of individual systems goes through the
phases of research or technology buildup, conceptual explora-
tion, validation, full scale development and finally adapta-
tion to the specific application. This process is described
in chapter 3. Of major significance is that individual
systems in all stages of development may be represented in
any one ship. A given ship design may include a sonar
system with an untried technology, a communication system
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that is in use in numerous existing ships and a myriad of
other systems whose state of development is somewhere between
these two. The only common requirement is that all systems
must be operationally ready when the ship is to be operation-
ally ready. Even this requirement is not sacrosanct, however,
for many modern ships are commissioned with "space and weight"
reserved for a system that is not ready for operational use
on a ship. The general requirement to have the systems
ready does have the effect of imposing markedly different
required rates of development for different individual systems
and a large variation in the degree of risk associated with
the inclusion of the different individual systems within the
ship design.
The integration of the multitude of different systems into
one ship is a task of major magnitude. Not only must changes
be made in individual systems to accomodate them to the ship,
but changes in one system can have marked effect on another
system. As an example, a relatively minor increase in the
power requirements of one or two of the systems can force
a commensurate change in the power requirements of other
systems or an increase in the power generation capability.
This generally means that additional volume and weight must
be alloted to power generation which will result in a growth
in the ship size or tradeoff with some other system or
systems originally allotted the space and weight. If the
ship grows then either a decrease in ship's speed must be
accepted or the propulsion power must be increased — with
further increases in volume and weight required. Design
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control must be exercised to coordinate these changes and
minimize the impact on the ship as a whole.
The funding of the ship is a major task in itself. This
starts from the budgeting of funds for research and develop-
ment for the technology, continues through the funding of
the ship itself and finally concludes with the payment to
the various contractors, including the settlement of any
claims which arise from the development and construction of
the ship and its systems. The sheer magnitude of the funds
expended to produce a ship and concern with the growth of
the cost of a ship have made this a task of particular
significance in today's environment.
Finally there is the requirement to control and monitor
the development and construction of the ship and its systems.
This can be roughly divided into control of the project by
external agencies and control of the development and con-
struction by the group of individuals directly charged with
the management of the project. In the case of a major
weapon system, this group is the Project Office. In the case
of a smaller system, it is a group within the systems command
which may be responsible for the development of several
individual systems.
The following specific listing of tasks related to the
procurement of a ship are taken from the Patrol Frigate
Preliminary Allocated Base l ine Design Plan, the Patrol
Frigate Project Net
,
' and the Management of Ship Design
at the Naval Ship Engineering Center, In
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addition, the author's experience on the new construction
crews of three ships is included. This description of tasks
is provided to allow comparison of individual tasks with each
other and to the applicable portions of the ship acquisition
structure
.
B. SYSTEMS ORIENTED TASKS
1 . Tasks Associated With Individual Systems
The development and manufacture of an individual
weapons system is an iterative process in which the design
features of the various components and finally the test
results are balanced to provide an operating system that
supports the needs of the ship. The individual tasks
required to produce the system are:
a. Technology development - Acquisition of the basic
scientific basis for the system and the engineering "know-
how" to construct it.
b. Specification creation - Development of an adequate des-
cription of the system and its components to enable the
Navy to communicate its requirements to the producer of
the system.
c. Component design or selection - Individual components
are selected that when aggregated will accomplish the
the purpose of the system. These components may be "off
the shelf" items which may be used in their existing
configuration or with modifications or they may be
designed for the specific application.
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d. System design and integration- The coordination of the
individual components to accomplish the purpose of the
system. The system design and integration, the component
design or selection, the specification creation and to
some extent the technology development all take place
essentially simultaneously as a iterative process to
meet the system goals. The whole process, like the system
itself, is derived from a technology base.
e. Component manufacture.
f. Component test - Proof that the individual components
will meet the requirements of the system.
g. System manufacture - Physical interconnection of the
components to produce the complete system. The construc-
tion of prototypes at land based test sites or on board
existing ships is done to prove the system at various
points in the development process.
h. System Test - System testing begins with the testing of
a breadboard version of the system designed to prove the
system concept, through prototypes that prove the oper-
ability and capability of the system and finally to
the system as installed on the ship.
i. Software production - An array of technical manuals,
blueprints, preventive maintenance requirements and
other supporting documents must be manufactured to




2 . Integrated Sys tem/Ship Tasks
The following are tasks that cross system boundries.
These include not only the bringing of the systems as an
integrated whole, but the conceptualization design and
construction of the ship as an individual entity.
a. Concept formulation - At some point, the determination
is made that a new ship or ship type is required for the
active fleet. As stated earlier, this may result from
the obsolescence or physical aging of the existing ships
in the fleet, the advancement of technology or a re-
evaluation of the threat. Theoretically this need is
expressed in terms of operational need instead of
specific characteristics, but this is frequently not the
practice
.
b. Specific requirements determination - Given that there
is a specific need to counter a threat, that there is
the desire to exploit new technology or that replacement
systems must be procured, the requirements in terms of
cost, schedule and performance are developed for the
ship. In this context, specific requirements determina-
tion is used to mean development of the requirements
for a specific ship. In other contexts, the term
"requirements determination" describes the entire
process of establishing the need and requirements for a
new weapons system.
c. Inclusion in Defense Planning - When the need for an
integrated system has been established, the integrated
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system (ship) must compete with other Department of Defense
programs for a position within their long ranged planning.
This is a necessary prerequisite for becoming a viable
program
.
Authorization - Once the requirements for a specific
ship have been established, this ship must be "sold" to
Congress. Without the authorization of Congress the
ship may not be developed and constructed. It should be
noted that the requirement for authorization and later
appropriation exists for major individual systems them-
selves .
System Integration/Arrangement - This is the design and
manufacturing process of bringing the individual systems
together to make a whole ship. The degree of coordination
required to accomplish this task is significant. Design-
ers must not only ensure that a pipe from one system does
not run through the physical space occupied by a pipe
for another system, but that design goals such as
maintainability and accessability are maintained in the
ship as a whole.
Multiple system testing - Testing to ensure the compat-
ability of the ships systems. In some instances this has
been done initially in a land based test site to provide
information in advance of the testing on the ship itself.
Ship Testing - The testing of the ship as a whole. Most
of this testing is conducted at sea and includes operation
of all systems in all modes. The major tests prior to
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delivery of the ship are Builder's Trials, Acceptance
Trials and Board of Inspection and Survey (INSURV) Trials
h. Acceptance - Transfer of ownership of the ship to the
Navy
.
C. CROSS SYSTEM TASKS
Cross system tasks are those that apply to more than one
system. Although some of these may be applied to one system
at a time, like reliability assurance, they are applicable
to more than one system and are generally subject to an
effort that encompases all systems. Others, like Configura-
tion Management, apply to all systems by their very nature.
1 . Configuration Management
Configuration management is the control of the design
of the ship to ensure that it meets the final requirements
of the ship and that the various individual systems are
coordinated. Some form of design control, technical review
and change control are routinely used to accomplish this
end
.
a. Design Control is the coordination of the various design
groups to achieve a compatible set of design. In the
case of the Patrol Frigate, it was also used to limit
the growth of the ship. Critical control parameters,
such as space, weight and manning were identified and
allocated to the individual system. These were then
tracked throughout the design process to ensure that the
ship retained its desired size, displacement and
(87:p. 5-4)
manning . * '
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b. Technical Review is plans and blueprints by applicable
divisions to ensure that the goals of the design are
being met and that the individual system details remain
compatible with one another. This review also serves
the function of providing the opportunity to verify the
reliability, maintainability and availability of the
system or portion of the system being reviewed.
c. Change Control is required to ensure that changes in one
system are taken into account in the design of other
systems as well as insuring that changes to a part of a
system are accounted for in the remainder of the individ-
ual system. Some form of formal change control is rou-
tinely established that requires specific approval of
applicable people to change the system. Establishment of
formal change control too early slows down the design
process by requiring too much administrative effort to
accomplish the iterative process used to arrive at the
final design of the systems. If formal design control is
established too late, lack of coordination will create
costly inconsistancies between designs. An alternative
step between general design control and formal change
control is the establishment of control of interfaces
between systems. This method was used in the design of
,. ~ , •
-n 4. (86:p 251)the Polaris missile system. * '
2 . Test and Evaluation
In order to prove that the ship meets the requirement
imposed, the ship, the systems and the individual components
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must be tested. The most valid test would be to involve
the ship in a battle and measure its success. The two draw-
backs from this absolute measure of effectiveness are the
shortage of wars to be used for test purposes and the inabil-
ity to provide uniform test conditions and isolate the
effectiveness of individual systems or components. As a
result, tests are devised to verify operational character-
istics starting at the component level and working up through
evaluation of the ship as a complete entity.
Before the ship is assembled completely, quality
control is exercised to give reasonable assurance that the
final objectives of the ship construction will be met. This
measurement of inputs into the process of ship construction
is required to provide reasonable assurance that the final
product will meet the requirements. Many attributes can
not be measured or at least can be measured with significantly
more difficulty once construction is complete. As an example,
the quality of steel is much more difficult to measure after
the steel has been used in the ship and the cost of replacing
steel that does not meet the requirements for the strength
of the ship makes evaluation of quality before installation
mandatory
.
To accomplish the objectives of test and evaluation,
including quality control, requires facilities, personnel,
test equipment and appropriate procedures and plans. These
must be integrated to achieve the results desired and coor-
dinated to insure that they minimize the impact on the ship
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schedule. The cost of the testing should be weighed against
the confidence derived from the testing to establish what




When a ship is delivered to the Navy, personnel must
be allocated to operate and maintain the ship. They must
further be trained in the techniques required to operate and
maintain the ship. Depending on the uniqueness of the ship
and its systems, the training for operation and maintenance
can be a lengthy and difficult process. As a result, the
manning requirements for the new ship in terms of personnel
with specific talents must be anticipated well ahead of
time and plans must be made to fulfill the requirements of
the new ship. This is even more difficult for a nuclear
powered ship where the requirement exists that the ship be
operated by a Navy crew starting with the very first stages




Reliability, Maintainability and Availability
A ship or system that is incapable of operating when
called upon is obviously incapable of meeting its operational
requirements. Hence a need exists to provide systems that
will not only measure up to their requirements, but will do
so reliably when called upon. A system that will meet its
full operational requirement only fifteen percent of the





Reliability is defined as the probability that a
system or product will give satisfactory performance for a
specified period of time when used under stated conditions.
Maintainability is a characteristic of design and installation
which is expressed as the probability that an item will be
retained in or restored to a specified condition within a
given period of time. When maintenance is performed in
accordance with prescribed procedures and resources. Avail-
ability is a combination of the reliability and maintain-
ability and is defined as the probabiltiy that a system or
equipment, when used under stated conditions, will operate
satisfactorily when called upon. Hence a required degree of
availability must be designed into the system and testing
must be done to prove that the availability goals, which are
derived from the reliability and maintainability, have been
. . . (10:pp. 5-15)
achieved . tri '
5 . Supply Support
Supply support includes the planning for and provision
of materials required for the operation and maintenance of
the ship's systems. Consumables are required for routine
operation of the system, including periodic preventive
maintenance. If the consumables are common to other systems,
the increased potential requirements must be reflected as an
increase in the quantities purchased. • If the consumable is
not common to other systems already in use, its demand must
be estimated and it must be purchased and incorporated in





The second type of supply support required is the
provision of repair parts for corrective maintenance.
Failure rates must be estimated and parts must be stocked
based on analysis of the effect on operational capability
of the failure, the cost of stocking, manufacturing or
purchasing the part and the length of time that will be
x
, -, . (10: pp. 52-53)required to obtain a replacement.
6. Maintenance Support
Both preventive and corrective maintenance must be
supported to ensure effective operation of the ship. In
addition to the spare parts support noted above, planning,
facilities, personnel, equipment and software must be
provided. The planning begins with the establishment of the
maintenance policy to be used on the systems and continues
through the details of providing the correct tools to accom-
plish the maintenance. With the distribution of on ship and
off ship decided, personnel with the correct types of train-
ing must be provided for and facilities must be established
or designated for the expected maintenance. In the case of
existing facilities, the present work load must be measured
and allowances must be made for the additional load incident
to the introduction of the new ship(s).
Finally, a wide spectrum of software must be provided
to give the needed direction and information to accomplish
the maintenance. This includes technical manuals, blueprints,
preventive maintenance requirements, data sheets and many
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other types of software. Without this type of support, repair




Throughout concept formulation, design and construc-
tion the various tasks associated with the ship development
and construction must be coordinated to ensure that specific
tasks are completed when they are needed to support the start
or continuation of other tasks. There are several systems in
use to accomplish this end, but the purpose of each is to
ensure that the prerequisites of a specific event have been
met at the time the event takes place. As an example, the
parts for a turbine generator must be manufactured or received
in time to support assembly, which in turn must be complete
in time to support the shipping date. The turbine generator
must be received in time to support an installation date that
is dependent on hull closure and/or system completion. System
completion is required to support system testing so that the
system will be ready to support ship testing — and so forth.
If there were no uncertainties in the development
and construction of a ship, the scheduling could be done
once and followed. In reality, equipment arrives late, parts
fail in testing, unforeseen interferences prevent simultaneous
accomplishment of two jobs, etc. This "type of occurrence
requires the schedule to undergo frequent revision to retain
its usefulness. Additionally, to be effective, it must show
the effect on other systems and on the ship as a whole of not
meeting a requirement at the time specified.
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8 . Operational Software Provision
To effectively use the ship and its systems, pro-
cedures must be established for its operation. Documents
covering the full range from tactical employment to operation
of a specific piece of equipment must be created. These are
derived from the initial planning and design of the ship and
its systems and should be revised as test results and opera-
tional experience provide better information about the systems
D. FINANCES
To be successful, a weapon system must have adequate
funding. The definition of what constitutes "adequate" for
a particular project varies widely with the point of view of
the person defining the appropriate level of funding, but
the obtaining of funding, the management of funds once
received and the disbursement of these funds are major tasks
in the process of development and construction of a ship.
The ability of applicable offices in the Department of
Defense to obtain and properly use funding have a significant
effect on the cost and performance of the ship.
Funding is not only a task, in that the mechanics are
required for ship acquisition, but it is a means of
communication and control as described in the previous
chapter. The tasks related in this sections are requirements
that the structure must accomplish.
1 . Budgeting Task
The first step in funding of a weapons system is
getting it included in the annual budget. This requires an
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annual defense of the project at each level of budget
review. This culminates in the presentation of the President's
budget to Congress and more recently the development of a
Congressional budget by the Congressional Budget office and




Technically "appropriation" is the provision by
Congress of funds to the Executive, Judicial and Legislative
Branches for the operation of the government, including
provision of funds for procurement of major weapons systems.
Used in the context of this thesis, it is the effort
necessary both by Congress and applicable portions of the
Executive branch to draft and enact the Armed Services
Appropriations Bill providing funds for the development and
construction of major weapons systems.
3 Allocation Task
Once the funds are appropriated, they are allocated
by the Department of Defense to the various services who
further allocate the funds to specific activities. Although
the funds are appropriated for a specific purpose, there is
sufficient freedom in the use of these funds, both in the bill
itself and in the practice of reprogramming , to allow move-
ment of funds from one project to another. Hence a project
office must insure that they actually get the funds and
further protect them from reallocation during the year. The
Offices of the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Navy,
the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Naval Material
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and the Chiefs of the various system commands must apply the
available funds to the uses that will, i„ thelr vlews
, most




Once the funds have been allocated, they are obligated
to various private and public organizations to procure the
goods and services that are required to obtain the ship.
The specific type of contract used effects the way in which
the performing organization will be paid, hence, in the case
of a private corporation, its profit on assets applied. In
the case of a public organization, this "business" is the




Payment or expenditure is the actual disbursement of
funds for the goods and services received. This is done in
accordance with the contract in the case of a private organi-
zation and is done by a transfer of appropriations and
subsequent disbursement by the perform,™"y m it i mg organization in
the case of public organizations.
6. Readj ustment Task
Frequently during the course of a contract or upon
completion of the contract there is a disagreement between
the government and the contractor over the terms of the
contractor. This results in an attempt by the contractor
the government or both to change the contract. Adjustments
™ay be made under the "Claims" provision of the contract
Public Law 85-804, Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals
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decision, Government Accounting Office decision or court
decision. The total process may delay final payment for
years
.
7 . Financial Management
The planning, directing and controlling the use of
funds at each level of management involved in weapons system
acquisition is a major undertaking. If the flow of funds
does not match the desired rate of work, costly delays or
loss of appropriated funds will occur. Staff organizations
at each level in the Department of Defense are charged with
controlling the funds and there is an increased awareness of
the necessity for careful management. There is an increasing
trend toward having business managers even in the Project
Offices
.
E. PROGRAM CONTROL AND MONITERING
If the Program Office is viewed as the focus of the ship
acquisition process, it is responsible to and acts under the
direction of those who provide the funds and for whom the
ship is being built. Senior offices in the Department of
Defense and the Office of the President issue general
guidance and specific instructions relating to weapons
system acquisition and procurement in general and the project,
specifically. Congress not only passes legislation relating
to procurement and the individual projects, but provides
direction in hearings and in meetings with congressmen and
members of their staffs. The courts provide opinions that
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act as constraints on possible alternative government-
civilian relationships.
The project organization, in turn, provides direction to
contractors and other organizations working on the project.
This takes the form of contract terms, memoranda of agreement,
specifications, conferences, etc. Status of the project is
provided by the contractor to the project and by the project
to the superior organizations to allow monitering of progress.
This same direction flow downward and information flow upward
can be viewed from any point in the chain from the taxpayer
through the Congress, the Office of the President, the various
organizations in the Department of Defense and the performing
organization (usually the contractor) until it finally
reaches the worker on the project.
Program monitering and control can be viewed as existing
in two principle areas -- fiscal and physical progress. These
two areas are obviously very much dependent upon one another,
but are frequently handled by two separate portions of each
organization involved in the weapons acquisition process.
1 • Expe ndi ture Monitering and Control
The notoriety of large cost overruns in major weapons
system acquisition has focused attention on the need to
adequately control expenditures. Lack of "real time" infor-
mation on expenditures has meant that a program could be in
serious trouble long before the appropriate managers realized
that expenditures were well beyond plans. Performance
Evaluation and Review Technique (PERT) Cost System and Cost
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Schedule Control System Criteria (CSCSC) are two methodologies
that were created to give the Project Manager better control
of expenditures relative to the performance of the project.
The specific financial direction of the contractor is in the
terms of the contract. Here the method of determining the
schedule of payment is described and the price of the ship,
including incentivation if used, is established.
Status of expenditure is routinely reported to
Congress via the Office of the Secretary of Defense in form
of the Selected Acquisition Report (SAR). Expenditures are
also reported in the normal fashion for appropriated funds.
Non-recurring reports are made based on investigations made
by the Government Accounting Office and the Defense Contract
Audit Agency.
2 . Program Progress and Control
The progress of the contractor is monitored by
local Defense Department representatives. In the case of
the prime contract for a ship, the agent for the government
at the shipyard is the Supervisor of Shipbuilding. Sub-
contracts are monitored by the prime contractor and progress
on government furnished equipment is monitored by the area
Defense Contract Administration Office.
The Selected Acquisition Report contains information
pertaining to the performance of the project in relation to
technical goals and schedule in addition to the financial
information. The Defense System Acquisition Review Committee
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reviews program progress prior to allowing the program to
progress to the next phase of development or production.
F . SYSTEMS
As previously noted, a ship can be considered a set of
systems that operate together to accomplish the mission of
the ship. Many of these systems are large enough and
expensive enough to have been developed under the auspices of
separate project organizations but all must be brought to-
gether and coordinated. The major categories of systems are:
1. Sensors - The detection systems that provide input infor-
mation to the weapon systems. Included: Air and surface
search radar, fixed and towed array sonar, electronic
surveillance
.
2. Combat. Systems - The weapons system of the ship. Included
Fire control systems, Weapon delivery systems, Weapons
themselves
.
3. Command and Control Systems - The systems used to coor-
dinate the various systems on the ship with each other
and with the systems on other ships. Included: Automatic
Command and Control, LINK 11.
4. Communications Systems - Means to communicate external to
the ship. Included: Visual signalling, secure and
unsecure radios, cryptographic equipment.
5
.
Interior Communications, Ship Control and Navigation -
The systems used to communicate within the ship and to
direct the ship. Included: Interior telephones, ship
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control information systems, inert ial navigation systems,
navigational data transfer systems.
6. Propulsion - The means by which the ship is propelled
through the water. Included: Main and auxiliary
propulsion systems.
7. Auxiliaries - The systems that provide the necessary
services to allow other ship systems to operate. Included:
Electric power generation and distribution, high and low
pressure air, hydraulics, air conditioning, damage control,
fresh and salt water cooling, degaussing, auxiliary steam,
deck machinery, replenishment equipment, ref regeration
.
8. Accommodation - Support of the crew. Included: Berthing
and eating facilities.
9- Support - Area required to provide space for the adminis-
tration and support of other systems. Included: Offices,
work spaces, spare part store rooms, ammunition storage
areas, fresh, dry and frozen provision store rooms.
10. Hull - The physical hull and items that related to the





V. TASK ACCOMPLISHMENT UNDER THE EXISTING SYSTEM
Specific examples are provided to illustrate the effects
of apparent mismatch of structure and task. Conclusions
relating to the mismatches are drawn in the following chapter.
A. THE PATROL FRIGATE
In September, 1970, OPNAV initiated a feasibility study
that resulted in a December recommendation that the "Navy
should expedite action on the new design escort ship... to
be built in quantity for a unit cost of about $50 million...."
NAVSHIPS considered this feasible and CNO approved proceeding
into the Conceptual Phase in January 1971. In early May,
CNO selected the payload characteristics, approved a lead
ship-follow ship concept in lieu of a more time-consuming
and costly prototype and set a provisional full load displace-
ment of 3000 tons. In mid-May, CONMASHIPS stated that the
3000 ton limit was unrealistic and suggested that a 3500 ton
limit was more practical, but felt that limiting cost was a
more appropriate control. In late May, CNO selected the
single shaft propulsion alternative, established a $45 million
upper limit of follow ship cost in FY 73 dollars and set a
(43")3400 ton upper limit on full load displacement. '
With this process, the Patrol Frigate became the Navy's
first "design-to-cost" ship. A "design-to-cost" weapon
system is one where the cost target is set before the design
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begins and is theoretically given equal consideration with
schedule and performance in tradeoffs. With the establishment
of a 185 man crew size, it became one of the most severly
constrained warships ever to be designed. High degrees of
automation, reliability and maintainability were required to
remain within the crew size restraint. Extremely effective
use of weight and volume were required to remain within the
displacement limits. These constraints, in the view of the
author, would require considerable innovation and a signifi-
cant degree of risk to complete the design and production of
the ship. The development estimate of the program was in
excess of $3 billion and had the direct interest of the Chief
of Naval Operations. The cost, the CNO interest and the
first attempt at "design-to-cost" combined to provide a high
degree of visibility for the project.
The lead ship was originally scheduled for delivery in
June 1977, providing a period of 6h years from approval to
proceed with the Conceptual Phase until completion of the
first ship. The resulting foreshortened development period
required a different approach to the procurement for the
traditional one. ' p ' } The follow ships were, however,
scheduled to start after completion of the lead ship. This
was intended to allow modification of design details as
required, based on the experience of the lead ship.
The design of the lead Patrol Frigate was done in four
stages: Functional Baseline, Preliminary Allocated Baseline,




"Functional Baseline (FBL) — The FBL, which was
developed by NAVSEC prior to the involvement of the two
shipbuilder participants, is essentially equivalent to a
preliminary design although it presents a greater level
of engineering detail in certain critical areas and includes
preliminary ILS, reliability and other technical support
studies. The FBL description is generally in an engineering
format rather than a contractual format, and formed the
basis for the start of the next phase of design—the
development of Preliminary Allocated Baseline (PABL)
.
Before starting the PABL, however, the FBL undergoes
extensive review by the Navy and the Shipbuilder partici-
pants to ensure its adequacy and accuracy."
"Preliminary Allocated Baseline (PABL) -- The next
technical baseline, PABL, represents an extension of the
results of FBL, and the production of the end documents in
contractual formats. The PABL was prepared by NAVSEC with
Bath and Todd (the two shipbuilders) participation and
Independent Contractor (Gibbs and Cox) assistance. It is
essentially equivalent to a contract design, but again is
somewhat more detailed in certain critical areas, and
includes preliminary technical support plans (ILS, reli-
ability, manning, etc.). It represents the Navy's and the
Technical Community's (NAVSEC and NAVSHIPS) version of
what the technical portion of the "lead" ship contractual
package should contain, and is quite similar to a con-
ventional contract design in format."
"Lead Ship Allocated Baseline (LSABL) — The PABL
package received extensive review by the Navy Material
Commands, COMCRUDESPAC/LANT , INSURV, and Bath and Todd who
submitted their comments to NAVSEC. All of the comments
were formally reviewed and adjudicated to decide which
should be included in the Lead Ship Contractual Package.
After decision and incorporation of applicable comments
the LSABL was produced, and formed the basis for negotiation
of the "lead" ship construction contract with Bath."
Detailed design — Translation of the LSABL into
drawings that can actually be used in the construction of
the ship was done by Bath, with assistance on a subcontract
basis from Gibbs and Cox. These designs, together with
equipment procurement, production planning and actual
construction experience from the "lead" ship form the basis
for the Follow Ship Allocated Baseline (FSABL) which is
the basis for the solicitation of competitive proposals
for the construction of the first block of "Follow" ships.
(67:pp. 87-88)
Although the Patrol Frigate was intended to be a "low
risk" weapons system acquisition, significant innovations
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were incorporated in both the acquisition process and the
technology of the systems themselves. The acquisition process
innovations were the employment of NAVSEC to create the ship
design, the involvement of two shipbuilders to ensure
producability , the "design-to-cost" concept, the use of
different types of contracts, appropriate to the risk involved,
as the development progressed, and the use of Propulsion
System and Combat System land based test sites to reduce
difficulties in the installation of the gas turbines and fire
control system in the "lead" and "follow" ships. Unproven
equipment included the 1000KW supercharged diesel generators,
the automatic electric system, the adapted Canadian 505 type
sonar and the MK 13 Mod 4 Guided Missile Launcher.
The Patrol Frigate Project Office (PMS 399) is an organi-
zation of 46 people charged with directing the development,
integration and construction of the Patrol Frigate. "Product"
oriented personnel are responsible for the lead and follow
ships. "Functional" personnel within the office are respon-
sible for technical direction, Test & Evaluation, Production
& Procurement Planning, Management (including financial) and
Integrated Logistics Support (ILS). Theoretically, this
office receives its direction from the Ship Acquisition
Division (NOP 37) of the Office of Deputy Chief of Naval
Operations (Surface Warfare) and from the Escort and Cruiser
Directorate (NSEA 93) of the Naval Ship Systems Command.
The Patrol Frigate Project Manager is also designated the
Deputy Project Manager for the Patrol Frigate in the Surface
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Ships Project Office (PM 18) of the Naval Material Command.
This does not create the problem that it could, as one person
holds the titles of both NSEA 93 and PM 18, but it does
present the interesting possibility of the Deputy Project
Manager for Patrol Frigates writing letters to himself as
the Project Manager of the Patrol Frigate Project. Thus the
project office is a mattrix organization within the mattrix
organizations of the Material Commands. This already com-
plicated chain of authority is complicated by the joint
roles of the Project Manager.
On the production side, the Project Manager theoretically
interacts only with the Ship Design Deivision (NSEC 6110)
of the Naval Ship Engineering Center (NAVSEC) and the Super-
visor of Shipbuilding for the prime contractor (Bath Iron
Works). During the early stages of Design, NAVSEC had a
design group, numbering about 40 designers, specifically
assigned to the Patrol Frigate. When the "Lead" Ship
Allocated Baseline was completed, this group was dissolved,
depending upon Bath Iron Works and Gibbs &, Cox for design
continuity
.
If the organizations relating to the Patrol Frigate
were true Weberian bureaucracies, then the interfaces listed
in the preceeding paragraphs would be the only ones existing
with the Project Manager. A review of ' two randomly selected
months in the Patrol Frigate Project Manager's schedule of
formal meetings showed the wide variety of interfaces


















Land Based Test Sites 2
NAVSEC (various codes) 3




















Clearly business is frequently not conducted through
the designated interfaces, complicating the communication
links between the Project Manager and the other principle
players considerably. A listing of all meetings and informal
contracts of the entire Project Office Staff over a longer
period of time would extend the above list manyfold. In
general, discussions with the staffs external to the Project
Office in NAVSEA, NAVMAT , OPNAV and the House of Represen-
tatives indicated that they felt that they served a directive
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function, providing no service to the Project Office. As
an example, the Reliability and Maintainability Directorate
(NSEA 98) staff of the Naval Ship Systems Command felt no
obligation to assist the project office in creating viable
Reliability and Maintainability Programs, but served solely
as an independent reviewing agency of the plans produced by
the projects themselves.
For the design of the Patrol Frigate, through LSABL, a
design group was created at the Naval Ship Engineering Center.
During the early stages of design development personnel were
drawn from various functional and staff branches to create
the group. Specific personnel from the staffs of the Naval
Supply Systems Command, the Naval Ordnance System Command,
the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, the Naval Air Systems
Command, the Naval Material Command and the Naval Ships
Command were designated as liason members of the design team.
They did not, however, move their offices to Hyattsville,
Maryland where the design was actually being done. ' '
These higher physical barriers have a tendency to reduce the
ability of the group to act in a concerted fashion.
As the design progressed, the design team increased in
size to about 40 people and changed its structure. The
functional branches relating to the actual design of hardware
were increased in size, but remained essentially the same
organizationally. Groups were added for management, integrated
logistics, test and evaluation and systems engineering. As
a result, the design team was no longer dependent on the
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functional branches relating to these disciplines. The
functional branches were then free to resume their role of
reviewers. Further, the formal designation of liason re-
., . . . . .. . . (52:p. 168)presentatives on the design team was deleted.
The Systems Commands and Bureaus, as well as the function-
al codes of NAVSEC exibit a high degree of organizational
complexity. Each branch considers their function effectively
independent of the functions of the other branches. The
Project Office in Naval Sea Systems Command and, while it
existed, the Design Team in NAVSEC were the major coordinat-
ing mechanisms. The feedback from the various NAVSEC codes,
in the opinion of the author, varied from mediocre to reason-
ably good. The feedback from the Bureaus and System Commands
could generally be characterized as late and over-optimistic.
1 . Personnel Turnover
It is generally recognized that personnel turnovers
during the course of the development of a weapons system
create discontinuities and losses of corporate memory that
act to the detriment of the project. All studies of this
phenomenum encountered by this author dealt only with turn-
overs within the project office. The Patrol Frigate Project
Office with three Technical Directors, two Integrated
Logistics System Directors, two Test Evaluation Directors
and two Ship Design Directors between project inception and
DSARC III was certainly subject to the problems associated
with personnel turnover. Discussions with the Deputy
Project Manager indicated that the lack of turnover of
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senior civilian personnel was not unique, as most had re-
ceived a grade advancement upon coming to the project. He
predicted that significant turnover would begin in the very
near future, as civilian personnel were looking for more
senior positions in projects that were growing and upon
which they could have a significant impact. Most of the
personnel were the type, in his judgement, who were most
satisfied in a developing design situation instead of a
production environment
.
Seldom discussed is the turnover of personnel at
the interfaces of the project. During the same period of
time there have been four different Patrol Frigate Program
Coordinators (NOP 371), four NAVSEC Design Coordinators, two
Deputy Chiefs of Naval Operations (Surface Warfare) (NOP 03),
two Chiefs of Naval Operations, four Deputy Commanders of
the Naval Sea Systems Command for Surface Ships, three
Chiefs of Naval Material, four Vice Chiefs of Naval Material,
four Naval Sea System Command Comptrollers, three Naval Sea
Systems Command Deputy Commanders for Contracts, three
Deputy Chiefs of Naval Material for Procurement and Pro-
duction (NMAT 02) and finally two Assistant Secretaries of
Navy (Installation and Logistics) (ASN( I&L) ) . In the opinion
of senior project personnel, the changes in NOP 03, NMAT 02
and ASN(I&L) were more significant to the project than the
changes within the project staff itself. As a minimum,
these new officials had to be made knowledgable about the
program, requiring effort and time to be expended by the
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perject personnel. Changes in management philosophy and
need perception on the part of new officials required modifi-
cation of both the management, of the project and the technical
requirements of the ship itself.
2 . Ships Service Diesel Generators
As originally envisioned, the Patrol Frigate was to
have four 750 KW ships service diesel generators. Loads of
1200 KW and 1350 KW were being estimated for the cruising and
battle conditions respectively. NAVSEC used the traditional
load growth factor of 1.3 in all categories except propulsion .
and steering, where 1.0 was used, to compute a cruising load
allowance of 1518 KW and a battle load allowance of 1713 KW.
The estimated load continued to grow as loads were better
defined until August 1971 when the cruising load was estimated
at 1569 KW and the battle load at 1746 KW. The decision was
made to attempt to reduce the loa,ds to bring the power re-
quirements within the capability of two generators with one
generator serving as a standby. The use of three generators
instead of four would provide a weight savings of 32,400
pounds in the diesel generator alone, plus the weight saved
in supporting systems. The cost savings for the generator
alone would be $160,000 per ship. By late September 1971,
the cruising and battle loads had been reduced to 1393 KW and
1408 KW respectively. Though this load was within the two
generator limit, routine load growth factors would bring the





Against the objections of the NAVSEC electrical
division designers, it was decided to change the growth
factors, allowing 1.3 growth only for Interior Communications
,
Ship Electronics, Ordnance Systems and Power Conversion
Equipment. This brought the load allowances to within 100
KW of the two generator limit and further conservation brought
the load allowance to below the 1500 KW limit by November
1971.
Betv/een November 1971 and March 1972, it was decided
to increase the generator capacities to 1000 KW by turbo-
charging the diesel and to go to an "all electric" ship
concept, deleting the auxiliary boiler with its space, weight
and cost. The electrical designers were uneasy about the use
of turbocharged diesels as they have decreased response and
less overload capability for the time required to bring up a
standby generator. Designers also returned to the use of a
1.3 margin in all but propulsion. By May 1972, it became
evident that a steam capability would have to be restored
if the load allowances were to fall within the two generator
limit. With the auxiliary boiler restored, the loads were
1334 KW (Cruise) and 1437 KW (Battle) with load allowances
of 1704 KW and 1834 KW, using the 1.3 margin.
In September 1972 it was decided to install a system
for utilizing the waste heat from the propulsion turbines
instead of the auxiliary boiler, which raised the cruising load
over 400 KW and the battle load over 100 KW. This resulted
in a cruising load allowance with full 1.3 margin in all
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except propulsion of 2106 KW limit <— over the capability of
two generators. Again to the dismay of the NAVSEC electrical
designers, the tightened growth limits were re-imposed and
the cruising load allowance was again within limits. Addi-
tion of electric space heaters and further definition of
equipment loads brought the cruising load allowance back up
to 2035 KW in February 1973, two months after the Preliminary
Allocated Baseline was completed. The actual cruising load
was 1920 KW at this time.
The Lead Ship Allocated Baseline was completed in
April 1973 and the design effort was completed at NAVSEC.
The design team was dissolved with the remaining functions
taken over by the individual functional branches of NAVSEC.
In the author's view, this shift of structure was accompanied
by a decrease in innovation and a loss of "corporate memory."
Interviews conducted by the author in February 1975 indicated
that the electrical designers associated with the Patrol
Frigate were firm belivers that a more traditional approach
to the electrical system should have been used throughout and
none of the rationale for earlier decisions could be found.
By December 1973, the cruising load had reached 2043
KW and the load allowance, even using the reduced load growth
factors, had reached 2154 KW. Addition of fin stabilizers,
special systems and changes in load factors (percentage of
time in use) of ordnance systems brought the cruising load
to 2245 KW in February 1974 and the Project Manager was
force to make the decision to add another diesel generator.
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The cost of the additional generator was $3,954,550 for the
lead ship and estimated at $1,310,000 for each follow ship.
Another aspect of the generating system aboard the
Patrol Frigate is the automatic startup, paralleling and
load assumption of the standby generator. Because of the
reduced manning, the system is designed such that loss of
one generator will cause the electrical system to shed loads
to remain within the capacity of the operating generators
and the "stand-by" generator will be automatically started,
paralleled with the running generators and assume its sha.re
of the load. The only ship in the U.S. Navy inventory with
this type of system is the DD963 Class destroyer, which does
not have turbocharged diesel generators. Discussions with
NAVSEC and Project Office personnel indicated that there was
no development program to produce and test this system in
terms of actual hardware prior to installation on the ship.
Testing of a single turbocharged diesel generator under
various loads and automatic startup is intended, but transient
characteristics will not be tested until the system is
actually installed on the lead ship. NAVSEC electrical de-
signer were very uncomfortable with the system and felt that
it would only be satisfactory when it "had a MILSPEC." They
seemed to the author to be incapable of handling significant
departures from previously used routines. Although they
seemed to recognize the inherent risk, they adopted a "wait
and see" attitude. The impression received by the author was
that if the system didn't work, they would be in a position
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of having been correct in their assessment. If the system
did work, they would routinize it by writing a Military
Specification
.
3 . Major Changes
Throughout the conceptual, preliminary design and
contract design phases of the Patrol Frigate acquisition,
there were numerous significant tradeoffs in characteristics
to achieve the desired combination of operational character-
istics and cost for the Patrol Frigate. In the author's
view, these tradeoffs represent the natural dialogue between
OPNAV, the user, and NAVSEA, the producer. A unique aspect
to this ship design, as described above, was the early
establishment of displacement, cost and manning envelope.
Some alternatives were put forward so late in the design
sequence, however, that they impacted the orderly production
of a contract design. As an example, the desire to change
from one LAMPS helocopter to two delayed the start of contract
design pending a study of the impact of the change. In
October 1973 the Lead Ship Contract for Detail Design and
Construction was awarded to Bath Iron Works based on the Lead
Ship Allocated Baseline completion in April 1973.
Subsequent to contract award, there have been 99
major changes (Headquarters Modification Requests (HMR)) in
addition to the diesel generator change described above.
Table V indicates organizational responsibility for the
changes and the effect, of the cost of the lead ship and each




Major Priced Changes to the Patrol Frigate
exclusive of diesel generator addition





Lead Ship Follow Ship
Project Office 16 - 793,.54 - 60.54
Bath Iron Works and
Other Vendors 19 + 455,.38 - 37.04
OPNAV 10 +1083,.46 +280,81
NAVSEC 31 + 904 ,21 +198.13
NAVELEX 11 + 67,.55 - 1.73
NAVSEA 04 (Gas Turbine) 2 + 41,.34 + 20.70
NAVSEA 06 (Ordance) 5 + 40,,04 + 8.82
NAVSEA 06 (Sonar) 2 + 17,,82
NAVSEA 98 (Reliability) 2 4 216,,45 + 10.27
NAVAIR 1 + 7,,80 + 3.14
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responsible changes that insufficient records existed to
trace the changes further than NAVSEC . The author recognizes
the strong possibility that a number of changes may actually
have been initiated outside the NAVSEC with NAVSEC acting
only as the agent starting the change. If, for instance,
a vendor discontinued the manufacture of a particular piece
of equipment after its inclusion in the NAVSEC design, the
change would be attributed to NAVSEC for specifying an item
of equipment that did not exist. Historical records do not
exist to show that the equipment was in production at the
time it was specified but later discontinued.
A review of these changes indicates that 37% were
initiated to correct deficiencies, 30% to accomplish improve-
ments in the existing design, 15% from changes in operational
requirements (including Reliability and Maintainability),
and 18% to accomplish program cost reductions. Most of the
cost reductions came from the Project office and the con-
tractors, with OPNAV, NAVSEC and NAVELEX making minor
contributions to cost reduction. Most of the changes result-
ing from changes in operational requirements came from OPNAV,
with the rest coming from staff organizations such as
NAVSEA 98 (Reliability & Maintainability). In relation to
this type of change, Deputy Secretary of Defense William P.
Clement, Jr. stated in his endorsement of Guided Missile
Frigate (FFG) Decision Coordinating Paper No. 97;
"I view the unexpected cost growth in GFE for this
program with concern. The Navy should extend the authority
of the FFG program manager so that the GFE program managers
are responsible to the program manager for cost as well
as configuration and performance ." (29)
183

The evaluation of the desirability and cost effec-
tiveness of these changes is beyond the scope of information
available to the author but the ability of organizations
clearly beyond the control of the Project Manager to make
costly changes to the project is obvious. The Defense System
Acquisition Review Committee decision relating to the LAMPS
III helicopter, for instance, caused changes in the Patrol
Frigate Program that have cost $283,700 for the lead ship
and $80,000 per follow ship in modifications to the Patrol
Frigate. Discussions with LAMPS personnel indicated that
this cost was not being included in the cost of the LAMPS III
program
.
Unless great care is exercised by senior officers in
OPNAV , the real effect of decisions external to the Project
Office will never be recognized, it will in any case be
reasonably well hidden as a footnote in reports to OSD and
Congress
4 . DSARC III Briefings
According to Department of Defense instructions, the
members of the Defense System Acquisition Review Council
(DSARC) are the Director of Defense Research and Engineering
and the Assistant Secretaries of Defense for Installation
and Logistics, Comptroller and Program Analysis and
Evaluation. The Assistant Secretaries for Intelligence
and Telecommunications are members for programs within
their area of responsibility and other key officials serve
as advisors to the DSARC principals.
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In preparation for a November DSARC III, the Patrol
Frigate Project Manager had to provide 23 briefings starting
in March of that year. Six briefings were given to NOP 37,
four to NOP 03, one to NOP 01C , one to NOP 43, One to NOP 090,
and two to the Vice Chief of Naval Operations. The Under
Secretary of Navy received a briefing relating to the sonar.
In the Office of the Secretary of Defense the staffs of
DDR&E and ASD(I&L) received two briefings, the Cost Analysis
Improvement Group two, the Director of Defense Test and
Evaluation two, General Starbird one and the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Installation and Logistics one
briefing. All of these briefings were in addition to scores
of private meetings with officials in the Naval Material
Command and the Naval Sea Systems Command.
Although the official instructions indicate a
reasonably simple process by which a production decision
(DSARC III) is obtained, this example provides an insight
into the lengths to which a Project Manager must go to obtain
a decision to let the contract and start production on fellow-
ships . This of course does not include the requirements to
obtain legislative authorization and appropriation for the
ships, which constitute an additional burden on the project
manager
.
This form of management provides a significant drain,
in the view of the author, of the resources of the project
manager. These resources would seem to be better used in
actually directing the project, leaving the coordinating




Two major interfaces were explored by the author in
interviews with people related to the weapons system acquisi-
tion process, but not directly related to the Patrol Frigate.
The Congress/Depa.rtment of Defense interface was explored
with members of the House of Representatives Armed Service
Committee and Appropriations Committee staffs and officers in
the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. The Material
Command/Chief of Naval Operations interface was the subject
of discussions with Project Managers in Naval Sea Systems
Command and Naval Air Systems Corrmmnd and officers in the
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.
The House of Representatives staff members generally
characterized the information flow from the Department of
Defense as good, but slow. They felt that the Department
of Defense was generally better managed than other departments
and that cost involved in Defense programs could be estimated
with reasonable assurance. Other departments were involved
in authorizations for which no reasonable estimate could be
provided (such as unemployment benefits, where the number of
unemployed is unpredictable) . They were also interested in
receiving more of the rationale behind Department of Defense
Decisions, specifically the Program Decision Memoranda and
Decision Coordinating Papers.
The staff officers in OPNAV, on the other hand, felt that
Congress was trying to get into technical decisions that
rightfully should be made by the Department of Defense. In
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relation to the Material Command, the OPNAV officers felt
that they were receiving information too late. They felt
that engineering decisions were being made that affected
the operational characteristics of the weapons system and
they didn't find out about the decision until alternatives
had been closed off.
The Project Managers generally felt that OPNAV was in
essense making engineering decisions that were the perogative
of the Project Manager. The extent of the arms length
relationship between the Project Manager and his OPNAV
contact varied significantly from project to project. In
some cases the Project Manager characterized his OPNAV
counterpart as a bothersome meddler and the OPNAV contact
characterized the Project Manager as and independent who
kept OPNAV "in the dark" unless there was a real problem.
In other cases, both the Project Manager and the OPNAV
contact felt they were a team, dependent upon each other and
the adequacy of information flow between the two offices.
One other problem was frequently mentioned -- lack of
"corporate memory." Legislative staff members had all been
in their jobs long enough so that they felt no personnal
problem this way, but they felt that there was a distinct
problem in the Department of Defense with the loss of know-
ledge that they felt results from the constant turnover of
personnel. They noted that Department of Defense personnel
will periodically testify on a subject about which the
congressional staff member has more background. This,
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they felt, can be an embarressment both to the DOD staff
member and to the Congressional Committee. The Project
Managers who have been in the position for longer than two
or three years felt that turnovers in senior Material
Command, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Office
of the Secretaries of Navy and Defense positions required
a great deal of time to brief the newcomers and that con-
stantly varying policies were disruptive to the orderly
acquisition of a weapon system.
These examples illustrate the existance of significant
problems at the interfaces between major organizations.
The need to stabilize the key personnel is also emphasized.
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VI - CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CORRELATION OF STRUCTURE AND TASK
Based on review of existing literature and observation
of organizations within the structure of the ships acquisi-
tion process, the author came to the conclusion that the
structure was at variance with the task being performed.
This will be illustrated with a specific example from the
Patrol Frigate acquisition. The general character of the
ships acquisition structure and tasks will then be examined.
Finally, conclusions will be drawn relating to the correlation
between the tasks common to developing and constructing any
naval ship and the structure of the ship acquisition process
today
.
1 . Patrol Frig ate Diesel Generator Example
The organizations most significantly effecting the
decisions relating to the diesel generator configuration on
the Patrol Frigate were the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, the
Patrol Frigate Project Office, Naval Ship Engineering Center
(NAVSEC) and the functional divisions of the System Commands
responsible for providing the individual ship systems. The
individual organizations within this structure, except for
the Project Office and the NAVSEC Design Team, were permanent
bureaucratic heirarchies. Both the Project Office and the
Design Group started as fairly open organizations and moved
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gradually to becoming more bureaucratic as they grew in size
and age. NAVSEC and the Systems Commands, as bureaucracies,
were sharply divided by function providing high complexity
and minimal communication across system boundries. Organi-
zational dependence was low, as the major occupation of the
specific functional groups within the System Commands and
NAVSEC was the solution of individual system problems in
existing systems and the review of externally produced designs.
The nature of the design review seldom required the groups
to consider the effects of one system on the other systems
or on the ship as a whole. This structure, in the view of
the author, was well suited to the task of design review by
system and solution of independent individual system problems.
The task, on the other hand, was the complete design
of a ship under very stringent Office of the Secretary of
Defense design to cost guidlines and restrictive Office of
the Chief of Naval Operations design requirements. For the
first time since the creation of NAVSEC in 1966, the Navy
had to manage the integration of all of a major ship's systems,
remaining within tight cost, displacement and manning
constraints. In addition to the management risks inherent
in attempting configuration management for the first time,
under tight constraints, some technicological risks were
introduced with the inclusion of new, untried equipment.
The specific task under discussion was the management of
power demands on the electric system and the provision of
that power. The requirement for a design effort relating to
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this task began with the earliest stages of design and will
last until the detailed design is finalized. If constraints
of displacement and cost are to be met, the feedback within
the system must be strong enough to limit growth in individual
system power requirements to the point where the limited
generating system can meet the aggregate requirement.
In the author's view, the structure relating to the
design of the Patrol Frigate was appropriate to the tasks
associated with that process. This is based on the proven
performance of the team in holding down grov/th of the ship,
as expressed in terms of increasing displacement and cost, as
compared with other recent Navy ships. In order to live
within the design parameters, significant innovation in
managing a set of tasks previously never done by the Navy was
exercised by the group.
NAVSEC electrical designers, in discussions with the
author, indicated that the Patrol Frigate would have been
originally designed with four 750 KW diesel generators if
the routine design practices had been followed. Instead of
this, pressure from OSD and OPNAV to meet the cost and dis-
placement goals resulted in the deletion of one generator.
The small, innovative Design Group and Project Office were
living within these limits, particularly when it was decided
by the Project Office with the approval of OPNAV to accept
the technicological risk of the turbocharged 1000 KW diesel
generators. Lack of control within the structure by the
Project Office of systems produced by the functional
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organizations, particularly those of other system commands,
and dissolution of the Design Team allowed the power require-
ments to grow. In this case, the change in structure re-
sulting from dissolution of the design team was particularly
significant. This ultimately caused the return to four
generators. The core technology of the present groups
responsible for the generators is based on reviewing proposals
against existing technology (Military Specifications).
Provided with the risk (technological uncertainty) of the
turbocharged generators, these groups created a development
plan that did not include integrated testing in spite of the
fact that this is a potentially serious problem. In the
author's view, this is the direct result of assigning a
development task to a group that is used to considerably
less innovative tasks and carries with it a high probability
that preventable problems will occur. In other words, the
high risk task was not in keeping with the organizational
complexity of the structure.
2 . Ship Acquisition Structure
The ship acquisition structure as a whole exhibits
significant layering in decision making, a proliferation of
staffs and rules and high degree of organizational complexity.
Based on existing organization theory, this bureaucratic
heirarcy is suited for routine, repetitive tasks, but not
for tasks requiring major degrees of innovation. Further,
routinization of innovative tasks has proved singuarly in-






The tasks associated with developing and constructing
a ship are very complex, but if the ship is to be acquired
in an environment of little or no constraint it can be done
by separate functional organizations with little coordination
In this case, task dependence is very low requiring low
organizational dependence. If the ship is to be constrained
design, however, the need for innovation decreases as the
design progresses. This is based on the increasing detail




Comparison of Ship Acquisition Structure and Task
The structure and the task are not, in the author's
opinion, compatible. Innovation is required, particularly
in the earlier stages of development, and the system is
designed for the routine. High risk situations require an
open structure with freedom to operate, not a highly con-
straining bureaucracy. Project Managers with whom this
thesis was discussed were in general agreement that their
success was in spite of the system instead of because of it.
In the author's opinion, a significant protion of the
problems of ships acquisition result directly from this mis-
match between the ships acquisition structure and the tasks
it is required to perform. Until the basic structure is
modified, successes in ships acquisition will come only from
avoiding the system, not using it. Cosmetic changes to the
structure will result only in changing the names of the
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problems, as "claims" became "requests for equitable adjust-
ment," not in improving the performance of the system as a
whole
.
B . RECOMMENDAT IONS
1 . Staff Units and Overhead
The existing organizations must be examined to verify
correlation between the existing buffering, coordination and
communication units and current needs for these units. Each
unit must be observed in the light of its contribution to
the outputs of the system. A management control system that
would allocate staff expenses to specific projects is a
possibility, as this would allow evaluation in dollar terms
of the usefulness of a given staff to the project it theoreti-
cally support. Overhead allocation does have inherent
problems. The bargaining function of overhead allocation
may smear the true cost to a specific project. Transients
in allocation may also provide an improper view of the
overhead costs.
A second alternative, particularly for the services
provided by the functional organizations to the staff
organizations, is to allocate the budget to the Project
Office. The Project Office would then "buy" the services of
the functional organizations and staffs. Industrial funding,
where used, is a form of this type of management control.
Care would have to be given to the tasks performed by the
functional and staff organizations that are not related to
any specific project but are of overall use to the organization;
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such as administrative support to top management, are not
neglected. These would have to be recognized and funded
directly to the staff or functional organization. This
method would carry with it the inherent disadvantage that
the staff organization would have to develop a "sales"
function to convince the project organizations of the useful-
ness of their services, The principle advantage is that
the project organization, which is generally evaluated in
terms of its output, would base its "purchase" of services
on their value to the output. This would result in evaluation,
indirectly, of the staff and functional organization outputs
in terms of the output of the project office -- the ship.
2 . Management Continuity
The quick answer to the problem of continuity of
management is to keep the same management team on for the
duration of the development and production of the ship. The
obvious drawbacks are that it may not constitute the best use
of personnel and it is at variance with the manpower
philosophy of the Navy. Different types of people are more
effective in different settings of risk, and within different
. . (59:p. 318) _ „ , . , . ..
structures. One type of person does best in the
unstructured environment of basic research and concept
formulation, another in the risk prone stages of development
and still a third type of person in the routine of production
and operation. With this approach, turnovers would take
place at the beginning of the validation phase and at the
end of the full scale development pahse as shown on Figure 10.
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For a ship this would mean the core project management team
would start while the characteristics of the ship are being
determined and remain with the project until completion of
sea trial testing of the lead ship. With an orderly turn-
over, a second team would supervise the further construction
of follow ships. The earliest states of development of
individual systems would be under the management of a team
that would be brought into the project as the system was
incorporated into the ship. The management of the system
would then be gradually turned over to the office responsible
for the coordination of the set of systems in which the
specific system was contained. This structural change over
the duration of the project would provide conduct more suit-
able to each stage of the development and construction.
Pre-education of project personnel would foreshorten
the time required to adequately turn over the management of
a phase of the development and construction and would be
particularly helpful when turnover is required at other than
key points. Expansion and contraction of applicable subunits
is obviously desirable as their contribution to the develop-
ment changes, but discontinuation of a function, as the NAVSEC
Design Team was dissolved, is detrimental to the continuity
of the project. Finally, it should be noted that the control
of personnel turnover should also apply to the people occupy-
ing interface positions in other organizations. Specifically,
the officers in OPNAV, NAVMAT , NAVAIR, etc. that are assigned
to the specific position of interfacing with a particular
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project should also rotate reasonably close to the time of
major transitions.
3. Task Division
Another way to approach the apparent mismatch between
the structure and the tasks is to divide the tasks based on
the different types of management that are required. Under
this approach, system and subsystems would be developed
using existing platforms. These would be based on basic needs
such as "improved communications," "energy transfer" and
"new propulsion methods." The emphasis would be on new
directions instead of further refining existing technology.
When the basic concepts had been proved, the system would be
placed "on the shelf" awaiting the need for a ship. Ships
then would be developed and constructed based on existing
technology and a need that was related to the force require-
ments. The major obsacle to this program would be the
acceptance by the existing structure of the cost of systems
that either prove not worthwhile and are canceled in develop-
ment or that are developed and find no use in a ship because
of lack of force requirements.
The major advantage of this approach is that it
foreshortens the time required to develop a ship and reduces
the risk inherent to developing a system at the same time
it is being integrated into a ship. Another advantage is
that it allows a relatively level research and development
effort, independent of the fluctuating needs for ships.
197

4 . Further Research
Perhaps the most significant requirement is for
further, integrated research into the weapons system
acquisition process. The work started by the Commission on
Government Procurement needs to be extended to include not
only the effects of the different phases of weapons develop-
ment on each other, but of the different organizations and
facets of the structure on the process as a whole.
Using a systems approach, the author would recommend
that each organization be considered a transformation device
that converts inputs to outputs and is subject to command
inputs and feedback. The mechanics of how and why each
organization in the weapon system acquisition structure
translates inputs to outputs and how it responds to signals
would then be explored. Next an incidence mattrix, such
as the one shown in Figure 17 would be constructed and the
interactions between each pair of organizations and between
the organizations and the environment would be considered.
The inputs and outputs would be the same as those used for
the individual organization studies. Should additional
inputs or outputs be recognized, they would be fed back into
the individual organization model, which would have to be a
adjusted accordingly. For the model containing successive
pairs of organizations the organizations other than the two
being observed would be considered part of the environment.
The study would then proceed on to models containing
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as shown in Figure 18. With the study of each model, the
interactions and mechanics of operation would be considered
over the whole range ("time dimension") of the weapons
system acquisition process from the creation of the technology
base through the production and deployment of the system, It
is this author's contention that only by studying the actual
structural interrelationships of the entire weapons system
acquisition process over the full course of development of
the system can meaningful changes be made to change the con-
duct of the structure to improve the performance of the
process
.
In interpreting the results of such a study, great
care must be used. As with the Heisenberg Uncertainty
Principle in physical measurements, which states the more
exact the measurement the more the act of measuring disturbs
the object being measured, studies whose purpose is to change
the structure will be subject to biased responses from those
with a vested interest in keeping the structure intact or
from those who would profit from making specific changes in
the structure. To a student with no authority to change the
structure, authorities in legislative staffs, material command
staffs, the office of the Chief of Naval Operations and the
Office of the Secretary of Defense were extremely frank.
There is good reason to believe responses to the same questions
would have been more carefully couched had the author had












Figure 18 - Inputs and Outputs to Organization
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The other problem inherent to such a study, in the
author's view, is the effect of changes in themselves. The
numerous changes that have happened in the weapons system
acquisition structure have, in themselves, created transient
conditions which make observation difficult. In studying the
process, it is rarely, if ever, possible to observe a
weapons acquisitions project of any magnitude that has gone
through the entire development and production process under
one structure. The effects of the variation of structure
must be allowed for to the maximum extent possible, but





OF MAJOR SYSTEMS - BY
COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT
DECEMBER 1972
1. Start new system acquisition programs with agency head
statements of needs and goals that have been reconciled
with overall agency capabilities and resources.
(a) State program needs and goals independent of any
system product. Use long-term projections of
mission capabilities and deficiencies prepared and
coordinated by agency component (s) to set program
goals that specify:
(1) Total mission costs within which new systems
should be bought and used.
(2) The level of mission capability to be achieved
above that of projected inventories and
existing systems.
(3) The time period in which the new capability is
to be achieved.
(b) Assign responsibility for responding- to statements
of needs and goals to agency components in such a
way that either:
(1) A single agency component is responsible for
developing system alternatives when the mission
need is clearly the responsibility of one
component; or
(2) Competition between agency components is
formally recognized with each offering alter-
native system solutions when the mission
responsibilities overlap.
2. Begin congressional budget proceedings with an annual
review by the appropriate committees of agency missions,
capabilities, deficiencies, and the needs and goals for
new acquisition programs as a basis for reviewing agency
budgets.
3. Support the general fields of knowledge that are related
to an agency's assigned responsibilities by funding




(a) Basic and applied research
(b) Proof of concept work
(c) Exploratory subsystem development
Restrict subsystem development to less than fully designed
hardware until identified as part of a system candidate
to meet a specific operational need.
4. Create alternative system candidates by:
(a) Soliciting industry proposals for new systems with
a statement of the need (mission deficiency); time,
cost, and capability goals; and operating constraints
of the responsible agency and component ( s) , with
each contractor free to propose system technical
approach, subsystems, and main design features.
(b) Soliciting system proposals from smaller firms that
do not own production facilities if they have:
(1) Personnel experienced in major development and
production activities
(2) Contingent plans for later use of required
equipment and facilities
(c) Sponsoring, for agency funding, the most promising
system candidates selected by agency component
heads from a review of those proposed, using a team
of experts from inside and outside the agency
component development organization.
5. Finance the exploration of alternative systems by:
(a) Proposing agency development budgets according to
mission need to support the exploration of alter-
native system candidates
(b) Authorizing and appropriating funds by agency mission
area in accordance with review of agency mission
needs and goals for new acquisition programs
(c) Allocating agency development funds to components
by mission need to support the most promising
system candidates. Monitor components' exploration
of alternatives at the agency head level through
annual budget and approval reviews using updated
mission needs and goals.
6. Maintain competition between contractors exploring
alternative systems by:
(a) Limiting commitments to each contractor to annual
fixed-level awards, subject to annual review of




(b) Assigning agency representatives with relevant
operational experience to advise competing contractors
as necessary in developing performance and other
requirements for each candidate system as tests
and tradeoffs are made
(c) Concentrating activities of agency development
organizations, Government laboratories, and technical
management staffs during the private sector competi-
tion on monitoring and evaluating contractor develop-
ment efforts, and participating in those tests
critical to determining whether the system candidate
should be continued.
7. Limit premature system commitments and retain the benefit
of system-level competition with an agency head decision
to conduct competitive demonstration of candidate systems
by:
(a) Choosing contractors for system demonstration depend-
ing on their relative technical progress, remaining
uncertainties, and economic constraints. The
overriding objectives should be to have competition
at least through the initial critical development
stages and to permit use of firm commitments for
final development and initial production.
(b) Providing selected contractors with the operational
test conditions, mission performance criteria, and
lifetime ownership cost factors that will be used
in the final system evaluation and selection.
(c) Proceeding with final development and initial
production and with commitments to a firm date for
operational use after the agency need and goals are
reaffirmed and competitive demonstration results
prove that the chosen technical approach is sound
and definition of a system procurement program is
practical
.
(d) Strengthening each agency's cost estimating capability
for
:
(1) Developing lifetime ownership costs for use in
choosing preferred major systems
(2) Developing total cost projections for the number
and kind of systems to be bought for operational
use
(3) Preparing budget requests for final development
and procurement.
8. Obtain agency head approval if an agency component
determines that it should concentrate development
resources on a single system without funding exploration
of competitive system candidates. Related actions should:
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(a) Establish a strong centralized program office within
an agency component to take direct technical and
management control of the program.
(b) Integrate selected technical and management contri-
butions from in-house groups and contractors.
(c) Select contractors with proven management, financial,
and technical capabilities as related to the problems
at hand. Use cost-reimbursement contracts for high
technical risk portions of the program.
(d) Estimate program cost within a probable range until
the system reaches the final development phase.
9. Withhold agency head approval and congressional commitments
for full production and use of new systems until the need
has been reconfirmed and the sj'stem performance has been
tested and evaluated in an environment that closely
approximates the expected operational conditions.
(a) Establish in each agency component an operational
test and evaluation activity separate from the *
developer and user organizations.
(b) Continue efforts to strengthen test and evaluation
capabilities in the military services with emphasis
on
:
(1) Tactically oriented test designers
(2) Test personnel with operational and scientific
background
(3) Tactical and environmental realism
(4) Setting critical test, objectives, evaluation,
and reporting.
(c) Establish an agencywide definition of the scope of
operational test and evaluation to include:
(1) Assessment of critical performance characteristics
of an emerging system to determine usefulness of
ultimate users
(2) Joint testing of systems whose mission cross
service lines
(3) Two-sided adversary-type testing when needed
to provide operational realism
(4) Operational test and evaluation during the
system life cycle as changes occur in need
assessment, mission goals, and as a result of
technical modifications to the system.
10. Use contracting as an important tool of system acquisition,
not as a substitute for management of acquisition
programs. In so doing:
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(a) Set policy guidelines within which experienced
personnel may exercise judgment in selectively
applying detailed contracting regulations
(b) Develop simplified contractual arrangements and
clauses for use in awarding final development and
production contracts for demonstrated systems
tested under competitive conditions.
(c) Allow contracting officials to use priced production
options if critical test milestones have reduced
risk to the point that the remaining development
work is relatively straight-forward.
11. Unify policymaking and monitoring responsibilities for
major system acquisitions within each agency and agency
component. Responsibilities and authority of unified
offices should be to:
(a) Set system acquisition policy
(b) Monitor results of acquisition policy
(c) Integrate technical and business management policy
for major systems
(d) Act for the secretary in agency head decision points
for each system acquisition program
(e) Establish a policy for assigning program managers
when acquisition programs are initiated
(f) Insure that key personnel have long-term experience
in a variety of Government/industry system
acquisition activities and institute a career program
to enlarge on that experience
(g) Minimize management layering, staff reviews,
coordinating points, unnecessary procedures,
reporting, and jDaperwork on both the agency and
industry side of major system acquisitions.
12. Delegate authority for all technical and program
decisions to the operating agency components except for
the key agency head decision of:
(a) Defining and updating the mission need and the goals
that an acquisition effort is to achieve
(b) Approving alternative systems to be committed to
system fabrication and demonstration
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(c) Approving the preferred system chosen for final
development and limited production




Directives Applicable to the Acquisition of a Naval Ship
DOD Directive 5000.1, Acquisition of Major Defense Systems.




DOD INST 7045.7, The Planning, Programming and Budgeting
System.
DOD INST 7045.8, Procedures for Updating Program Data in the
Five Year Defense Program (FYDP).
SECNAVINST 5000.1, System Acquisition in th e Department of
the Navy
.
SECNAVINST 5420.172, Establishment of the Department of Navy
System Acqu isition Review Council (DNSARC)
SECNAVINST 7700.5, Selected Acquisition Report (SAR).
OPNAVINST 1500. 8G, Coordinat ion of Personn el Requirements and
Trai ning Programs with Material Developments
(Other than Air, Medical and Reserve) .
OPNAVINST 3500. 23A, Assembly
,
Organization and Training of
Crews for U.S. Navy Sh ips Commissioned
in Time of Peace.
OPNAVINST 3910. 16B, Research and Developmen t Planning Summary
(DP Form 163 4) for Research and Develop-
ment Program Plann ing Review .
OPNAVINST 3960.10, Tes t and Evaluation.
OPNAVINST 4441.12, Supply Support of the Operating Forces.
OPNAVINST 5000. 41B, Pre-Defense System Acquisition Review
Council (DSARC) Procedures.
OPNAVINST 5000.42, Weapon System Selection and Planning .
OPNAVINST 5100. 8A, Safety Program, Implementation.





OPNAVINST 5330.8, Navy Standard Workweek for Enlisted
Personnel
,
OPNAVINST 5420. 2J , Chi ef of N aval Operations Executive Board .
OPNAVNOTE 5430, Changes to the Organ i zat ion of the Office of
the Chief of Naval Operation (creation of OP-97)
OPNAVINST 7720.2, Classification of SCN Cost Estimates .
OPNAVINST C9 010. XXX, Approved Characteristics .
NAVY PROGRAMMING MANUAL
NAVMAT INST 3 91 . 1 0C , Implement ation Procedures for the Navy
Advanced Concepts
,
NAVMATINST 4000. 20A, Integrated Logistic S upport Planning
Policy .
NAVMATINST 4441.1A, Suppl y Readiness Objectives and Milestones
for Newl y Constructed Ships .
NAVMATINST 5430.49A, Maj or Surface Combatant Ships Project
Manager (PM-18)
.
NAVMATINST 7000. 14B, Improved Management Procedures within
the Naval M aterial Command for Sh j_p
Construction and Convers ion Projects
under the SCN Appropriation
.




NAVSHIPSINST 4341. 5C, Government Furnished Material for New
Construction and Conversion.
NAVSHIPSINST 4441. 92A, Supply Readiness Objectives and
Milestones; Implementing Procedures.
NAVSHIPSINST 54 30. XXX, Ship Acquisition Project, designation of .
NAVSHIPS 0900-031-0010, NAVSHIPS Fitt ing Out Manual .




Functional Baseline Description .
NAVSEC Preliminary- Allocated Baseline Plan.
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NAVSHIPS Advance Procurement Plan No. XXXt-XX^XX^-X .
Program PABL and Lead Ship Contract Review Plan
.
NAVORD Publication OP-3347, Navy Safety Precautions ,
MIL-STD 470, Maintainability Program Requirements for Systems
and Equipments
.
MIL-STD-480, Configuration Control-Engineering Change s,
Deviations and Waivers
.
MIL-STD- 78 5, Requirements for Reliability Programs for Systems
and Equipments .
MIL-STD-881, Work Breakdown Structure for Defense Materiel
I terns
.
MIL-STD- 88 2, System Saf ety Program for Systems and Associated
Subsystems and Equipment Requirements fo r.
MIL-STD-1375 (Navy), General Requirements for Provisioning.
MIL-P-15137C (Ships), Provisioning Technical Documentation
for Repair Part s, Special Tools and
Test Equipment for Electrical^ and
Mechanical Equipment
.
M I L-P - 1 4 14 , Preclusio n of Hazards from Electomagnetic
Radia tion to Ordance, General Requirements for .
MIL-Q-9858A, Quality Program Requirements.
DOD INST 7041.3, Economic Analysis and Program Evaluation for
Resource M anag ement .
Reference: (64




Documents Relating to the Planning, Programming and Budgeting
System
A. Department of Defense Planning Documents
"• Program/Budget Review Schedule - An annual Secretary of
Defense memorandum issued to announce the schedule of
significant events impacting on the DOD decision-making
cycle
.
2- Fiscal Guidance - Annual guidance issued by the Secretary
of Defense which provides the fiscal constraints that
must be observed by the JCS , the Military Departments,
and Defense Agencies, in the formulation of force
structures and Five Year Defense Programs, and by the
Secretary of Defense staff in reviewing proposed
programs
.
3« Five Yea r Defense Program (FYDP) - The official program
which summarizes the Secretary of Defense approved plans
and programs for the Department of Defense. The FYDP is
published at least once annually. The FYDP is also
represented by a computer data base which is updated
regularly to reflect decisions.
4. Joint Force Memorandum (JFM) - A document prepared
annually by the JCS and submitted to the Secretary of
Defense which provides recommendations on the joint




Joint Research and Development Objective Document (JRDOD ) -
A document prepared annually which provides the advice of
the JCS to the Secretary of Defense concerning R&D
objectives necessary to carry out the strategy and force
recommendations in the JSOP
.
6. Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (J SOP) - A document
prepared annually which provides the advice of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff to the President and the Secretary of
Defense on the military strategy and force objectives
for attaining the national security objective of the
United States. In addition to recommendations on major
forces, it includes the rationale supporting the forces
and assessment of risks associated therewith, costs and
manpower estimates, and other supporting data. The JSOP
is published in three volumes: I - Strategy, II - Analysis
and Force Tabulations, and III - Free World Forces.
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7. Prog-ram Chang e Decision (PCD) - A Secretary of Defense
decision, in prescribed format, authorizing changes to




8. Program Change Req uest (PCR) - Proposal in prescribed
format for out-of-cycle changes to the approved data in
the Five Year Defense Program.
9. Program Deci sion Memorandum (PPM) - A document which
provides decisions of the Secretary of Defense on POMs
and the JFM
1 . Program Objective Memorandum (POM) - A memorandum in
prescribed format submitted to the Secretary of Defense
by the Secretary of a Military Department of the Director
of a Defense Agency which recommends the total resource
requirements within the parameters of the published
Secretary of Defense fiscal guidance.
H- Program/Budget Decis ion (PBD) - A Secretary of Defense
decision in prescribed format, authorizing changes to a
submitted budget estimate and the FYDP
.
B. Navy Planning Documents
1 • Navy Strategic S tudy (NSS)
The NSS provides concepts and philosophy concerning
future naval contributions to national defense and to provide
basic guidance for Navy long-range and mid-range planning.
It appraises the world situation for these periods, outlines
the potential threats and the national and military policy,
objectives and strategy. It also summarizes the Navy's
roles and tasks. The NSS is issued annually on 1 January,
covering the period five to twenty years in the future from
the end of the current fiscal year.
It is the primary basis for the Navy input to the JLRSS
and JRDOD, provides a broad frame of reference for mid-range
planning and provides long range strategic guidance.
2 . Marine Corps Long-Range Plan (MLRP )
The MLRP sets forth a broad concept, supporting concepts
and planning objectives and serves as a basis for the pro-
gressive and evolutionary development of Marine Corps forces.
It provides guidance for Marine Corps long-range study and
developmental actions as well as a common basis for continuing
coordination with -the other services in defining landing
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force characteristics and requirements in the long-range
period
.
The MLRP addresses the period 10 to 20 years in the
future. The primary source for development of the MLRP is
the "Marine Corps Long-Range Study." That study utilizes
other appropriate studies, including the JLRSS and the NSS,
in appraising long-range strategic and technological forecasts
The MLRP addresses the transition between approved mid-range
objectives and those desirable long-range capabilities which
advancing technology provides, and future strategy may require
It treats qualitative goals rather than resource requirements
and structuring of the Marine Corps. It is subject to
review and revision every 5 years. There is an annual
review of concepts of operation, and organizational and
material objectives.
3 • Department o f the Navy Pl anning and Programming Guidance
(DQNPPG)
The Secretary of the Navy issues memoranda at appropriate
times in the PPBS process to provide guidance for planning
and programming actions. These memoranda amplify or supple-
ment SECDEF guidance as necessary, establish Department of
the Navy planning and programming policy, and identify areas
requiring special attention by the CNO, CMC and Civilian
Executive Assistants in the development of the Department
of the Navy POM. Additionally, these memoranda are the means
by which SECNAV decisions on CNO/CMC planning and programming
proposals are transmitted. In the aggregate, these memoranda
constitute the DONPPG.
4 • CNO Policy and Planning Guidance (CPPG)
The CPPG transmits the essence of the SECDEF ' s and SECNAV '
s
policy and planning guidance as it applies to the Navy, along
with the CNO ' s amplification of this guidance. It presents
the CNO ' s view of other factors such as changes in the inter-
national political scene, the military threat, domestic
attitudes and national aspirations which affect the long-
range direction of the Navy, and describes the ways in which
he hopes to meet the SECDEF and the SECNAV guidance while
moving toward the best mid-range posture attainable, The
CPPG is reissued at the beginning of each program development
cycle. The CPPG provides more specific guidance for the
Navy input to the JFM and the input to the Navy POM. It
presents the CNO ' s objectives for the future and lays out
ground rules for the development of more detailed alternative
ways of meeting these objectives.
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5 • CMC Program Policy and Planning Guidance (CMC PPPG)
The CMC PPPG transmits the essence of the DPPG and
DONPPG as they pertain to the Marine Corps. It addresses
the requirements of the national strategy on the Marine Corps
relating to readiness, force levels and modernization.
6. Extended Planning Guidance (EPG)
The EPG extends the CPPG, based on the results of SECDEF *
:
Extended Planning Annex (EPA), and provides guidance for
refining CNO long-range planning with regard to projection
of future development and operating costs. By extending the
planning horizon ten years beyond the FYDP , the EPG provides
a consistent Navy-wide frame of reference which, ultimately,
will assist in: evaluating acquisition plans; guiding long-
term R&D planning; and demonstrating af fordability of current
plans
.
7 • Marine Corps Mid-Range Objectives Plan (MMROP)
The MMROP develops concepts, objectives, and requirements
necessary to accomplish statutory missions and projects them
over a 10-year period beginning one fiscal year after the
fiscal year of publication. The MMROP provides mid-range
objectives guidance to Marine Corps commands, and information
to the DOD
;
JCS , and Unified and Specified Commands.
Additionally, the MMROP serves as a basis for Marine Corps
inputs to the JSOP and other PPB actions, and for Marine
Corps Research, Development and Studies efforts.
The MMROP contains an appraisal of the mid-range threat;
a summary of the strategy developed in the JSOP, modified
as necessary by subsequent national strategy guidance; a
summary of Marine Corps role and missions; and statements of
basic mid-range Marine Corps objectives. From these, a
concept of operations, supporting active and reserve objective
force structures, and operational objectives are developed.
These, in turn, are used as a basis for developing training,
installations, logistics and material, management systems
and research and development objectives.
8 . Navy Capab i lities Plan (NCP )
The NCP provides a statement of capabilities in support
of the JSCP and provides direction and guidance, as
appropriate, for: mobilizing, organizing, training and
equipping ready naval forces for prompt and sustained combat;
the administration and support of naval forces assigned to
Commanders of Unified and Specified Commands; Naval Forces
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not assigned to Unified and Specified Commands and planning
by Commanders of Unified and Specified Commands and their
naval component commanders for the employment of assigned
naval forces,
9 . Marine Corps Capabilities Plan (MCP)
The MCP is the Marine Corps short-range plan that supports
the JSCP. The MCP states the Marine Corps capability to
accomplish its statutory mission and assigned tasks during
the current fiscal year under all conditions of war. It
provides planning information and guidance to Marine Corps
subordinate commands for accomplishment of their assigned
tasks
.
The MCP displays force assignments made in the JSCP
and structure and dispositions of Fleet Marine Forces. It
provides plans for selective partial, full and/or total
mobilization of additional resources to meet the Marine
Corps general war posture. Mobilization plans include a
concept of mobilizing selected Organized Marine Corps Reserve
(OMCR) units and detachments to form task-organized units
specifically tailored either for deployment or augmentation.
Tasks and coordinating instructions for the various elements
of the supporting establishments are provided. The MCP is
updated at least annually.
10. Navy Support and Mobilizati on Plan (NS&MP)
The NS&MP contains policy and guidance for the logistics
support of the phased expansion of the Department of the
Navy in mobilization. The NS&MP supports the NCP and JSCP
by stating logistic capabilities for the current and eight
succeeding fiscal years under various conditions of war.
Objectives are stated in terms of major resources and fields
of endeavor, i.e., manpower, facilities, material and
research and development needs. There are three separately
bound supplements to the NS&MP; these are the Mobilization
Manpower Allocation/Requirements Plan (M-MARP) ; the Civilian
Mobilization Manpower Allocation/Requirements Plan (Civ-M-MARP)
and the Mobilization Construction Plan (MOBCON).
1 1 . Department of the Navy Five Year Program (DNFYP)
The Navy's portion of the DOD FYDP is summarized, dis-
played and distributed by the DNFYP. The DNFYP is structured
in terms of major missions and support, categories. It is
published and distributed by the Program Information Center
(D0NP1C). It is updated on a continuing basis and within the
Navy, represents the "approved" program.
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1 2 • CNO Program Analysis Memorandum (CPAM)
CPAMs are developed to present the CEB with an overview
of the approved DNFYP and possible alternatives thereto.
The individual CPAMs are: Strategic Forces, General Purpose
Forces, Command, Control and Communications, Support and
Logistics, Manpower and Training, and Summary CPAM.
Each CPAM describes the approved DNFYP and outlines the
capabilities to carry out the overall goals and objectives.
In addition, each CPAM identifies the major issues requiring
a CEB decision plus the alternatives available/proposed for
consideration in the current calendar year JFM/POM.
Alternatives are considered in terms of fiscal levels
prescribed in the CPPG. Subsequent to the CEB review and
decision, the CPAMs form the basis for JFM and POM develop-
m en t
.
1 3 . Program Analysis Memorandum (PAM)
The General Purpose Forces area comprises the major
portion of the total force structure. To provide an analytical
method of examinging each subarea, four PAMs are prepared
as follows: Sea Control/Projection Forces (Tactical Air);
Sea Projection Forces (Amphibious); Support and Mobility
Forces, and Sea Control Forces.
The individual PAM describes the approved DNFYP, reviews
capabilities and identifies major issues. The alternative
to obtain capabilities are discussed in light of fiscal
constraints. Each PAM is presented to the CEB for tentative
decisions to be incorporated in the CPAM for General Purpose
Forces
.
14. Resource Allo cation Display (RAD)
To assist in the analysis of the approved and proposed
DNFYP, a computerized model, the RAD has been developed for
displaying the allocation of resources. In the RAD, numerous
displays are possible. For example, resource allocations can
be displayed by the following categories: Force areas;
Major Mission and Support Categories; Function areas; PAMs;
CPAMs, and Organization entity.
15. Force and Mission Sponsor Plan (FMSP)
Each Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (DCNO) and Director,
Major Staff Office (DMSO) prepares and maintains an annually
revised/updated FMSP which sets forth, as a minimum,
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current FYDP approved force levels, FYDP procurements/
modification plans, reasonably achievable variations to the
FYDP plans, and a fifteen-year extended projection of those
plans. The baseline plan is constrained to the CPPG/EPG
fiscal guidance. The FMSP sets forth, as concisely and
coherently as feasible, the sponsor perceived force/mission
needs necessary to carry out CPPG guidance and warfare,
mission, or support plans which contain guidance for
introduction of new or modernized systems along with user
requirement objectives. The FMSP serves as the basis for
annual CPAM issue paper inputs (and Sponsor Program Priorities
(SPP)). The extended projection will be the basis for the




Documents Relating to System Approval
The Decision Coordinating Paper (DCP)
a. The DCP is a summary document of not more than twenty
standard pages that provides management with a broad
overview of a major defense system program. The purpose
of this document is to support the DSARC review and
SecDef decision-making process throughout the program
life cycle. It serves as the document for (1) program
decisions by the SecDef, (2) recording the primary
information on a program: the thresholds, the issues
and risks, the alternatives, the reviews, rationale for
the decisions, and af fordability , and (3) recording
SecDef decisions.
b. A SecDef decision is consummated when he signs the DCP,
or issues a memorandum, authorizing the DOD Component to
proceed with the program or directing another course of
action. His decision set forth in the DCP establishes
the limit of authority delegated to the cognizant DOD
Component to conduct the program.
Research and Development Plan ( RDP)
The Director, Research, Development, Test and Evaluation
(DRDTE) prepares and maintains the RDP which serves as the
central repository of research and development planning
guidance. The RDP will be consistent with the CPPG, EPG,
and PPGM and ensures a balanced effort responsive to mid-
and long-range needs. The RDP is developed using the FMSP
and other requirements, and serves as the primary guide to
the research and development community for the establishment
of projects which are responsive to operational needs. The
RDP will be updated on a continual basis. The RDP will
enunciate operational problems raised by FMSP that may
require longer range activity in basic research and exploratory
development. The RDP consists of two parts:
Science and Technology Objectives (STO).
The sum of approved Operational Requirements (OR)
.
Navy Advanced Concepts (NAC)
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Advanced System Concept (ASC)
The NAC , an annual NAVMAT publication, consists of
proposals of future concepts, each called an Advanced System
Concept (ASC), arranged according to the fiscal year in which
the system could be ready, form a technological standpoint,
for initiation as an Advanced Development Project. The ASC '
s
will in many cases be a direct response to the STO's.
Information from all sources may be utilized to reflect
proposals emphasizing Navy and Marine Corps operational needs.
More than one ASC, each proposing a solution to an operational
problem, may be included for publication in the NAC. The
objective of the NAC is to provide candidate systems concepts,
for Advanced Development within a 5-year period, for use in
the POM process.
Each ASC will address a particular problem of, or offer
an opportunity for a specific new capability for the Navy
or Marine Corps operating forces. Selection of new projects .
for Advanced Development (6.3) consideration will be initiated
by the DRDT&E by selecting particular items from these
Candidate systems which are in consonance with the overall
plans for increasing the operational capabilities of the
Navy/Marine Corps. It is emphasized that items which are
already in the DNFYP are not submitted for the NAC.
The Chief of Naval Development (CND) selects ,. assembles
and publishes ASCs , submitted via a Systems Command, Burea.u
or office, for the NAC.
Each Systems Command, Bureau or Office may submit up to
30 ASCs, each limited to maximum of six pages, each year for
consideration for publication in the NAC document. These
are to reflect their perception of the most needed improvements
in Naval or Marine Corps operating capabilities. These
submissions are coded to one of the four RDT&.E planning
categories listed under the STO and in turn may be prioritized
within each category.
Operational Requirement (OR)
ORs are concise statements of operational needs. The OR
is the basic requirement document for all Navy acquisition
programs requiring research and development effort. The OR
solicits Development Plan (DP) from the Naval Material
Command or Bureaus, as appropriate. The OR is limited to
three (3) pages.
ORs are submitted for all development requirements.
Draft ORs or brief statements of operational needs or
requirements may be submitted by any fleet activity or Navy
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command via the chain of command to the cognizant Force and
Mission sponsors (F&M sponsors) with a copy to DRUT&E . When
ORs or statements of operational need are submitted by
activities located outside the local Washington area the
originating activity is informed of the action contemplated
by the cognizant F&M sponsor.
All ORs are concurred in by cognizant F&M sponsors and
Director, Navy Program Planning, and promulgated by DRDT&E.
ORs which clearly will lead to major weapon system acquisitions
or will require costly R&D programs or early conceptual effort
will be submitted to the CEB/ARC for concurrence prior to
promulgation. Current approved ORs are maintained in the
R&D plan until an NDCP , PM, or DCP has been issued. ORs are
reviewed periodically for continued applicability, revision,
or cancellation.
Development Proposal (DP)
The DP formally responds to the OR. DPs will be prepared
and submitted by the Naval Material Command or Bureaus in
accordance with the schedule contained in the promulgating
letter forwarding the OR. If major modification of the OR is
required, it will be so recommended. It is an iterative
process through informal dialogue between the OPNAV OR
sponsor and the CNM to prepare the DP, Through this avenue
it is possible to resolve all questions in relation to the
OR and the development of alternatives available to fulfill
the requirement. If it is considered necessary to formally
document modifications, a preliminary or partial DP is used
to set forth the problem. A revised OR is the normal response
Navy Development Con cept Paper ( NDCP
)
The NDCP supports and promulgates CNO decisions to
initiate conceptual development programs and establish
appropriate Advanced/Engineering Development line items. The
NDCP serves as the basis for preparing DCPs and PMs . NDCPs
,
DCPs, and PMs have the same basic format.
The NDCP defines program issues, the considerations
which support the operational need, program objectives,
program plans, performance parameters, areas of risk, and
development alternatives. The NDCP approval procedure
parallels that used for PMs and DCPs. Draft NDCPs will be
presented for CNO approval at the CEB or ARC meeting. If
required to further define the program or alternatives,
additional (iterative) CEBs or ARCs will be used to develop
the CNO decision (preferred alternative). For non-designated
Navy development programs an abbreviated NDCP is prepared if
required by CNO or the DMPP or DRDT&E for their approval.
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For designated programs requiring further approval by
high authority, the NDCP approval only authorizes extended
systems planning and conceptual effort, within Navy authorized
funding level as identified in the CNO approved program, and
as ratified by the ASN(R&D), until program initiation approval
is received. For SECDEF/DEPSECDEF or DSARC Principal-
designated programs, the NDCP cover sheet must include the
draft DCP or PM title. Approved NDCPs shall be promulgated
by DRDT&E.
Project Master Plan ( PMP)
The PMP provides uniform guidance for work planning and
scheduling, and basic documentation which coordinates
related Command effort for a specific project. The scope,
depth and detai] of the planning effort required for a major
project varies with the product/capability to be produced,
its complexity, magnitude, schedule and other factors. In
consideration of these variations the Guidance for the
Preparation of PMPs does not attempt to precisely prescribe
the planning effort required for each individual project.
Project Managers are encouraged to flexibly tailor the scope,
depth and detail of their planning efforts to suit the
particular needs of the Project. The Project Manager must
determine for his particular project the optimum depth and
detail of planning needed.
Science and Technolog y Objectives (STO)
The STO describes in broad terms the Navy's needs and
problems requiring R&D solutions, and are based on the Navy's
role, objectives, and threat anticipated in the 10- to 20-year
future time frame. One STO is developed and maintained for
each of the warfare/support areas shown under the following
four RDT&E Planning Catagories:
I . Strategic Deterrence
A. Sea-Based Strategic Warfare
II . Sea Control
A
.




D. Mine Warfare/Mine Countermeasures
III. Projection of Power Ashore
A. Amphibious Warfare






B. Support, Logistics & Underway Replenishment
C. Ocean Surveillance



























Termination of Contract for Construction of
Nuclear Attack Sub
Weakness in Award and Pricing of Ship Overhaul
Contracts
Two Proposed Methods for Enhancing Competition
in Weapons Procurement
Questionable Waiver of Pre Award Audits of Non
Competitive Price Proposals
CPSR's
Pricing of Bomb Bodies
Turnover of Managers Directing R&D Projects
Pricing of Changes Ships Construction
Production Prior to Completing Development
Same as 3063 - Covers "DASH" Project
DOD Career Program Procurement Personnel
Processing of ECP '
s
Use of Performance and Delivery Incentives
Same as 3063 Covers SQS-26
Competition in Emergency Procurements
Analysis of F 14/F 15 Contracts
Application of Should Cost
Pre Award Survey Improvements




3253A Inhouse Lab I R&D Program
3260 Multi Year Procurement
3288 Contracting versus Inhouse Procurement
3293 Shipbuilding Claims
329S RDT&E
3301 ADP Software Acquisition
3310 and
3310A Contractual Features S3A Program
3336 Review of F-14 Costs
333S Control of Ship Construction Costs Private Yards
3362 Truth in Negotiations
3366 Theory and Practice of Cost Estimating
3367 Feasibility of Constructing Weapon System
Price Indexes
3389 Test and Evaluate Major Systems
3423 Contract Termination in DOD
3434 Lockheed Claims
3444 Impact of Inflation on Cost of Proposed Programs
3453 Cost and Procurement Practices Litton, Pasc
3465 UYK-7 Computer
3499 Procurement of Steal without Cost and Pricing
Data
3543 Implementation of LCC Acquisition Technique
3597 Cost Growth in Major Weapon Systems
3009 Payments for IR&D and B&P Costs
3623 Operations and Activities of the Renegotiation
Board




















Benefits and Drawbacks of U.S. Participation
in Military Coop. R&D Programs
Industrial Management Reviews of Defense
Contractor Operations
t-
Executive Branch Response to Recommendations of
Commission on Government Procurement
Outlook for Production of LHA and DD963 Ship-
building Programs
Financial Status of Major Weapon Systems
Effectiveness of Testing on SES Program
Assessment of Should Cost Studies
Assessment of Army & Navy Should Cost
Dual Awards for Prototypes
Military Service Planning for Innovative
Research
ARPA Approach to Management of Technology
Transfer
Use of ACP's and TCP's to plan Technology
Base Activity
Improvements needed for Negotiating Prices of
Noncompetitive Contracts over $100,000
Cost Growth or CVAN Construction Program
Status of Selected Major Weapon Systems
Life Cycle Costing - It's Status and Potential
Use in Major Weapon Systems Acquisition
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